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Environmental Management: Choice Between Collective Action and Government Action

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Abstract

Environmental externalities create problems for the optimal supply of collective goods or goods supplied and used by a group of people (common grazing lands, common lake fisheries, etc.) and the supply of pure public goods (air and water quality, recreation, etc.). The choice between government action and collective action for correcting such a market inefficiency caused by environmental externalities is a subject matter of great debate in the literature on environmental policy. The doubtful quality of government, the problems of asymmetric information and non-convexities related to environmental externalities, and high transaction costs make governmental instruments of pollution taxes and permits inefficient. In contrast, there is evidence to show that collective action institutions can and also have been proved to be efficient in dealing with environmental externalities in all-weather situations. Two types of such collective action interventions are dealt with in this paper. The first shows that with voluntary participation or institutions providing incentives for rightful actions and penalties for wrongful actions of group members, the collective action by a group provides optimal supply of the collective good. The second type explains that there is dualism in dealing with pure public good type of externality involving two groups of people, group creating pollution externality and the group affected by it. Also, there could be multiple groups of stakeholders to this type of externality and the competition among them could result in optimal control of externality.

I was a colleague of Professor Kanchan Chopra at Institute of Economic Growth (IEG), Delhi for almost three decades. From the very beginning of pursuing research at Delhi School of Economics (DSE), we both had a common research interest in Social Cost Benefit Analysis. Since her Ph.D. work on the subject precedes mine, I got maximum benefit from it. Ever since I joined IEG in early 1980s my research interest has gradually been shifted from Public Economics to Environment and Resource Economics. This in turn helped me since Professor Kanchan Chopra and some other colleagues at IEG have already chosen this subject as an area of their research. We have done successful collaborative research at IEG on the subject matter of this paper which has produced a book entitled ‘Participatory Development’ and some research papers published in international journals.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    By this term, we mean resources of natural origin.

  2. 2.

    See Bator (1958).

  3. 3.

    See Arrow (1969).

  4. 4.

    It states that if every commodity can be exchanged in a market, a competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal.

  5. 5.

    Adverse selection problem arises when characteristics of commodities and individuals are not observed in the market. Moral hazard problem could be there when activities of people are not observable.

  6. 6.

    Akerlof (1970) was the first to explain the asymmetric information and adverse selection problem with a lucid example of US market of used cars (lemons). If buyers could not distinguish between used cars and new cars in the market, they offer only an expected market price for cars, thus eventually driving new cars out of market.

  7. 7.

    Arnott and Stiglitz (1988) have shown that in this case the moral hazard problem creates non-convexity in firms’ choices of combinations of premium and insurance cover.

  8. 8.

    See Baumol and Bradford (1972).

  9. 9.

    See Starret (1972).

  10. 10.

    Cornes and Sandler (1984, 1989).

  11. 11.

    Also, see Nlebuff (1997).

  12. 12.

    See Wade (1987, 1988), Ostrom (2009, 2000) and Chopra et al. (1999).

  13. 13.

    See Baumol and Oates (1988).

  14. 14.

    See Wietzman (1974, 1978).

  15. 15.

    See Kolstad (2004).

  16. 16.

    See Stern (2006).

  17. 17.

    As pointed out in Ostrom (2009).

  18. 18.

    Here, the word ‘commons’ used by Hardin refers to open access resources given that the term ‘common property’ refers to an efficiently managed resource in the current literature.

  19. 19.

    See Ernesto (2003) for a good discussion on this evidence.

  20. 20.

    For experimental evidence, see Fehr and Gächter (2000).

  21. 21.

    See Dawes et al. (1986).

  22. 22.

    See Agrawal and Goyal (2001).

  23. 23.

    See Fehr and Fischbacher (2002).

  24. 24.

    Murty (1994).

  25. 25.

    See Murty (1994) for details.

  26. 26.

    See Bromley and Chapagain (1984) and Chopra et al. (1999).

  27. 27.

    See also Murty (2010).

  28. 28.

    Coase’s example of a building that blocks wind mill’s air currents or a confectioner’s machine that disturbs doctor’s quiet, etc., is one such.

  29. 29.

    See Baumol and Bradford (1972).

  30. 30.

    See Starret (1972).

  31. 31.

    See in Nlebuff (1997) example of half bell-shaped benefit function for lake pollution.

  32. 32.

    The discussion in this section is drawn from Murty (1995).

  33. 33.

    See Murty (1995).

  34. 34.

    A survey of 17 highly water-polluting industries in India conducted by the Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi, in 1996.

  35. 35.

    There have been a number of such PILs on the matter of industrial water pollution abatement in the Supreme Court. In one such case, constitution of an expert committee was ordered concerning an industrial estate in Hyderabad. The terms of reference included studying the problem of water pollution and to make recommendations not just about the extent of compensation to be paid to the recipients by the generators of pollution in the pertinent case but also remedial measures that the industries and the government have to take for preventing water pollution in future. Later, acting on these recommendations the Supreme Court has directed the factories to pay compensation to the recipients and the government to take action against factories in case they violate the pollution standards as per the existing environmental laws.

  36. 36.

    See Pargal and Wheeler (1996) and World Bank (1999).

  37. 37.

    See Murty et al. (1999) and Murty and Prasad (1999).

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Murty, M.N. (2018). Environmental Management: Choice Between Collective Action and Government Action. In: Dayal, V., Duraiappah, A., Nawn, N. (eds) Ecology, Economy and Society. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5675-8_7

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