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The Future of Investor-State Arbitration: Revising the Rules?

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Asia's Changing International Investment Regime

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Abstract

The last two decades have seen a remarkable growth in the number of investor-state disputes. Asia itself has witnessed a startling number of investment disputes. Overall, about 21% of all known investment disputes involve Asian states. Several authors predict an increasing number of disputes involving Asian actors in the future. While arbitration remains the preferred dispute resolution mechanism for resolving investor-state disputes, a number of Asian states have expressed discontent with the investment arbitration system. A few States have denounced investor-state arbitration entirely, while others have significantly reformed the dispute resolution provisions in their investment agreements. The EU, Canada and, in Asia, Vietnam have altogether dispensed with the inclusion of “traditional” investor-state arbitration in their investment agreements. In this tumultuous scenario, with Asia witnessing record foreign investment inflows and outflows, it is timely to review the current trends and recent developments in the investment arbitration framework and consider their effects on both Asian states as well as Asian investors. After explaining the current investment treaty and investment arbitration framework, this Chapter examines current trends and concerns in investment arbitration as relevant to the Asia-Pacific region. It reviews several recent developments in investment arbitration—from resolving the common concerns with investment arbitration on a piecemeal basis to a wholesale replacement of the current system—and examines their reception in Asia. It concludes that Asia has seen a considerable evolution (and, perhaps, maturity) in its international investment agreement framework, which bodes well for the region. Several international developments are likely to impact the investment arbitration framework in Asia, and it would be ideal to adapt them to the Asian context.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    UNCTAD World Investment Report 2017, accessed by http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2017_en.pdf (noting that the number of cases initiated in 2016 (62) were higher than the 10-year average of 49 cases per year); IIA Issues Note No. 2 2016; UNCTAD World Investment Report 2016, accessed by http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2016_en.pdf (noting that the number of investor-state arbitrations in 2015 set a new annual high). See also Kollamparambil (2016) (concluding on the basis of empirical analysis that investors initiate a higher number of disputes against countries that have IIAs).

  2. 2.

    IIA Issues Note No. 2 2016, IIA Issues Note No. 1 2015. See also UNCTAD World Investment Report 2016, accessed by http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2016_en.pdf<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationChapters/wir2015ch0_KeyMessage_en.pdf. This is the number of publicly known cases. As a significant number of cases are conducted in a confidential framework, the actual number of disputes is likely to be higher.

  3. 3.

    See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByCountry. See also Chaisse (2013, pp. 187, 202) (concluding that more than 90 investment disputes involving 24 Asia-Pacific states have been filed since 1987). Dr. Chaisse’s study did not include cases involving Asian investors, or claims filed in 2014–2016.

  4. 4.

    See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS.

  5. 5.

    Chaisse (2015, p. 563), Chaisse (2013, p. 187), Malintoppi (2015, p. 12), Kim (2012, p. 399). Luttrell, ISDS in the Asia-Pacific, a regional snap shot.

  6. 6.

    See generally Vandevelde (2005, p. 157) (noting that foreign investors are increasingly resorting to international arbitration for resolving their disputes with host states).

  7. 7.

    See Bernasconi-Osterwalder (2014). Retrieved from http://www.iisd.org/publications/investment-treaty-arbitration-opportunities-reform-arbitral-rules-and-processes.

  8. 8.

    See Press release of the European Commission, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/vietnam/. On 1 February 2016, the text of the EU–Vietnam Free Trade Agreement was published, following the announcement of the conclusion of the negotiations. The legal review of the text has now begun and will be followed by translation into the EU’s official languages and Vietnamese. The Commission will then present a proposal to the Council of Ministers for approval of the agreement and ratification by the European Parliament. An investment court is also contemplated under the EU–Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (see below). See EU–Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf.

    Available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1409. See also: Daly and Ahmad (2015).

  9. 9.

    WIR 2016, p. 110 (noting that Indonesia’s draft model BIT is ‘is characterized by carve-outs, safeguards and clarifications’). See also, UNCTAD (2007) (noting a recent trend of “more circumscribed” IIA dispute settlement provisions, and citing the Malaysia–Pakistan Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (2007) which excludes all disputes concerning national treatment and performance requirements as an example.)

  10. 10.

    See, for instance, the 2015 Indian Model BIT, which has been analyzed in Chapter 16 [add full reference].

  11. 11.

    Following their meeting in Shanghai on 9–10 July 2016 under the Chinese G20 Presidency, G20 trade ministers issued a statement reinforcing their determination to “promote inclusive, robust and sustainable trade and investment growth.” At the same time, ministers agreed to the G20 Principles. See Annex III: G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking [available at www.g20.org/]. Nine non-binding Guiding Principles provide guidance for investment policymaking with a view to fostering an open, transparent and conducive global policy environment for investment, promoting coherence in national and international investment policymaking and promoting inclusive economic growth and sustainable development.

  12. 12.

    See Annex III: G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking.

  13. 13.

    See WIR 2017; WIR 2016.

  14. 14.

    See generally Lowenfeld (2003, pp. 123, 129).

  15. 15.

    See generally Chaisse and Bellak (2015, p. 79).

  16. 16.

    See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS.

  17. 17.

    UNCTAD (2016).

  18. 18.

    See Chaisse (2015, p. 563).

  19. 19.

    See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA; Bryan Cave (2015).

  20. 20.

    See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA; WIR 2016, p. 101 (noting that Japan, the Republic of Korea and China were the “most active” in concluding IIAs).

  21. 21.

    ‘Home state’ refers to the investor’s state of nationality.

  22. 22.

    ‘Host state’ refers to the state in which the investment is made.

  23. 23.

    Sacerdoti (2014, p. 4).

  24. 24.

    Blythe (2013, pp. 273–290).

  25. 25.

    IIA Issues Note No. 1 (2017) showing trends in known IIA based investor-state cases from 1987 to 2016; IIA Issues Note No. 2 (2016) (finding that 62% of all known cases have been filed under the ICSID Convention or ICSID Additional Facility Rules).

  26. 26.

    Allee and Peinhardt (2010, p. 1).

  27. 27.

    Some level of institutional support is often provided by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague.

  28. 28.

    Allee and Peinhardt (2010, p. 401).

  29. 29.

    MercoPress, US will vote against loans to Argentina in World Bank and IDB, available at http://en.mercopress.com/2011/09/29/us-will-vote-against-loans-to-argentina-in-world-bank-and-idb.

  30. 30.

    Viñuales and Bentolila (2012).

  31. 31.

    See generally, Rosenberg (2013, p. 503).

  32. 32.

    ICSID, “50 Years of ICSID”, available at www.icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/Documents/ICSID%20Timeline%20-%20Featured.pdf. See also Asian Agricultural Products Limited v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3), Award, June 27, 1990.

  33. 33.

    See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS; Behn and Langford (2016).

  34. 34.

    Scott Miller and Gregory Hicks, ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A reality Check’, available at  www.csis.org/analysis/investor-state-dispute-settlement-reality-check-working-paper.

  35. 35.

    WIR 2017, IIA Issues Note No. 2 2016.

  36. 36.

    WIR 2017, IIA Issues Note No. 2 2016.

  37. 37.

    A ‘win’ is defined as the awarding of US$1 or more, even if de minimus or less than the investor’s unrecovered expenses. Franck and Wylie (2015, p. 459).

  38. 38.

    Franck and Wylie (2015).

  39. 39.

    Scott Miller and Gregory Hicks, ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A reality Check’, available at https://www.csis.org/analysis/investor-state-dispute-settlement-reality-check-working-paper.

  40. 40.

    Wellhausen (2016, pp. 117–135).

  41. 41.

    For an analysis of the limits of empirical research in answering legal questions see Van Harten (2011, p. 33).

  42. 42.

    Nottage and Romesh Weeramantry (2012, p. 19).

  43. 43.

    Kim (2012, p. 399).

  44. 44.

    Chaisse (2015, p. 563).

  45. 45.

    Nakagawa (2007, pp. 837–867).

    doi: 10.1093/jiel/jgm032.

  46. 46.

    Salomon and Friedrich (2015, pp. 800, 837).

  47. 47.

    Ibid.

  48. 48.

    Ibid. 838.

  49. 49.

    See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS.

  50. 50.

    See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS; Bryan Cave (2015).

  51. 51.

    Welhausen (2016, pp. 117–135).

  52. 52.

    See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS.

  53. 53.

    See for instance, Ikenson (2014), The Economist (2014).

  54. 54.

    New York Times (2004).

  55. 55.

    Monbiot (2013).

  56. 56.

    Eberhardt et al. (2012), Van Harten (2012, p. 1), Ikenson (2014).

  57. 57.

    Brown (2013, p. 1) (noting that IIAs “do indeed prevent some countries from developing or enforcing effective environmental policies”).

  58. 58.

    See Schill (2015).

  59. 59.

    Trakman and Sharma (2014a, b); Press Release from the Government of India, Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty (2015) http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=133411 (noting that “during the last few years, significant changes have occurred globally regarding BITs, in general, and investor-state dispute resolution mechanism in particular”).

  60. 60.

    Tienhaara and Ranald (2011).

  61. 61.

    See generally, Nottage (2011, p. 5), Tietje et al. (2014) Study prepared for the Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign affairs, The Netherlands; UNCHR (2003).

  62. 62.

    See, for instance, Gloria et al. (2016, pp. 1–36).

  63. 63.

    IBA Subcommittee on Investment Treaty Arbitration, Report on the Subcommittee’s Investment Treaty Arbitration survey May 2016.

  64. 64.

    WIR 2016, p. 116. For a detailed review of substantive developments see UNCTAD (2016).

  65. 65.

    Langford et al. (2016) (providing a historical overview of the narrative of ‘legitimacy crisis’ in the field of investment arbitration). See generally, Waibel et al. (2010).

  66. 66.

    Sri Lanka has announced its intention to move away from traditional IIAs, inter alia because of the “bitter lessons” learned from investment arbitration. See http://unctad-worldinvestmentforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Malalgoda.pdf. The same is the case with India, which substantially revised its earlier model IIA in light of the ruling against it in the White Industries arbitration. See Press Release from the Government of India, Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty (2015) http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=133411 noting that “during the last few years, significant changes have occurred globally regarding BITs, in general, and investor-state dispute resolution mechanism in particular”.

  67. 67.

    Haftel and Thompson (2013, p. 355).

  68. 68.

    This is the case with India, which has begun renegotiating its IIAs. See http://isds.bilaterals.org/?india-wants-new-foreign-investment&lang=en.

  69. 69.

    This is the case with India and Indonesia. See, for instance, Bland and Donnan (2014); Trakman and Sharma (2014a, b).

  70. 70.

    Schill (2016).

  71. 71.

    Ibid.

  72. 72.

    Australia for instance has faced claims concerning its tobacco regulations. See also Kim (2012, p. 399).

  73. 73.

    See Wälde (2009, pp. 724, 737).

  74. 74.

    Gaukrodger (2016).

  75. 75.

    Eleni Methymaki and Antonios Tzanakopoulos (forthcoming).

  76. 76.

    See US CAFTA-DR, Art. 10.22 (3) and 19.1(3), available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/freetradeagreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text; EU–Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Art. X.27 and X.42, consolidated text available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf.

  77. 77.

    Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People-s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

  78. 78.

    ACIA, Art. 40(3) (“A joint decision of the Member States, declaring their interpretation of a provision of this Agreement shall be binding on a tribunal, and any decision or award issued by a tribunal must be consistent with the joint decision”); AANZ, Art. 27(3) (“A joint decision of the Parties, declaring their interpretation of a provision of this Agreement shall be binding on a tribunal, and any decision or award issued by a tribunal must be consistent with that joint decision.”).

  79. 79.

    Measures that are non-discriminatory and that have been taken for ‘legitimate public welfare objectives’ of public health, safety, the environment, public morals or public order are excluded. See ChAFTA, Art. 9.11.5.

  80. 80.

    ChAFTA, Arts. 9.11.5–9.11.6.

  81. 81.

    ChAFTA, Art. 9.18.3.

  82. 82.

    ChAFTA, Art. 9.11.8.

  83. 83.

    See generally Waibel et al. (2010).

  84. 84.

    Lalive and Halonen (2011, pp. 141, 154–55).

  85. 85.

    Lalive and Halonen (2011, p. 479).

  86. 86.

    Popova and Poon (2015, p. 223).

  87. 87.

    Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq v The Republic of Indonesia, UNCITRAL, Award (15 December 2014).

  88. 88.

    TPP, Art. 9.18.2: ‘“When the claimant submits a claim pursuant to para 1(a)(i)(B), 1(a)(i)(C), 1(b)(i)(B) or 1(b)(i)(C), the respondent may make a counterclaim in connection with the factual and legal basis of the claim or rely on a claim for the purpose of a set off against the claimant.”’

  89. 89.

    For a review of counterclaims in Asian IIAs, see Trisha Mitra and Rahul Donde Claims and Counterclaims under Asian Multilateral Investment Treaties in: L. Choukroune (Ed.), Judging the State in International Trade and Investment Law: Modern Sovereignty, the Law and the Economics, Springer, 2016.

  90. 90.

    See generally, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II Transparency 2011 at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/unctaddiaeia2011d6_en.pdf; Kaufmann-Kohler (2013, pp. 305, 308).

  91. 91.

    www.iisd.org/itn/2016/02/29/state-strategies-for-the-defence-of-domestic-interests-in-investor-state-arbitration-julia-calvert/.

  92. 92.

    www.iareporter.com/articles/the-czech-republic-updates-on-fifteen-investment-treaty-disputes/.

  93. 93.

    www.sccinstitute.com/media/72819/scc-application-of-mauritius-convention-and-uncitral-rules-on-transparency.pdf.

  94. 94.

    United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (adopted on 10 December 2014, opened for signature on 17 March 2015). See also UN (2014a), United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, General Assembly, 69th session, Resolution A/69/116 (18 December 2014).

  95. 95.

    www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2014Transparency_Convention_status.html.

  96. 96.

    www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2014Transparency_Convention_status.html.

  97. 97.

    For instance, while the ACIA and the AANZ contain transparency obligations, China is more reluctant. See Zhao and Yun (2014, pp. 150–163), Hsu (2012, pp. 243, 256).

  98. 98.

    Potestà (2013, pp. 753–770).

  99. 99.

    See discussion of this case in Bernasconi-Osterwalder (2014).

  100. 100.

    Ecuador v. United States, PCA Case No. 2012-5, Request for Arbitration, ¶ 1 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2011). See generally Roberts (2011, p. 1).

  101. 101.

    In the ICSID context, grounds for annulment are specified in Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. In non-ICSID context, the grounds for review would be the same as those for international commercial arbitration, which usually exclude a full review of the merits. See generally, Fouret and Mourre (2015).

  102. 102.

    European Commission Concept Paper, ‘Investment in the TTIP and Beyond’ 8.

  103. 103.

    Proposals for an appeals mechanism were considered by ICSID in 2004 and by the OECD in 2005. See generally Parra (2014, p. 9), Yannaca-Small (2008, p. 223).

  104. 104.

    See, for example, Article 15.19(10) of the United States–Singapore FTA, available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/singapore/asset_upload_file708_4036.pdf.

  105. 105.

    India Model BIT, Art. 29.

  106. 106.

    TPP, Art. 9.22(11).

  107. 107.

    Sam Luttrell, ISDS in the Asia-Pacific: A Regional Snap-Shot.

  108. 108.

    Both these treaties are awaiting domestic approvals and subsequent ratification.

  109. 109.

    EU-Vietnam FTA, Art. 4.

  110. 110.

    EU-Vietnam FTA, Art. 4(4).

  111. 111.

    EU-Vietnam FTA, Art. 7(1).

  112. 112.

    EU-Vietnam FTA, Art. 12(2).

  113. 113.

    EU-Vietnam FTA, Art. 12(6).

  114. 114.

    EU-Vietnam FTA, Art. 27(6).

  115. 115.

    EU-Vietnam FTA, Art. 28(1).

  116. 116.

    EU-Vietnam FTA, Art. 28(2)-(3).

  117. 117.

    Sornarajah (2016).

  118. 118.

    Joint statement: Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-16-446_en.htm.

  119. 119.

    For instance, Canada and India are presently negotiating a ‘Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement’, as are the EU and China.

  120. 120.

    Annex III: G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking.

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Donde, R., Chaisse, J. (2017). The Future of Investor-State Arbitration: Revising the Rules?. In: Chaisse, J., Ishikawa, T., Jusoh, S. (eds) Asia's Changing International Investment Regime. International Law and the Global South. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5882-0_12

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