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Optimal Income Tax Structure with Favoritism

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Applied Approaches to Societal Institutions and Economics

Part of the book series: New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives ((NFRSASIPER,volume 18))

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Abstract

This paper clarifies that in any society, when stricter penalties for tax evasion are sought based on the permeation of the idea that high-income earners should not be permitted to evade taxes for their personal gain, the government inadvertently creates a larger tax burden on the poor. In other words, a policy decision conferring preferential treatment or favoritism on the poor is incompatible with stricter penalties.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Fukuoka Women’s University, Fukuoka, Japan

    Hideki Sato

Authors
  1. Hideki Sato
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Correspondence to Hideki Sato .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan

    Tohru Naito

  2. Keimyung University, Daegu, Korea (Republic of)

    Woohyung Lee

  3. Department of Economics, Hiroshima University, Higashi-Hiroshima City, Hiroshima, Japan

    Yasunori Ouchida

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Sato, H. (2017). Optimal Income Tax Structure with Favoritism. In: Naito, T., Lee, W., Ouchida, Y. (eds) Applied Approaches to Societal Institutions and Economics. New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives, vol 18. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5663-5_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5663-5_11

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore

  • Print ISBN: 978-981-10-5662-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-981-10-5663-5

  • eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)

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