Abstract
Asymmetric information can help achieve an efficient equilibrium in repeated coordination games. If there is a small probability that one player can play only one of a continuum of moves, that player can pretend to be of the constrained type and other players will coordinate with him. This hurts efficiency in the repeated battle of the sexes, however, by knocking out the pure-strategy equilibria.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
References
Bacharach, Michael. 1993. Variable universe games. Frontiers of game theory, ed. Ken Binmore, Alan Kirman, and Piero Tani, 255–275. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Benoit, Jean-Pierre, and Vijay Krishna. 1985. Finitely repeated games. Econometrica 53: 905–922.
Binmore, Ken, and Larry Samuelson. 2006. The evolution of focal points. Games and Economic Behavior 55: 21–42.
Carlsson, Hans, and Eric van Damme. 1994. Global games and equilibrium selection. Econometrica 61: 989–1018.
Crawford, Vincent P., and Hans Haller. 1990. Learning how to cooperate: Optimal play in repeated coordination games. Econometrica 58: 571–595.
Daley, Brendan, and Philipp Sadowski. 2017. Magical thinking: A representation result. Theoretical Economics 12(2): 909–956.
Ellison, Glenn. 1993. Learning, local interaction, and coordination. Econometrica 61: 1047–1071.
Fudenberg, Drew, and Eric Maskin. 1986. The Folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information. Econometrica 54: 533–554.
Gautier, David. 1975. Coordination. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Harsanyi, John and Reinhard Selten. 1988. A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Janssen, Maarten C.W. 2001a. On the principle of coordination. Economics and Philosophy 17: 221–234.
Janssen, Maarten C.W. 2001b. Rationalizing focal points. Theory and Decision 50: 119–148.
Kandori, Michihiro, George J. Mailath, and Rafael Rob. 1993. Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games. Econometrica 61: 29–56.
Kreps, David, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts, and Robert Wilson. 1982. Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory 27: 245–252.
Lewis, David. 1969. Convention. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Mehta, Judith, Chris Starmer, and Robert Sugden. 1994. Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation. Theory and Decision 36: 163–185.
Morris, Stephen, and Hyun Song Shin. 2003. Global games: Theory and applications. In Advances in economics and econometrics (Proceedings of the Eighth World Congress of the Econometric Society), ed. M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen, and S. Turnovsky. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Schelling, Thomas. 1960. The strategy of conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Young, H. Peyton. 1993. The evolution of conventions. Econometrica 61: 57–84.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2017 Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Rasmusen, E. (2017). Incomplete Information in Repeated Coordination Games. In: Naito, T., Lee, W., Ouchida, Y. (eds) Applied Approaches to Societal Institutions and Economics. New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives, vol 18. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5663-5_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5663-5_9
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore
Print ISBN: 978-981-10-5662-8
Online ISBN: 978-981-10-5663-5
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)