Skip to main content

Managers’ Window Dressing and Liability for Damages to a Stock Sales in Management Buyouts

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Applied Approaches to Societal Institutions and Economics

Part of the book series: New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives ((NFRSASIPER,volume 18))

  • 391 Accesses

Abstract

This paper analyzes the inverse window dressing of managers in their management buyouts (MBOs) and the claims of damages for compensation filed by the small shareholders against the manager.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    In the aspect of corporate accounting point of view, “dressing” refers to the value embroidery reported by managers, more than the real, and “inverse dressing” is in contrary sense.

  2. 2.

    The origin of FIEA had been enacted in 2007.

  3. 3.

    For example, see Burkart and Panunzi (2006)

  4. 4.

    While it is important to consider the type that the stock price would be, in this paper, we focus on damage claim action after sale.

  5. 5.

    If there is only a few small shareholder, the cost of litigation would be very high, and there is a possibility of abandoning the lawsuit. However, here, we are considering a class action lawsuit by small shareholders.

  6. 6.

    Here, we assume that the cost of litigation is 0 for the simplification of the model. Of course, the magnitude of litigation costs is an important issue, and the results of the analysis can change.

References

  • Burkart, M., and F. Panunzi. 2006. Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection. Journal of Financial Intermediation 15: 1–31.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cuny, C.J., and E. Talmor. 2007. A theory of private equity turnarounds. Journal of Corporate Finance 13: 629–646.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Elitzur, R., P. Halpern, R. Kieschnick, and W. Rotenberg. 1998. Managerial incentives and the structure of management buyouts. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 36: 347–367.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Financial Services Agency. 2014. Kinyou Shoushin Torihiki Hou nado no Ichibu wo Kaisei suru Houritu ni kakawaru shiryo. http://www.fsa.go.jp/common/diet/186/01/setsumei.pdf (In Japanese).

  • Hanamura, S. 2011. Impact of hostile TOBs on managers and information disclosure. Syouken Keizai Gakkai Nenpou 46: 99–108D (In Japanese).

    Google Scholar 

  • Kato, T. 2011. Ryutsu shijo ni okeru fujistu kaiji to toushika no songai. Shin Sedai Hou Seisakugaku Kenkyu 11: 303–346 (In Japanese).

    Google Scholar 

  • Stein, J. C. 1988. Takeover threats and managerial myopia. Journal of Political Economy 96(1): 61–80.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tamayama, T. 2010. The judicial screening of MBOs. Nanzan Hougaku 33(3/4): 313–343 (In Japanese).

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ryutaro Nozaki .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2017 Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Nozaki, R. (2017). Managers’ Window Dressing and Liability for Damages to a Stock Sales in Management Buyouts. In: Naito, T., Lee, W., Ouchida, Y. (eds) Applied Approaches to Societal Institutions and Economics. New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives, vol 18. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5663-5_6

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5663-5_6

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore

  • Print ISBN: 978-981-10-5662-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-981-10-5663-5

  • eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics