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North Korea’s Second Nuclear Crisis and Inception of the SPT

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Abstract

The analysis begins with China’s commitment to the SPT, one of the most mentioned foreign policy shifts viewed in the SPT process. When most existing literatures endeavor to find out the causes for China’s foreign policy shift merely based on either realist or ideational paradigm, the chapter locates the most critical motives behind China’s proactive foreign policy by investigating what role conflicts occurred in a broader context of state interactions. In addition, we can see how it set a reconstruction of other states’ behavior in motion and exerted an effect on the social structure when China’s new role of “proactive mediator” was complemented and solidified by the rest of the five other states.

Ironically, “the second North Korean nuclear crisis initiated a new chapter in efforts to promote security and stability in Northeast Asia” (Snyder 2007b ).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Jing-dong Yuan (2008: 60) argues that Beijing’s hesitation, especially in multilateral arms control and disarmament negotiations, is because those could also impose constraints on its nuclear weapons programs. Wang Yizhou, Vice Dean of the School of International Studies of Peking University, asserts that Chinese involvement in international affairs has been and should be essentially different from Western powers’ interventionism in a way that it calls for active diplomatic mediation and economic assistance instead of intervention by force. His interview with Beijing Review can be found at: http://china-wire.org/?p=19221.

  2. 2.

    Address by President Kim Dae-jung of the Republic of Korea, Lessons of German Reunification and the Korean Peninsula. University of Berlin, (9 March 2000). In return, the Kim government asked the North to abandon any armed provocation against the South and give up ambitions to develop nuclear weapons and long-range missiles.

  3. 3.

    Under the Guidelines for the Uses of the Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Funds, the Kim Dae-jung government subsidized South Korean firms which were involved in inter-Korean projects.

  4. 4.

    The 2005 Public Opinion Survey of Unification Issues. Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification 2005.

  5. 5.

    Reiss (2001) argues that as none of the senior officials aggressively took the lead on North Korean issues, Congress had been filling the policy vacuum. According to William Perry who was appointed as North Korea’s policy coordinator, there would have been no chance of success in confronting the Congress on this (North Korean) issue. See PBS Front Line’s Interview with William Perry, (26 February 2003).

  6. 6.

    PBS Front Line’s Interview with William Perry, (26 February 2003). Perry explicates that the determination of the opponents to the Agreed Framework to use North Korea’s firing of the Taepodong missiles in 1998 as a reason to kill the agreement motivated the Clinton administration to review its North Korea policy. The interview script is available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/perry.html.

  7. 7.

    Gennady Chufrin, “The North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” Social Science Research Council, (12 July 2005).

  8. 8.

    Japan’s abduction issues will be discussed in full detail in Chap. 4.

  9. 9.

    Korea Herald, “N. Korea’s Diplomatic Campaign Targets EU Nations,” (3 March 2001).

  10. 10.

    EU Presidency Statement—Peace, security and reunification of the Korean Peninsula, (31 October 2000).

  11. 11.

    New York Times, “Europe and Bush: Early Storm Clouds to Watch,” (26 March 2001), p. A-3.

  12. 12.

    Reuters, “EU Delegation Begins Historic North Korean Visit,” (2 May 2001).

  13. 13.

    Washington Post, “N. Korea Leader to Continue Sale of Missile,” (5 May 2001), p. A-13.

  14. 14.

    European Union, “The EU’s Relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” (2002).

  15. 15.

    AFP, “Normalization of Japan-N. Korea Diplomatic Ties Inevitable: FM Kono,” (23 January 2001).

  16. 16.

    According to the 1956 joint declaration, Russia promised to return a Russian-held island to Japan after signing a peace treaty. PM Mori was keen on moving the negotiations forward by concluding the peace treaty and resolving the island issues, but Mori and Putin failed to narrow the difference in interpreting the 1956 pact. For detailed information, see the article by Kyodo News, “Mori, Putin Confirm ’56 Pact as Basis for Isles Talk,” (26 March 2001).

  17. 17.

    Author’s interview with Hitoshi Tanaka (September 2013).

  18. 18.

    Ibid.

  19. 19.

    Ibid.

  20. 20.

    Ibid.

  21. 21.

    Opening Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the Press Conference in New York, 13 September 2002. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/pfmv0209/press0913.html.

  22. 22.

    Ralph A. Cossa, “Koizumi’s ‘bold gamble’ in Pyongyang,” Asia Times, (17 September 2002).

  23. 23.

    Japan Times, “Rough going awaits postal reforms,” (30 April 2002).

  24. 24.

    Howard W. French and Ken Belson, “Showdown over Japanese Banking Reform,” New York Times, (28 October 2002). Additionally, Professor Kobayashi Yoshiaki at Keio University, during the interview with Hankyoreh Newspaper on 10 May 2002, said the approval rate of Koizumi plummeted as the Japanese public with high expectation toward the Koizumi government became greatly disappointed when Koizumi compromised with the ruling party over reforms to pass budget-related and other key bills. The title of the interview article is “선거제 개정이 개혁의 핵심 (The key is to change the voting system).”

  25. 25.

    Colin Joyce, “Japanese PM hit by new scandal,” Telegraph, (19 March 2002).

  26. 26.

    Victor Cha dubbed Bush’s North Korea policy as “Hawk Engagement,” which was implemented with a purpose of exposing North Korea’s “malevolent intentions” of developing WMDs and laying the groundwork for punitive actions against North Korea by engaging with the North. See his article, “Korea’s Place in the Axis,” Foreign Affairs, (May/June 2002).

  27. 27.

    Carla Anne Robbins, David S. Cloud, and Greg Jaffe, “North Korea Complicates Bush’s Axis of Evil Strategy,” Wall Street Journal Online, (18 October 2002).

  28. 28.

    After his second visit to Pyongyang, Koizumi even delivered Kim Jong-il’s request for direct bilateral talks with the United States at the 2004 G-8 meeting. See Yun Duk-min’s “Japan’s Dual-Approach Policy toward North Korea: Past, Present, and Future,” Social Science Research Council, (12 July 2005).

  29. 29.

    The first Japan–North Korea summit produced a joint agreement, the Pyongyang Declaration. The Japanese side expressed “deep remorse and heartfelt apology” for “the tremendous damage and suffering caused to the people of Korea through Japan’s colonial rule.” Pyongyang also pledged to “take appropriate measures so that regrettable incidents that took place under the abnormal bilateral relationship would never happen in the future.”

  30. 30.

    Gary Leupp, “Runaway Ally Joins the Axis of Evil, One More Neocon Target: South Korea,” Counterpunch, Weekend Edition, (27–29 November 2004).

  31. 31.

    These issues of the formation and change of South Korea’s and Japan’s role conceptions will be fully dealt with in Chap. 5.

  32. 32.

    President Bush’s personal dislike toward the Kim Jong-il regime is also widely known, and this negative attitude toward the North Korean regime was largely shared by the hardliners in the administration (Moon and Bae 2005: 46; Ness 2005: 244).

  33. 33.

    Statement on Completion of the North Korea Policy Review, (6 June 2001). Available at: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45819.

  34. 34.

    Since the Agreed Framework was signed between the United States and the DPRK, the North Korea policy became an “extremely partisan foreign policy issue.” Lindsey Ford et al. (April 2009) U.S.-DPRK Nuclear Negotiations: A Survey of the Policy Literature, Center for a New American Security, p. 15.

  35. 35.

    David E. Sanger, “Bush Tells Seoul Talks with North Won’t Resume Now,” New York Times, (8 March 2001).

  36. 36.

    PBS: Frontline. Interview with Stephen Bosworth: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/bosworth.html.

  37. 37.

    Reuters, (2 February 1994). In: Hyung-min Joo (2010) “Democratic Inconsistency in the North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper, No. 6.

  38. 38.

    New York Times, (24 October 1994). In: Hyung-min Joo (2010) “Democratic Inconsistency in the North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper, No. 6.

  39. 39.

    David E. Sanger, “Bush Tells Seoul Talks with North Won’t Resume Now,” New York Times, (8 March 2001).

  40. 40.

    American historian Melvyn Leffler (2011) argues in his article “September 11 in Retrospect” that the natural tendency to say September 11 substantially altered the US foreign policy seemed unjustified, since the Bush administration’s foreign policy was consistent with the long-term trend in US foreign policy. However, a few people like Thomas Henriksen (2012) argue that September 11 at least revolutionized the US foreign policy in Iraq and Afghanistan.

  41. 41.

    The Nuclear Posture Review of 2002, a classified Pentagon contingency plan, noted a possible use of nuclear weapons against seven countries including North Korea.

  42. 42.

    The Economist, “American is set on a brave but hazardous course,” (31 January 2002). The newspaper pointed out that even many of America’s allies do not meet the list of values that the United States pronounces.

  43. 43.

    See also Alex Wagner’s article, “Bush Labels North Korea, Iran, Iraq an Axis of Evil,” Arms Control Association, (March 2002).

  44. 44.

    PBS, Frontier, Interview with Robert Gallucci: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/gallucci.html.

  45. 45.

    Disarmament Diplomacy, “Bush ‘Axis of Evil’ Speech to Define War against Terrorism, Proliferation,” Issue No. 63, (March/April 2002).

  46. 46.

    The Economist, “American is set on a brave but hazardous course,” (31 January 2002). David Krieger, the founder of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, says Mr. Bush’s labeling North Korea as part of the Axis of Evil shows its “untenable nuclear double standard, as the Bush administration was not only seeking to change the US non-proliferation laws and international agreements in order to transfer nuclear technology and materials to India but also silent on Israel’s nuclear weapons program.” See his article, “North Korea’s nuclear test: turning crisis into opportunity,” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, (17 October 2007).

  47. 47.

    Wade Huntley at the Simons Centre for Disarmament and Nonproliferation Research argues that the Bush administration’s tenacious approach of “regime change” as the only long-term solution for North Korean nuclear programs can be explained in this context.

  48. 48.

    Record (2003: 11) explains that there is little chance that Saddam Hussein as a secular dictator, who had repressed radical Islamism in Iraq, would transfer his hard-earned WMD to the Islamic terrorist group whose weapons could be used against his own regime.

  49. 49.

    Record (2003: 12) quotes the comment by Frank Rich of the New York Times, saying that choosing a first-strike target would not eradicate “stateless, itinerant Islamic terrorism of the youthful Mohamed Atta generation.”

  50. 50.

    Henry C.K. Liu, “China and the US: Part 8: Bush’s Bellicose Policy on N. Korea,” Asia Time Online, (5 January 2007).

  51. 51.

    “Regime change” also served as a strategy to resolve the Bush administration’s role conflicts between the United States’ determination to attack Iraq and its moral responsibility as a member of the UN Security Council. The Bush administration said it would reverse its coercive approach toward Iraq if the Iraqi leader were to meet all the conditions of UNSC resolutions, which Saddam Hussein never assured. By February 2003, in a speech at the US think tank American Enterprise Institute, Bush publicly restated that his aim was to replace the Iraqi regime with a new democracy, which convinced North Korean leadership that “regime change” would be the foremost goal of the Bush administration toward the states designated as “axis of evil” by Bush. See Kenneth Quinones’ “Dualism in the Bush Administration’s North Korea Policy,” (2003).

  52. 52.

    Gavan McCormack, “Pyongyang Waiting for the Spring,” TomDispatch.com, (24 February 2005).

  53. 53.

    Tony Karon, “Why Talking May Only Make the North Korea Situation Worse,” Time, (26 August 2003).

  54. 54.

    Tong Kim, “Off the Record on HEU,” Korea Times, (8 April 2008).

  55. 55.

    See North Korea Chronology 2002 by Social Science Research Council for more details about the controversy over DPRK’s uranium-enriched program.

  56. 56.

    A declassified November 2002 CIA report to Congress claimed that “North Korea was constructing a plant that could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons when fully operational – which could be as soon as mid-decade.” However, a declassified August 2007 Director of National Intelligence report noted as follows: “We continue to assess with high confidence that North Korea has pursued efforts to acquire a uranium enrichment capability, which we assess is intended for nuclear weapons. All intelligence community agencies judge with at least moderate confidence that this past effort continues. The degree of progress toward producing enrichment uranium remains ‘unknown’, however.” See Hui Zhang’s “Assessing North Korea’s Uranium Enrichment Capabilities,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (18 June 2009). In addition, the October 2006 issue of Newsweek pointed out, quoting the then Pacific commander Adm. Dennis Blair, that the US intelligence had never detected “telltale emissions” from any centrifuges in the region.

  57. 57.

    Victor Cha (2002a, b) argues that the seemingly independent move by Japan was critical to the US decision to reinstate the visit by James Kelly, not because “the substance of the summit convinced anyone in the Bush administration of North Korea’s benign intentions,” but because “neither Kim Jong-il’s extension of the missile testing moratorium nor the vague statement on complying with nuclear agreements offered any real value-added for security types in terms of transparency on the regime.”

  58. 58.

    Don Kirk, “Koreas Begin Relinking Railroad Closed Since the War: A Cold War Barricade Tumbles,” New York Times, (19 September 2002).

  59. 59.

    Tong Kim, “Off the Record on HEU,” Korean Times, (8 April 2008).

  60. 60.

    Max Fisher, “Why Uranium Would Make a North Korean Nuclear Test Especially Scary,” Washington Post, (8 February 2013). According to Cheong Wook-sik, Director of Peace Net in Seoul, when seeing the large uranium enrichment plant, which was unveiled to the visiting team of US academics in November 2010, there is a high probability that North Korea had uranium programs back in 2002. See Cheong Wook-sik’s “우라늄은 제네바 합의를 깨부술 해머 (Uranium is the hammer to break down the Agreed Framework),” Pressian, (20 October 2014).

  61. 61.

    Hui Zhang said the main evidence regarding North Korea’s HEU program was acquisition of about 24 of P1 and P2 centrifuges, blueprints, a flow meter, special oils for centrifuges, import of 150 tons of high-strength aluminum tubes, acquisition of equipment suitable for use in uranium feed-and-withdrawal system. However, these cannot be convincing or overwhelming evidence to support the existence of the construction of a large-scale centrifuge program that the United States accused North Korea of.

  62. 62.

    Dong’a Ilbo, “양성철 “미, 북 ‘고농축 우라늄 프로그램’ 과장” (Yang Sung-chul, US exaggerated North Korea’s HEU), (5 March 2007). Available at: http://news.donga.com/3/all/20070305/8414070/1.

  63. 63.

    Ibid.

  64. 64.

    An unclassified CIA paper written in November 2002 estimated that “the North has one or possibly two weapons using plutonium it produced prior to 1992” (Squassoni 2004: 4).

  65. 65.

    A few weeks later after the US–DPRK October meeting, to calm the situation, Kim Jong-il delivered the oral message through former ambassador Donald Gregg who visited Pyongyang on 2 November 2002. However, the message was regarded as “unwelcome noise” and was quickly rejected by Washington (Oberdorfer and Carlin 2014: 378). According to Don Oberdorfer and Robert Carlin (2014: 363), “Washington did not understand Kim Jong-il was in the final stages of a major diplomatic effort to create the peaceful security environment he thought was required for his economic initiative to succeed.”

  66. 66.

    Bruce Cumings, “The US Should Change Its Policy of Isolating North Korea,” Ukrainian Week, (3 October 2012).

  67. 67.

    Tong Kim, who served as the senior Korean language interpreter for 27 years in the US Department of State and participated in almost all bilateral negotiations between the United States and the DPRK, asserts that “[e]ven if Kang Suk-ju had denied North Korea’s HEU program , I doubt the ensuing course of U.S. policy would have been different, given the administration’s revulsion to the North Korea regime and the threatening security environment in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which raised scary concerns about any possibility of transferring weapons of mass destruction into the hands of terrorists.” See his article, “Off the Record on HEU,” Korea Times, (8 April 2007).

  68. 68.

    Steven R. Weisman, “The Struggle for Iraq: News Analysis; Bush Foreign Policy and Harsh Reality,” New York Times, (5 September 2003).

  69. 69.

    “Regional Implications of the Changing Nuclear Equation on the Korean Peninsula,” Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, (12 March 2003).

  70. 70.

    David Sanger, “US Said to Shift Approach in Talks with North Korea,” New York Times, p. A1. (5 September 2003).

  71. 71.

    It was an answer to one of the questions asked at the Q&A session after his speech at Fudan University in 2004: http://www.chinausfocus.com/print/?id=7279.

  72. 72.

    Without being too heavily involved in external affairs, China was consequently able to concentrate on economic development, yielding a double-digit growth rate during much of the 1980s and 1990s.

  73. 73.

    Hu’s foreign policy goals were consistent with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence first formulated in 1955 and finally enshrined in the Chinese constitution in 1982: “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonaggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence” (Liu 2004: 13).

  74. 74.

    Jisi Wang, “Peaceful Rise: A Discourse on China,” unpublished public lecture, LSE, (8 May 2006).

  75. 75.

    In April 2004 Bo’ao Forum for Asia, Hu Jintao intentionally mentioned “peace and stability,” “peace and security,” and “peaceful coexistence” in his discourse, but not “peaceful rise” (Suettinger 2004: 5).

  76. 76.

    In 2003, the UNHCR estimated approximately 100,000 North Korean asylum seekers resided in China.

  77. 77.

    Author’s interview with Yongming Shi at CIIS, (February 2014). Samuel Kim also notes that “China’s leverage is very much constrained. Though cutting off massive Chinese aid could be used as a disincentive, the strategy could potentially backfire and provoke Pyongyang into a military confrontation.” See his article, “Uneasy Allies: Fifty Years of China-North Korea Relations,” Wilson Center, Events Summary, (29 July 2003).

  78. 78.

    Also see Max Fisher’s “Why China Still Supports North Korea, In Six Little Words,” Washington Post, (12 February 2013).

  79. 79.

    Foreign Affairs, “Beijing’s Brand Ambassador: A Conversation with Cui Tiankai,” July/August 2013 Issue.

  80. 80.

    Zhongying Pang (2008: 245) explicates the reluctance of Chinese leadership in taking a higher international profile on difficult foreign policy issues which helped “China create and maintain a deep political affinity with the wider developing world.”

  81. 81.

    Experts at the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) also agreed that China was not seriously alarmed by the US government’s revelation of North Korea’s alleged uranium-enriched nuclear programs. Basically, China had significant doubts about North Korea’s enrichment capabilities, (interviews by the author in January 2014).

  82. 82.

    Mr. Pan Zhenqiang, retired Major General, who had served for over two decades in the Department of the General Staff, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), also asserts that the North Korean nuclear problem is a “by-product of US-DPRK antagonism” (Cheon 2012: 265).

  83. 83.

    At the 2003 Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee, the Chinese leadership defined the next 20 years as an important period of “strategic opportunities” to seize in which China should steer historic development to create a “harmonious socialist society.”

  84. 84.

    China Daily, “Hu Wants Deeper Ties with United States,” (22 April 2006). The Chinese leadership suspected that the United States’ “responsible stakeholder” policy toward China was to demand changes not only in Chinese diplomatic behavior but also in China’s domestic political and social system (Masayuki 2009).

  85. 85.

    James B. Steinberg, “America May Wield ‘Fear Factor’ Against North Korea, Syria, Iran,” The San Jose Mercury News, Opinion, (13 April 2003); Agence France-Presse reported that a confidential Pentagon report contains detailed plans to bomb the DPRK’s nuclear plant in Yongbyon and its territory where North Korea’s heavy artillery is located, if it is confirmed that North Korea has reprocessed its spent nuclear fuel rods. See Liselotte Odgaard’s “The Role of South Korea in the US-DPRK Nuclear Standoff,” (2003); John J. Tkacik Jr., “Getting China to Support a Denuclearized North Korea,” Backgrounder #1678 on Asia, Heritage Foundation, (25 August 2003).

  86. 86.

    Author’s interview with Prof. Byung-ro Kim, (January 2014).

  87. 87.

    Alan Fung, “North Korea: On the Borderline, Part 1: Soldiers head for the frontier,” Asia Times Online, (30 September 2003).

  88. 88.

    Author’s interview with Prof. Byung-ro Kim, (January 2014).

  89. 89.

    During the presidential election campaign in fall 2000, George W. Bush criticized Clinton’s engagement policy toward China, arguing that, given China’s ideological preference and ill-conceived ambitions, China is rather a “strategic competitor” than a “strategic partner” to the United States. Bush also promised that the United States would be “more effective in helping Taiwan defend itself,” which was understood by China as potentially aggressive (Zhao 2008: 49).

  90. 90.

    John W. Lewis, “The Contradictions of Bush’s China Policy,” New York Times, (2 June 2001).

  91. 91.

    James Kelly , “Kelly Hopeful North Korea Will Abandon Nuclear Weapons,” Remarks to the Research Conference, North Korea: Towards a New International Framework, (13 February 2004).

  92. 92.

    KCNA, “U.S. Urged to Respond to DPRK-U.S. Direct Talks,” (26 March 2003).

  93. 93.

    In addition to the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which lowered the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons and specifically listed China and North Korea as two of the seven target countries, especially, the Bush doctrine of preemption codified in 2002 and exercised in Iraq in 2003 sharply increased Pyongyang’s perceived US threats (Kim 2010: 66).

  94. 94.

    International Affairs Review, “Why North Korea Still Needs U.S. Security Guarantees before Proceeding with Major Reforms.” Available from http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/436.

  95. 95.

    North Korean economic reforms of July 2002 were starkly different from the old ones. Kim Jong-il’s government adopted a more liberal economic policy, allowing a degree of privatization, greater autonomy to state-owned enterprises, and even barter markets in agriculture and other goods. It was a daring move by the Kim regime to fix the malfunctioning public sector and overcome chronic economic deprivation through a multitude of reforms. North Korea watchers were surprised by Kim Jong-il’s macroeconomic experiments, stating that “the 2002 project sowed a vital seed of change – the market.” See Korea Herald’s article, “Failed 2002 Reform Sowed Seeds of Change in North Korea,” (4 July 2012).

  96. 96.

    Editorial board special article, “Military First Politics Is a Powerful Weapon in Our Era’s Anti-imperialist Struggle,” Nodong Sinmun, (1 April 2002). Despite numerous challenges including the Kelly process by the Bush administration, a close review of North Korean media commentary and economic journals shows reformers in North Korea managed to assert their position by upholding Kim Jong-il’s principles for building “an economically powerful state.” See Robert Carlin’s “North Korean Reform: Politics, Economics and Security,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, (2013).

  97. 97.

    It was South Korea’s engagement policy toward North Korea under the Kim Dae-jung administration. For illustrative details, see Chung-in Moon’s Kim Dae-jung Government and Sunshine Policy Promises and Challenges (1999).

  98. 98.

    Further details on Roh Moo-hyun’s North Korea policy and his vision about inter-Korean relations are discussed in Chap. 4.

  99. 99.

    During Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang in 2002, the Kim Jong-il regime made significant compromises of admitting its abduction of Japanese nationals in the 1970s and 1980s, candidly apologized for it, and promised to prevent its recurrence. However, it stirred up strong public sentiment against the DPRK in Japan, which fixated Japan’s North Korea policy on resolving abduction issues. Japan’s abduction diplomacy will be fully discussed in Chap. 5.

  100. 100.

    Charles Pritchard, (20 May 2005), Crisis Group telephone interview in International Crisis Group’s Asia Report N100, “Japan and North Korea” Bones of Contention,” (27 June 2005).

  101. 101.

    Yukio Ochi, “U.S., Japan continuing to discuss forum for N. Korea: Powell,” Kyodo News Service, (23 February 2003). Japan had a slightly different formula of multilateral talks in mind: inviting the United States and North Korea to pursue their bilateral talks within the core framework established beforehand by the coordination by China, Japan, and South Korea.

  102. 102.

    All the Internet links were accessed on 28 April 2015 to confirm the availability.

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    Mi-yeon Hur

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Hur, My. (2018). North Korea’s Second Nuclear Crisis and Inception of the SPT. In: The Six-Party Talks on North Korea. Palgrave, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7113-3_2

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