Abstract
This book investigates rural–urban income inequality in China, and the existing literature has examined this issue extensively. Whereas the purpose of this book is to explore from the rural perspective we believe the following theories and thoughts are closely related to our research.
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Notes
- 1.
These people used to be urban but were transferred to rural areas during political upheavals.
- 2.
The term ‘price-scissors’ is believed to come from Russia, and is so-called because the diagram of the relative prices of industrial and agricultural goods looks like a pair of scissors.
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Gao, Y., Fennell, S. (2018). Theoretical Background. In: China’s Rural–Urban Inequality in the Countryside. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8273-3_2
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