Abstract
North Korea’s nuclear diplomacy is once again put into investigation. Pyongyang’s nuclear detonation in May 2009 puzzled many because the incoming Obama administration was showing its willingness to talk to North Korea. The chapter investigates the US policy actions rather than rhetoric to disclose the motivations of Pyongyang’s provocation. China’s voting for UN Resolution 1874 is another issue to be dealt with in this chapter. Given China’s pragmatic stance of non-interventionism, its support for tougher sanctions against the DPRK was unexpected and unprecedented. There has been ongoing debate between experts whether it was due to China’s increasing degree of caution toward North Korea or due to the need for China to weigh its international responsibility. Without discrediting either account, the chapter provides an illustration of how intra-role conflicts intrigued China to reassess its stance on North Korea’s nuclear program.
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Notes
- 1.
David E. Sanger, “Tested Early by North Korea, Obama Has Few Options,” New York Times, (25 May 2009).
- 2.
Siegfried S. Hecker , “Lessons Learned from the North Korean Nuclear Crises,” NAPSNet Policy Forum, (17 November 2010); Bruce Klingner, “Leadership Change in North Korea – What It Means for the U.S.,” Heritage Foundation: Backgrounder #2397, (7 April 2010); Blaine Harden, “N. Korea’s Belligerence Seen as Succession Drama,” Washington Post, (10 June 2009).
- 3.
Richard C. Bush III, “North Korea’s Nuclear Bargain,” Brookings, Opinions, (26 May 2009).
- 4.
BBC News, “North Korea Blows up Cooling Tower in Nuclear Concession,” (27 June 2008).
- 5.
Blaine Harden, “N. Korea Misses Deadline, but U.S. Response Is Restrained,” Washington Post, (1 January 2008); Peter Crail, “U.S.-NK Clash on Nuclear Deadline,” Arms Control Today, (25 January 2008).
- 6.
38 North, “China’s Embrace of North Korea: The Curious Case of the Hwanggumpyong Island Economic Zone,” (19 February 2012).
- 7.
Hankyoreh, “Nuclear Negotiators Nearing Agreement on N. Korean Declaration, (4 April 2008).
- 8.
Disarmament Diplomacy, “Deal or No Deal: Can the North Korea Nuclear Agreement Be Salvaged?”, Issue No. 88, (Summer 2008). Hill told Kim Kye-gwan during the US-DPRK bilateral meeting in March 2008 in Geneva that the United States could be “flexible on format” to pave the way for a compromise.
- 9.
Helene Cooper, “Past Deals by N. Korea May Face Less Study,” New York Times, (18 April 2008), p. A-8. Despite the absence of evidence that North Korea provided reactor fuel to Syria, Christopher Hill asserted the United States should stick with the steps toward denuclearization of the North (Nelson Report, 25 April, 2008).
- 10.
The actual rescission of North Korea’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism can be carried out 45 days after the President’s notification to Congress.
- 11.
Glenn Kessler, “N. Korea Agrees to Blow Up Tower at Its Nuclear Facility,” Washington Post, (2 May 2008). It was reported that “the destruction of the cooling tower is intended by U.S. officials to be a striking visual, broadcast around the globe, that would offer tangible evidence that North Korea was retreating from its nuclear ambition.”
- 12.
Ibid.
- 13.
KCNA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesman on DPRK’s Decision to Suspend Activities to Disable Nuclear Facilities, 26 August 2008.
- 14.
Hankyore, “N. Korea Intends to Continue Denuclearization Negotiations despite Remaining on Terror List,” (15 August 2008).
- 15.
Kyodo News, “N. Korea Starts Reassembling Nuclear Facility: Sources,” 3 September 2008.
- 16.
Glenn Kessler, “Far-Reaching US Plan Impaired N. Korea Deal, Washington Post, (26 September 2008), p. A-20.
- 17.
“By early June 2008, Pyongyang had fulfilled its Phase II commitments. Yet in a speech on June 18, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice disclosed that the United States was demanding to move ‘issues that were to be taken in Phase III, like verification, like access to the reactor, into Phase II’ before it would implement the modest Phase II commitments. This brought negotiations to an abrupt halt once again” (Gard 2013).
- 18.
Glenn Kessler, “Far-Reaching US Plan Impaired N. Korea Deal, Washington Post, 26 September 2008, p. A-20.
- 19.
Kim Chi-young, “Talks by the Heads of Six Party Delegations,” Chosun Sinbo, 18 December 2008.
- 20.
Author’s email exchanges with Prof. Christoph Bluth.
- 21.
Helen Cooper, “Bush Rebuffs Hard-Liners to Ease North Korean Curbs,” New York Times, (27 January 2008).
- 22.
Paul Richter, “Foreign Horizons Shrinking,” LA Times, (21 January 2008).
- 23.
Glenn Kessler, “Far-Reaching U.S. Plan Impaired N. Korea Deal,” Washington Post, (26 September 2008).
- 24.
Hankyoreh, “President to Maintain Current N. Korea Policy,” (6 December 2008).
- 25.
Jung Sung-ki, “Big Ticket Inter-Korean Projects Put on Backburner,” Korea Times, (7 January 2008).
- 26.
New York Times, “North Korea Faces Worst Food Crisis in Decade,” (23 October 2008).
- 27.
Yonhap News, “S. Korea Refrains from Spending on North amid Political Limbo,” (31 May 2009).
- 28.
Hankyoreh, “S. Korea Abstains from Human Rights Resolution on Iran,” (5 December 2008).
- 29.
Choi Sung-jin, “김태효의 대북정책 정밀폭격 (Kim Tae-hyo’s North Korea Policy: Surgical Strike),” Hankyoreh 21, No. 738, (5 December 2008).
- 30.
Shindonga, “[정밀해부] 협상파 vs 원칙파 대북정책 힘겨루기 내막 (Conflict between Hawks and Doves over North Korea Policy)” (1 October 2010). Available at: http://shindonga.donga.com/docs/magazine/shin/2010/10/01/201010010500012/201010010500012_1.html.
- 31.
Author’s interview with Mr. Moon-hee Nam (February 2014).
- 32.
Bo-geun Kim, “싱크탱크 시각: 19대 국회와 ‘남북관계의 갈림길’ (Think Tank’s Perspectives: 19th Parliament and inter-Korean Relations at Crossroad),” Hankyoreh Column, (30 May 2012).
- 33.
Young-hee Kim, “김영희 칼럼: 남북관계, 어디까지 후퇴하는가 (How Further South-North Korean Relations Would Be Deteriorated),” Joong’ang Ilbo, (14 November 2008); Oh Tae-gyu, “아침햇발: 한국의 ‘네오콘’ (Editorials: Korea’s ‘Neo-cons’),” Hankyoreh, (21 December 2009); Hwang Joon-ho, “박근혜 밀었던 ‘MB 네오콘’, 말 갈아탈 준비 끝? (Are the ‘MB Neo-cons’ Who Supported Park Geun-hye Ready to Assume the Roles?),” Pressian, (25 March 2011).
- 34.
Martin Fackler and Sang-hun Choe, “Modifying Conciliatory Stance, South Korea Pushes back against the North,” New York Times, (1 June 2009), p. A-4.
- 35.
It is the sister newspaper of The Korea Times.
- 36.
Korea Times, “Roh’s Popularity Jumps to 40% After Summit,” (7 October 2007)
- 37.
Moo-jin Yang, “정동칼럼: 남북이 함께하는 통일준비 (South, North Must Prepare Together for Unification),” Kyunghyang Shinmun, (20 January 2011).
- 38.
The Lee government and the ruling party of GNP believed a decade of engagement with the North Korea was fruitless and pursued ABR, “Anything But Roh” policy toward North Korea.
- 39.
Moo-jin Yang, “정동칼럼: 남북이 함께하는 통일준비 (South, North Must Prepare Together for Unification),” Kyunghyang Shinmun, (20 January 2011).
- 40.
Hankyoreh, “Lee’s North Korea Policy Appears to Turn on Terror List Removal,” (3 November 2008).
- 41.
Chosen Soren has functioned as Pyongyang’s de facto embassy in Japan whose members primarily consist of Korean residents in Japan with close ties with North Korea.
- 42.
Blain Harden, “With Obama in White House, North Korea Steps up Big Talk,” Washington Post, (4 February 2009), p. A-10.
- 43.
Martin Fackler, “Test Delivers a Message for Domestic Audience, New York Times (25 May 2009).
- 44.
Rodongshinmun, “Every Country Has the Right to Use Space Peacefully,” Available at: http://www.kcna.co.jp/calandar/2009/02/02-07/2009-0207-006.html.
- 45.
Author’s email exchanges with Mr. Ho-jye Kang (May 2014).
- 46.
William J. Broad, “North Korean Missile Launch Was a Failure, Experts Say,” New York Times, (5 April 2009). North Korea said through its official state media that what it claimed to be a communications satellite, Kwangmyongsong-2, was successfully put into orbit following the launch of a three-stage carrier rocket. In reality, its first stage fell into the East Sea as expected, but the remaining stages landed in the Pacific Ocean without lofting the rocket’s third stage and the supposed satellite into space. No object entered orbit, experts said.
- 47.
Blaine Harden, “N. Korea Discordant on Obama Era, Nuclear Arsenal,” Washington Post, (18 January 2009), p. A-22.
- 48.
Sang-hun Choe, “North Korea Says It Has ‘Weaponized’ Plutonium,” New York Times, (17 January 2009).
- 49.
Young-june Yeh, “Pyongyang Wants Envoy at Obama’s January Inauguration,” Joong’ang Ilbo, (12 January 2009).
- 50.
For Clinton’s hearing, see Council on Foreign Relations, “Transcript of Hillary Clinton’s Confirmation Hearing,” (13 January 2009).
- 51.
Pressian, “북한 위성 발사가 ‘G2’에게 묻는 것 (What North Korea asked to G2 with its Satellite Launch),” (27 March 2012).
- 52.
Elisabeth Bumiller and David E. Sanger, “Gates Warns of North Korea Missile Threat to U.S.,” New York Times, (11 January 2011).
- 53.
Kyodo News, “N. Korea Launches ‘Satellite’ Stirring Outcry from Japan, Allies,” 5 April 2009.
- 54.
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Barack Obama: Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic,” (5 April 2009).
- 55.
Bill Powell, “China Gropes for a Response to North Korea’s Nukes,” Time, (28 May 2009).
- 56.
Chris Buckley, “China Urges Cautious Response to North Korea Launch,” Reuters, (7 April 2009).
- 57.
Blain Harden, “N. Korea to Put American Journalists on Trial,” Washington Post Foreign Service, (30 March 2009).
- 58.
Ben Blanchard, “China Urges World Not to Overreact to N. Korea Launch,” Reuters, (5 April 2009).
- 59.
Ibid.
- 60.
Associated Press, “UN Security Council Condemns North Korean Rocket Launch,” (13 April 2009); Associated Press, “Japan Strengthens Sanctions against North Korea,” (10 April 2009). The Japanese government unilaterally imposed new economic sanctions and tightened the monetary transmission rules to North Korea.
- 61.
KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Vehemently Refutes UNSC’s Presidential Statement,” (14 April 2009).
- 62.
KCNA, “DPRK’s Stand on Satellite Launch for Peaceful Purposes Re-clarified” (26 March 2009).
- 63.
KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Vehemently Refutes UNSC’s Presidential Statement,” (14 April 2009).
- 64.
KCNA, “One More Successful Underground Nuclear Test,” (25 May 2009). To complement its deviant nature of role-making that repudiated international norms, the North Korean government also emphasized its special responsibilities of ensuring peace and stability on the Korean peninsula as well as the Northeast Asian region. Though its nuclear diplomacy was unquestionably a foreign policy learning toward an ego-dominated role, neglecting not only the generalized others of the non-proliferation regime but also the organized others of the SPT, the Kim Jong-il government seemingly cared not to be left with an even more tarnished reputation.
- 65.
Martin Fackler, “Test Delivers a Message for Domestic Audience, New York Times (25 May 2009).
- 66.
Charles Hutzler, “China Keeps US Waiting on North Korea’s Future,” Associated Press, (2 August 2009).
- 67.
Georgy Toloraya, “The New Korean Cold War and the Possibility of Thaw,” Japan Focus, (9 May 2009).
- 68.
Reuter, “Insight: Obama’s North Korean Leap of Faith Falls Short,” (30 March 2012). It was certainly the understanding of the new Obama administration regarding the North Korean nuclear issue.
- 69.
Sang-hun Choe, “North Korea Claims to Conduct 2nd Nuclear Test,” New York Times, (24 May 2009). The April satellite launch was to a great extent undertaken to test the Obama administration’s attitude toward and perception of North Korea, and the new US government failed the test. Washington’s response toward North Korea’s April satellite launch only made the North Korean leadership believe that the US hostile policy toward North Korea remained unchanged and that a nuclear detonation was an indispensable step to take.
- 70.
KCNA “DPRK Foreign Ministry’s Spokesman Dismisses U.S. Wrong Assertion,” (13 January 2009). North Korea also demanded removing South Korea from the US nuclear umbrella.
- 71.
Sang-hun Choe, “Tensions Rise on Korean Peninsula,” New York Times, (18 January 2009).
- 72.
Yonhap News, “Han Sung-joo: North Korea’s Nuclear Test Is to Secure Deterrence Capacity against the U.S.,” (8 June 2009).
- 73.
WikiLeaks cable: “Confidential Seoul 001386, Subject: Hyundai Chairwoman on DPRK Trip, Kim Jong-il.”
- 74.
Yonhap News, “North Korea News Letter No. 79: N. Korea and U.S. Agree to Hold Bilateral Meeting Before Six-Party Talks,” (5 November 2009).
- 75.
Pressian, “박근혜, 2009 년 힐러리 주장이 정답이다 (President Park, 2009 Hillary’s Agenda Was the Right Answer),” (4 February 2013).
- 76.
Author’s interview with Chinese researchers at CIIS in Beijing, (January 2014).
- 77.
The thermal plants use coal for their fuel, but the average operation rate of North Korea’s existing mines is below 30 percent. Despite its abundant coal reserves, the deterioration of coal mining facilities and equipment and lack of investment in new mine development due to its dire economic situation have decreased coal production. Concerning North Korea’s hydroelectric power plants, most of them were built during the Japanese occupation in the 1930s and are suffering from malfunction. See Kyung-soo Choi’s “The Mining Industry of North Korea,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 2, (June, 2011), pp. 211–230.
- 78.
NK Tech, “북한의 원자력 개발, 무엇을 위한 것인가? (North Korea’s Nuclear Development, What is that for?).” Available at: http://www.nktech.net/inform/newsletter/nl_tend_v.jsp?record_no=143&gubun=1.
- 79.
Jay Solomon, Alix M. Freeman and Gordon Fairclough, “Troubled Power Project Plays Role in North Korea Showdown,” Wall Street Journal, (30 January 2003). Projects were pursued without any plan for modernizing North Korea’s feeble power grids.
- 80.
NK Joins, “김정일의 ‘모기장 이론’ (Kim Jong-il’s Mosquito Net Theory).” Available at: http://nk.joins.com/news/view.asp?aid=2997473.
- 81.
Charles Pritchard, “A Guarantee to Bring Kim into Line,” Financial Times, (10 October 2003).
- 82.
After the first and the second nuclear explosions in 2006 and 2009, respectively, the North Korean government claimed that its nuclear tests would contribute to “peace and security” on the Korean peninsula and the region, which implies that the North Korean leadership under Kim Jong-il continued to perceive the region essentially according to balances and power distributions.
- 83.
Neil MacFarquhar, “U.N. Security Council Pushes North Korea by Passing Sanctions,” New York Times, (12 June 2009).
- 84.
Arshad Mohammed, “U.S. Says Will Never Have Normal Ties with Nuclear North Korea,” Reuters, (21 October 2009).
- 85.
Associated Press, “President Obama Calls North Korea A ‘Grave Threat’,” (16 June 2009); Hillary Rodham Clinton , “Remarks at the ASEAN Regional Forum,” Speech in Phuket, Thailand, (23 July 2009); Dan De Luce, “U.S. Will Never Accept a Nuclear-Armed N. Korea: Gates,” Defence News, (21 October 2009). The message regarding North Korea’s nuclear test was clear and consistent. In July 2009, while speaking in Thailand, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that, “The United State and its allies and partners cannot accept a North Korea that tries to maintain nuclear weapons.” Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, echoed the message during his speech in Seoul in October 2009, saying “We do not today nor will we ever accept a North Korea with nuclear weapons.”
- 86.
Roh Moo-hyun, “10.4 선언 1주년 기념 특별강연 (Keynote Speech: The First Anniversary of the 10.4 Inter-Korean Summit Declaration),” (4 October 2008). The video is available from http://youtu.be/f_Sh9ZilCyM. President Roh also perceived that fully joining PSI meant entangling South Korea into the US-China strategic competition. He advised that South Korea should vigorously maintain a balance between two great powers without heavily siding with one state.
- 87.
Reuters, “Japan to Ban Exports to North Korea after Nuclear Test,” (15 June 2009). Imports from North Korea were already banned after the nuclear test in October 2006. Sheila A. Smith, a Japan expert at CFR, explains that through the imposition of sanctions against the North Korean regime, Japan has gradually lost its direct (economic) leverage over North Korea, which constrains Japan’s ability to assert influence on bilateral negotiation with the North as well as to shape events on the Korean peninsula. See her article, “North Korea in Japan’s Strategic Thinking,” Asan Special Forum, (7 October 2013).
- 88.
Se-jung Chang and Jee-ho Yoo “China Reconsidering North Policies after Nuclear Test,” JoongAng Ilbo, (4 June 2009).
- 89.
KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Declares Strong Counter-Measures against UNSC’s ‘Resolution 1874’,” (13 June 2009).
- 90.
The efficacy of the UN sanctions is always debatable. Recently the UN study finds out the UN sanctions against North Korea have been mainly targeting trading companies and individuals registered in North Korea, while foreign companies as well as Korean transportation companies are playing key roles in sanctions evasion and violations, which has greatly limited the influence of the UN resolutions (Griffiths and Dermody 2014).
- 91.
New York Times, “China Aims to Steady North Korea,” (6 October 2009).
- 92.
NK Economy Watch, “China Approves Tumen Border Development Zone,” (23 November 2009).
- 93.
The statements are from the paragraphs 19 and 20 of the UNSC Resolution 1874 adopted by the Security Council on 12 June 2009. As the resolution appropriately allows exceptions for humanitarian assistance, Chinese government has long been suspected of exploiting the convenient interpretation of humanitarian assistance by handing over bundles of cash as humanitarian aid which the North Korean government may divert for its WMD development.
- 94.
Cheo Sang-hun, “Test Looms as U.S. Tracks North Korean Freighter Said to be Heading toward Myanmar,” New York Times, (22 June 2009, p.A-8). President Obama reiterated that the US military was fully prepared for any contingencies.
- 95.
Jay Solomon, “U.S. Pursue Financial Leverage over North Korea,” Wall Street Journal,” (30 June 2009). Ambassador Philip S. Goldberg was named as a coordinator to implement the UN resolution; the Treasury Department’s Stuart Levey and Daniel Glaser, the two main architects of the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) incident, were overseeing President Obama’s financial crackdown against North Korea.
- 96.
Glenn Kessler, “Analysis: North Korea Tests U.S. Policy of ‘Strategic Patience’,” Washington Post, (27 May 2010).
- 97.
KCNA, “New Analyst on U.S. Policy of ‘Strategic Patience’,” (5 June 2014).
- 98.
Glenn Kessler, “Analysis: North Korea Tests U.S. Policy of ‘Strategic Patience’,” Washington Post, (27 May 2010).
- 99.
Ibid.
- 100.
Ibid.
- 101.
With Stephen Bosworth , known as a tough negotiator, as a head of the team, Kurt Campbell who intensely distrusted North Korea replaced Christopher Hill as the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia; Deputy Secretary of the Department of Energy, Daniel Poneman, was also perceived as a “hardliner”; two additional advisors from the National Security Council (NSC), Gary Samore and Jeffrey Bader, clearly preferred sticks over carrots toward North Korea (Quinones 2009a).
- 102.
PBS Frontline Interview, (21 February 2003).
- 103.
Andrew Quinn, “Insight: Obama’s North Korean Leap of Faith Falls Short,” Reuters, (30 March 2012).
- 104.
John Delury (2013) denounces the conventional account that Obama had no choice but to adopt “strategic patience” because of North Korea’s provocations with the missile launch and the nuclear test right after his inauguration. He explicates there were the widespread views inside Washington that “Pyongyang would never give up its nuclear weapons, making negotiations about them a fool’s errand … aversion to investing political capital on an issue that produced such limited returns, intensified speculation that the North Korean regime might soon collapse in the wake of Kim Jong-il’s stroke … optimism that sanctions were getting ‘smarter’ and might be more effective in punishing Pyongyang,” which had been the general belief of the US neoconservatives.
- 105.
Pressian, “북-미는 터프외교 시동, MB정부는 어깃장 외교 (US starts tough Diplomacy toward North Korea while MB Government dissuades the US from engaging with Pyongyang),” 14 January 2009. http://www.pressian.com/news/article.html?no=57881.
- 106.
North Korea showed its determination that it would “never participate in the SPT” after having been condemned by the UNSC regarding its satellite launch in April 2009 (Glaser 2009: 4), even the Hu government “watered down” the importance of the SPT and became dubious about the resumption of the talks after North Korea’s second nuclear test (Glaser 2009: 9).
- 107.
All the Internet links were accessed on 28 April 2015 to confirm the availability.
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Hur, My. (2018). North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test. In: The Six-Party Talks on North Korea. Palgrave, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7113-3_5
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