Optimal Income Tax Structure with Favoritism

  • Hideki SatoEmail author
Part of the New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives book series (NFRSASIPER, volume 18)


This paper clarifies that in any society, when stricter penalties for tax evasion are sought based on the permeation of the idea that high-income earners should not be permitted to evade taxes for their personal gain, the government inadvertently creates a larger tax burden on the poor. In other words, a policy decision conferring preferential treatment or favoritism on the poor is incompatible with stricter penalties.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Fukuoka Women’s UniversityFukuokaJapan

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