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The Role of the Security Council in WMD-Related Export Control: Synergy Between Resolution 1540 (2004) and Sanctions Resolutions

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Abstract

This article analyzes the question of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related export control from a perspective of synergy between Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) and its sanctions resolutions. Resolution 1540 (2004) has made the hitherto non-binding export control rules of the existing export control regimes legally binding on all UN member States. However, it does not include control lists with which States would implement their national export control legislation in a more harmonious manner. Sanctions resolutions of the Security Council seem to have eliminated this defect by incorporating such control lists as part of their sanctions regimes binding on all UN members. Thus, Resolution 1540 (2004) and sanctions resolutions have contributed to an effective implementation of WMD-related export control.

The author acknowledges with appreciation that the research on which this article is based has been funded by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (2012–2016).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/ accessed 6 December 2015.

  2. 2.

    http://www.australiagroup.net/en/ accessed 6 December 2015.

  3. 3.

    http://www.mtcr.info/english/ accessed 6 December 2015.

  4. 4.

    http://www.wassenaar.org/ accessed 6 December 2015.

  5. 5.

    Takehiko Yamamoto, “Kokomu Kyotei ha Kokusaikyotei ni seyo [Make the COCOM Agreement an International Treaty],” Sentaku, March 1990, p. 130.

  6. 6.

    IAEA Doc INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1, 13 November 2013, para. 4 (a).

  7. 7.

    Ibid., Annex A, para. 2.1.

  8. 8.

    Parties to the NPT are obligated to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA under Article III of the Treaty. Most of the non-nuclear-weapon states which are parties to the NPT have concluded such an agreement, but there are twelve that as yet have not. See https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/sg_-agreements-status-list-20-july-2015.pdf accessed 6 December 2015.

  9. 9.

    IAEA Doc INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1, op. cit., para. 4 (d).

  10. 10.

    Daniel Horner, “China, Pakistan Set Reactor Deal,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 40, No. 5 (June 2010), p. 41. See also Salman Masood and Chris Buckley, “Pakistan Breaks Ground on Nuclear Plant Project with China,” New York Times, 26 November 2013. For the controversy over China’s invocation of the grandfather provision of the NSG guidelines, see “Lessons from China’s Successful NSG Campaign,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 34, No. 8 (October 2004), p. 24.

  11. 11.

    See, e.g., William J. Broad, David E. Sanger and Raymond Bonner, “A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: How Pakistani Built His Network,” New York Times, 12 February 2004; “On the Trail of the Black Market Bombs,” BBC News, 12 February 2004.

  12. 12.

    David E. Sanger, “The Khan Network,” paper presented at the Conference on South Asia and the Nuclear Future held June 4-5, 2004 at Stanford University, p. 2.

  13. 13.

    President George W. Bush, preface to The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (White House, September 2002).

  14. 14.

    UN Doc S/RES/1540(2004), 28 April 2004, para. 2.

  15. 15.

    The resolution itself states that “all States” shall take such and such measures, but, strictly legally speaking, it is not possible in principle for a UN resolution to impose legal obligations on non-UN-member states.

  16. 16.

    UN Doc S/RES/1540(2004), op. cit., para. 3.

  17. 17.

    The existing export control regimes have seen the lack of control over brokering and transit/transshipment as a sort of loophole, and quite recently, some of them have sought to regulate those activities. The NSG’s 2014 plenary meeting (held in June 2014) adopted a document titled “Good Practices for the Implementation of Brokering and Transit/Transshipment Controls”; and the Wassenaar Arrangement’s 2015 plenary meeting (held in December 2015) adopted a document titled “Best Practice Guidelines for Transit or Transshipment.” http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/images/Files/National_Practices/National_Good_Practices.pdf; http://www.wassenaar.org/best-practice-guidelines-for-transit-or-transshipment/ accessed 13 January 2016.

  18. 18.

    UN Doc S/RES/1540(2004), op. cit., para. 4.

  19. 19.

    Laurence Scheinman and Johan Bergenas (2010) “UN Security Council Resolution 1540,” CISTEC Journal, No. 126 (March 2010), p. 13.

  20. 20.

    “The 1540 Matrix.” http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/national-implementation/matrix.shtml accessed 6 December 2015.

  21. 21.

    See CWC, Annex on Chemicals, Schedule of Chemicals. The Zangger Committee has produced a list of items for export control under Article III, paragraph 2, of the NPT (called the Zangger List). IAEA Doc INFCIRC/209/Rev.3, June 2014. However, this committee is not a formal, NPT-based group with a mandate to produce a list of items relevant to the said paragraph. See http://www.foi.se/en/Customer--Partners/Projects/zc/zangger/ accessed 6 December 2015.

  22. 22.

    One of the reasons for the change seems to be that the Security Council’s concept of “threat to the peace” against which it can take enforcement action has been broadened to include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction with the issuance of its Presidential Statement in January 1992.

  23. 23.

    Resolution 1737 (2006), imposing sanctions on Iran, also used Security Council documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 (lists of the NSG and MTCR) with certain modifications. UN Doc S/RES/1737(2006), 23 December 2006, paras. 3–7.

  24. 24.

    For the background of China not being admitted to the MTCR, for example, see Victor Zaborsky, “Does China Belong in the Missile Technology Control Regime?,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 34, No. 8 (October 2004), pp. 20–26; Wade Boese, “Missile Regime Puts Off China,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 34, No. 9 (November 2004), p. 39.

  25. 25.

    S/RES/1540 (2004), op. cit., para. 7.

References

  • Broad, William J., David E. Sanger, and Raymond Bonner. 2004. A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: How Pakistani Built His Network. New York Times, Feb 12.

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  • Horner, Daniel. 2010. China, Pakistan Set Reactor Deal. Arms Control Today, 40(5): 41 Jun.

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  • Masood, Salman, and Chris Buckley. 2013. Pakistan Breaks Ground on Nuclear Plant Project with China. New York Times, Nov 26.

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  • Sanger, David E. 2004. The Khan Network. Paper presented at the Conference on South Asia and the Nuclear Future, held at Stanford University, June 4–5.

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  • Scheinman, Laurence, and Johan Bergenas. 2010. UN Security Council Resolution 1540. CISTEC Journal, (126): 11 Mar.

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Asada, M. (2017). The Role of the Security Council in WMD-Related Export Control: Synergy Between Resolution 1540 (2004) and Sanctions Resolutions. In: Tamada, D., Achilleas, P. (eds) Theory and Practice of Export Control. SpringerBriefs in Economics(). Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5960-5_3

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