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Conclusions

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Part of the book series: Governing China in the 21st Century ((GC21))

Abstract

This chapter being the concluding chapter provides an overall recommendation for China’s future course with the ICC—to become a full member of the ICC or to engage in it more directly—based on the analysis of the substantive chapters both in the specific ICC context and the wider context. It provides a detailed account of the substantial incentives for China to join the ICC, which serves as a supplementary basis for the overall recommendation. The concluding chapter also uses the ICC as an example to reflect China’s engagement with global governance in general.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Statement by Ms Yanduan Li (19 June 1998), para. 37.

  2. 2.

    For potential armed conflicts in the South China Sea, see B. S. Glaser, ‘Armed Clash in the South China Sea’ (April 2012), online: Council on Foreign Relations http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883, date accessed 27 August 2017. For possible armed conflicts in the East China Sea, see Sheila A. Smith, ‘A Sino-Japanese Clash in the East China Sea’ (April 2013), online: Council on Foreign Relations http://www.cfr.org/japan/sino-japanese-clash-east-china-sea/p30504, date accessed 27 August 2017.

  3. 3.

    This can be seen from the 2009 Impeccable Incident between China and the United States that occurred in the South China; see R. Pedrozo (2009) ‘Close Encounters at Sea: The USNS Impeccable Incident’ Naval War College Review, 62, p. 101.

  4. 4.

    For China’s concerns regarding the crime of aggression, see Chap. 7, Sect. 7.3.

  5. 5.

    For the concerns of China regarding war crimes in internal armed conflict, see Chap. 6, Sect. 6.2.

  6. 6.

    For discussions on China’s concerns in relation to crimes against humanity committed during peacetime, see Chap. 6, Sect. 6.1.

  7. 7.

    See Dan Zhu (2013) ‘The Criteria of “Unwillingness ” under the Rome Statute and the Concerns of China’, Chinese Criminal Science, 3, pp. 106–115.

  8. 8.

    Complementarity was not clearly defined in Rome. It largely depends on how the Court’s practice fleshes out. However, the practice of the ICC has not borne out the Chinese concern regarding the ICC’s function as a human rights court of the traditional kind. For more discussions on complementarity, see Chap. 4, Sect. 4.2.

  9. 9.

    See J. Gurulé (2001–2002) ‘United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute Establishing an International Criminal Court: Is the Court’s Jurisdiction Truly Complementary to National Criminal Jurisdictions?’ Cornell International Law Journal, 35, p. 5, ‘The problem with the United States’ position is that its argument against the Rome Statute is outcome-based. In other words, the US opposes an ICC that could exercise jurisdiction over US soldiers, military commanders, and political leaders for the inadvertent, unintended loss of innocent civilian life caused during an international peacekeeping operation. That outcome is simply unacceptable to the US . However, what is the legal basis, if any, for the US’ opposition to the Rome Statute ? Stated another way, can the US’ outcome-based argument be converted into a legal argument? If so, perhaps the US could more effectively persuade other states parties to embrace its view, and provide a further basis for addressing the US’ concerns when the ICC’s Draft Rules of Procedure and Evidence are submitted for consideration at the first meeting of the Assembly of States Parties’ ; see also B. N. Schiff (2008) Building the International Criminal Court (Cambridge University Press), p. 179, ‘If US policy makers seek immunity from international jurisdiction over the three crimes, their legal arguments … against joining the [ICC] are irrelevant … If on the other hand, policy makers decide that adherence to the [ICC] would benefit the United States (by winning friends, by strengthening deterrence against international crimes , and by making available a new institution for serving US interests), then the legal arguments are also irrelevant, but the United States should join.’

  10. 10.

    See discussions in Chap. 5, Sect. 5.2.3.

  11. 11.

    See Chap. 6, Sect. 6.1.4.

  12. 12.

    Ibid.

  13. 13.

    Ibid., see also Chap. 4, Sect. 4.2.2.

  14. 14.

    B. Simma and A. L. Paulus (1999) The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View, American Journal of International Law, 93, p. 313.

  15. 15.

    For more discussions on jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals on war crimes committed in non-international armed conflict, see Chap. 6, Sect. 6.2.

  16. 16.

    A. Anghie and B. S. Chimni (2003) ‘Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts’, Chinese Journal of International Law, 2, p. 93.

  17. 17.

    ICC Statute, Arts. 124 and 121(5).

  18. 18.

    Ibid., Art. 112(1).

  19. 19.

    Ibid.

  20. 20.

    Ibid.

  21. 21.

    Ibid., Art. 36(4)(a).

  22. 22.

    Ibid., Art. 36(8)(a)(ii).

  23. 23.

    A. Kenneth (2009) ‘The Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended and Unintended Consequences’, European Journal of International Law, 20, p. 332.

  24. 24.

    2005 World Summit Outcome, para. 139.

  25. 25.

    Jianwei Wang (2005) ‘China’s Multilateral Diplomacy in the New Millennium’ in Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang (eds.) China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers), p. 159.

  26. 26.

    M. Lanteigne (2005) China and International Institutions: Alternate Paths to Global Power (Routledge), p. 172.

  27. 27.

    P. Kirsch (1999) ‘Keynote Address, The International Criminal Court: Consensus and Debate on the International Adjudication of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes, and Aggression’, Cornell International Law Journal, 32, p. 437.

  28. 28.

    Jurist, ‘UN Rights Chief Criticizes China for not Arresting Sudan President’, 30 June 2011, at: http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/06/un-rights-chief-criticizes-china-for-not-arresting-sudan-president.php, date accessed 27 August 2017.

  29. 29.

    By committing to an international judicial scrutiny of military actions, which is immune from the Security Council’s filter, China would be able to show its neighbours and the world its peaceful intentions.

  30. 30.

    GA Res. A/RES/71/248(2016).

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Zhu, D. (2018). Conclusions. In: China and the International Criminal Court. Governing China in the 21st Century. Palgrave, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7374-8_8

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