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Proceedings of the 21st International Symposium on Advancement of Construction Management and Real Estate pp 375–382Cite as

Board of Director’s Role in Preventing Corporate Misconduct in the Construction Industry

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Abstract

This paper examines the theoretical literature and conducts empirical analysis on the mechanisms of corporate governance. We focus on directors’ role in ameliorating various types of agency problems (e.g., corporate misconduct) arising from conflicts of interests between stakeholders and managers to the firm. In a sample of 45 public listed construction companies in Taiwan between 2005 and 2014, the result indicates that illegal corporate behavior is more likely to occur in firms with large boards while board independence isn’t significant for misconduct constraining. The finding also shows why board’s monitoring function is important and how firms rein in misconduct by altering board size and composition.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Hom, Hong Kong, China

    R. Wang & S. C. Hsu

  2. Department of Management and Information Technology, Southern Taiwan University, Tainan City, Taiwan

    C. Y. Lee

  3. Institute of Human Resource Management, National Sun Yat-Sen University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan

    C. J. Lee

Authors
  1. C. J. Lee
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  2. R. Wang
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  3. S. C. Hsu
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  4. C. Y. Lee
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to S. C. Hsu .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Real Estate and Construction, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong

    K. W. Chau

  2. Department of Real Estate and Construction, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong

    Isabelle Y.S. Chan

  3. Department of Real Estate and Construction, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong

    Weisheng Lu

  4. Faculty of Architecture, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong

    Chris Webster

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Lee, C.J., Wang, R., Hsu, S.C., Lee, C.Y. (2018). Board of Director’s Role in Preventing Corporate Misconduct in the Construction Industry. In: Chau, K., Chan, I., Lu, W., Webster, C. (eds) Proceedings of the 21st International Symposium on Advancement of Construction Management and Real Estate. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-6190-5_33

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