Abstract
Axiomatizations and recursive representations of the Shapley value on the class of all cooperative games with transferable utilities are given. Marginal games, which are closely related to dual games, play central roles in our results. Our axiomatizations are based on axioms that are marginal game variations of the well-known balanced contributions property, so that they are interpreted as fair treatment between two players in games as the balanced contributions property is. Our general recursive representation enables us to represent the Shapley value for n-person games by those for r-person and \((n-r)\)-person games with fixed \(r<n\). The particular case of \(r=1\) has a clear contrasting interpretation to the existing recursive formula.
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Acknowledgments
The authors thank Rodica Branzei, Irinel Dragan, and Stef Tijs for their helpful comments. This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 15K17031 (Kongo), 24220033 (Funaki), 26245026 (Funaki), and 26380247 (Funaki).
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Kongo, T., Funaki, Y. (2017). Marginal Games and Characterizations of the Shapley Value in TU Games. In: Li, DF., Yang, XG., Uetz, M., Xu, GJ. (eds) Game Theory and Applications. China GTA China-Dutch GTA 2016 2016. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 758. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-6753-2_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-6753-2_12
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