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Protecting Chinese Overseas Interests

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China's Private Army

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Abstract

The Silk Road historical legacy legitimizes China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a pure commercial endeavour that is not related to hegemonic strategy. The overall Belt and Road footprint has already witnessed several incidents due to a lack of corporate social responsibilities (CSRs), as well as the absence of policies devoted to avoiding environmental degradation, work-related accidents and corruption. These kinds of incidents have fomented tensions that resulted in confrontation between Chinese and local workers. Today’s global insecurity, ranging from terrorist threats to hybrid conflicts led by non-state actors, demands immediate policy responses. In this respect, it is imperative to address the normative approach to regulate the scope of the private security companies (PSCs) in light of new risks and security needs.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Reports of China’s losses in Libya are inaccurate, said Shen Danyang, spokesman of the Ministry of Commerce, on Wednesday. China does not have direct investments in Libya , only contract projects, he said. ‘No direct Chinese investments in Libya’ , China Daily August 25, 2011, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2011-08/25/content_13193258.htm

  2. 2.

    Circular n16 (2006) Circular n225 (2008), Circular n16 ‘Interim measures for the supervision and administration of overseas State-owned assets of central State-owned Enterprises’ (2011).

  3. 3.

    Author’s interview with international PSCs in Shanghai, November 2015.

  4. 4.

    ‘Sudanese petroleum minister Mohamed Zayed Awad said that Chinese companies control 75 percent of foreign investment in Sudan’s oil sector.’

  5. 5.

    ‘The government had requested $1.9 billion from the Chinese government to develop oil fields and infrastructure projects. Part of the funds could be used to reopen key oil fields in Unity state that has been shut down since a civil war began in December 2013.’ Sudan Tribune, ‘South Sudan seeks nearly $2 billion loan from China’ August 9, 2016, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article59880

  6. 6.

    After 54 consecutive months of year-on-year falls, the producer price index (PPI) rose 0.1% year-on-year in the month, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) October 14, 2016.

  7. 7.

    Author interview with the Chinese Contractors Association, Beijing September 2016.

  8. 8.

    China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation Limited (Sinopec) and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC).

  9. 9.

    ‘FDI on the Rebound.’ The At Kearney Foreign Direct Investment Confidence Index 2016. https://www.atkearney.com/documents/10192/8064626/2016+A.T.+Kearney+Foreign+Direct+Investment+Confidence+Index%E2%80%93FDI+on+the+Rebound.pdf/e61ec054-3923-4f96-b46c-d4b4227e7606

  10. 10.

    General Debate of the 70th Session of the UN official transcript of the Statement by H.E. Xi Jinping , president of the People’s Republic of China, https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/70/70_ZH_en.pdf

  11. 11.

    The State Council of the People’s Republic of China ‘President Xi delivers keynote speech at B20 summit in Hangzhou’, http://english.gov.cn/news/top_news/2016/09/04/content_281475432981211.htm

  12. 12.

    In August 2016, the Chinese outbound direct investments reached US$118 billion with an increase of 61.8% on the previous year. Ministry of Commerce, http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2016-08/17/content_26510134.htm Xinhua China ‘Jan-July Outbound Direct Investments surges 61.8%, (August 17, 2016), http://english.gov.cn/archive/statistics/2016/08/17/content_281475419422422.htm

  13. 13.

    ‘Xi said that the military must never get stuck in its old ways. It needed to change with the times. China’s military needs to put more focus on technology rather than force of numbers.’ Xinhua Shanghai Daily. ‘Army must change with the times’ December 5, 2016, http://www.shanghaidaily.com/nation/Army-must-change-with-the-times/shdaily.shtml

  14. 14.

    Hua Chunying ‘Remarks on Chinese Embassy in Kyrgyzstan Hit by Terrorist Attack. China strongly condemns the horrific terrorist attack against the Chinese Embassy in Kyrgyzstan . Terrorism is the common enemy for the international community, posing the gravest threat on regional countries. China also falls victim to terrorism . We will strengthen anti-terrorism cooperation with regional countries including Kyrgyzstan under bilateral and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) frameworks, clamp down on all forms of terrorism , and take tangible efforts to ensure the safety of Chinese institutions and people in relevant countries and uphold regional peace and stability.’ http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1393115.shtml

  15. 15.

    ‘It is the possibility of Chinese dual-use bases in the IOR that deserves the most attention. A commercial facility with low-level logistical support capability, a dual-use base is a risk-free way of establishing maritime presence in a region of interest, Abhijit Singh A ‘PLA-N’ for Chinese maritime bases in the Indian Ocean, PacNet #7—CSIS newsletter January 26, 2015, https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-7-%E2%80%98pla-n%E2%80%99-chinese-maritime-bases-indian-ocean

  16. 16.

    It refers to the Western and Japanese imperialism in China during 1839 and 1949. John King Fairbank ‘The Cambridge History of China: Late Chʻing, 1800–1911.’ Cambridge University Press. 1978.

  17. 17.

    Professor Wang Yizhou, vice dean of the School of International Studies of Peking University , has initiated a new diplomatic concept—‘creative involvement’ , calling on China to actively play a bigger role and voluntarily get involved in international affairs. Beijing Review ‘A new direction for China political affairs’ March 3, 2012, http://www.bjreview.com.cn/world/txt/2012-03/05/content_439626.htm

  18. 18.

    ‘Absorb and Conquer. An EU Approach to Russian and Chinese Integration in Eurasia’ European Council on Foreign Relations ECFR.EU May 2016.

  19. 19.

    Russian SEO Arms intermediary agency for defence products import/export, http://www.roe.ru/roe/eng_status.html

  20. 20.

    Chinese SEOs’ defence sector manufacturers.

  21. 21.

    ‘The commanders failed however to acknowledge the real lesson of Quetta: decades of Pakistani military and intelligence support underwritten by funding from quarters in Saudi Arabia for sectarian and ultra-conservative groups in Pakistan has divided the country almost irreversibly.’ James M. Dorsey ‘Political Violence and Sectarianism in Pakistan ‘RSIS Commentary.

  22. 22.

    ‘“Soon we’ll start hiring 700–800 police to be part of a separate security unit dedicated to Chinese security, and at a later stage a new security division would be formed,” Jafer Khan, regional police officer in Gwadar told Reuters.’ Syed Raza Hassan ‘To protect Chinese investment, Pakistan military leaves little to chance’ Reuters January 26, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/pakistan-china-security-gwadar-idUSKCN0VH06F

  23. 23.

    China ‘New Normal’ defines the transition from accelerated economic development of two digit GDP increase in the last three decades and a slower but steady economic development focused on 6–7% GDP growth per year.

  24. 24.

    ‘The Pakistan military, which has detachments of civil, mechanical and electrical engineers, has had decades of experience with large infrastructure projects and analysts say the army is well placed to supervise the corridor.’ Financial Times ‘China urges Pakistan to give army lead role in Silk Road project. Squabbles in Islamabad highlight obstacles to Beijing’s plans for transport and energy corridor’ July 21, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/5eea66c0-4ef9-11e6-8172-e39ecd3b86fc

  25. 25.

    In the last decade, Sino-Russian relations were considered to have reached a normalization stage based on pragmatic relationship eviscerated by any ideology driver, other than the common opposition to US unipolarity. Ibidem.

  26. 26.

    SCO sets blueprint for next decade, http://www.scosummit2012.org/english/2012-06/08/c_131640161.htm

  27. 27.

    ‘Much like the inexact art of Kremlinology—divining the fortunes of the Soviet elite—Kazakhstan has produced its own parlor game of tracking the ups and downs of various political players.’ Philip Shishkin, ‘Central Asia Report’, Asian Society (2012) p. 8.

  28. 28.

    Regional Anti-terrorist Structure (RATS), http://www.ecrats.com/en/normative_documents/2005

  29. 29.

    SCO members include China, Kazakhstan , Kyrgyzstan , Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan , while Afghanistan, India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan are ranked as observers and Belarus, Turkey and Sri Lanka as dialogue partners.

  30. 30.

    With a reduced number of effectives than a normal division (around 7000 men among conscripts and contractors), the 201st motorized infantry division ‘Gachinskaia’ has been deployed in Tajikistan—under CIS mandate—in three military facilities near the capital Dushanbe since the end of the Soviet-Afghan war. The last armoured personnel carrier that left Afghanistan in 1989 belonged to the 201st.

  31. 31.

    J.V. developed by Metallurgical Corporation of China and Jiangxi Copper Co. for an estimated investment of USD 3 billion.

  32. 32.

    Chinese vice minister of Commerce Gao Yan during the Second Meeting of China-Afghanistan Joint Committee of Economics and Trade in Beijing on 26 June 2015, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/significantnews/201506/20150601027796.shtml

  33. 33.

    The number ranges from 26,000 to more than 40,000 depending on the reporting source.

  34. 34.

    Interview with Ethiopian security expert. Singapore, December 2015.

  35. 35.

    Also known as Gansler report ‘Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations’ November 2007, http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/us_research_and_oversight/special_commissions/us_special_report_gansler.pdf

  36. 36.

    ‘Learning From Iraq : A Final Report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’ culminates SIGIR’s nine-year mission overseeing Iraq’s reconstruction. It serves as a follow-up to our previous comprehensive review of the rebuilding effort, ‘Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience.’ March 2013 Sigir website is close but the data can be found on https://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/sigir/20131001083907/http://www.sigir.mil/learningfromiraq/index.html

  37. 37.

    Ibidem.

  38. 38.

    Ibidem.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Co – Director Security & Crisis Management Program, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences—UNITO, Shanghai, China

    Alessandro Arduino

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Arduino, A. (2018). Protecting Chinese Overseas Interests. In: China's Private Army. Palgrave Pivot, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7215-4_3

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