Incomplete Information in Repeated Coordination Games

  • Eric RasmusenEmail author
Part of the New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives book series (NFRSASIPER, volume 18)


Asymmetric information can help achieve an efficient equilibrium in repeated coordination games. If there is a small probability that one player can play only one of a continuum of moves, that player can pretend to be of the constrained type and other players will coordinate with him. This hurts efficiency in the repeated battle of the sexes, however, by knocking out the pure-strategy equilibria.


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© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Indiana UniversityBloomingtonUSA

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