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Delegation of Policy Tasks from Politician to the Bureaucrat

  • Masayuki KanazakiEmail author
Chapter
Part of the New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives book series (NFRSASIPER, volume 18)

Abstract

Originally, the agenda setting is the task in legislature. However, we often see that the politician and the bureaucrat contend with this task cooperatively. This implies that the politician delegates a part of his tasks to the bureaucrat. Why does the politician delegate his tasks? Does the bureaucrat who is delegated the politician’s tasks make an effort sufficiently for the policy implementation?

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Kyushu Sangyo UniversityFukuokaJapan

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