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Voting for Secession and Siting Nuisance Facilities in a Federation

  • Shigeharu SatoEmail author
Chapter
Part of the New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives book series (NFRSASIPER, volume 18)

Abstract

Facilities such as power plants, waste disposal areas, airports, prisons, and military bases are necessary and useful for society, but they can be a nuisance and noxious for neighbors, causing conflicts between governments and residents. These are therefore often called “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) facilities. Governments must construct NIMBY facilities, but their location presents many difficulties.

Notes

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Moriki Hosoe, whose enormous support and insightful comments were invaluable.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Nagasaki Wesleyan UniversityIsahayaJapan

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