Abstract
As described in Chap. 1, common types of intentional interference mainly include jamming and spoofing. Chapters 2 and 3 mainly discuss jamming. In this chapter we discuss techniques to suppress the interference emitted by spoofers. Different from jamming, the power level, signal format and frequency spectrum structure of interference emitted by spoofers are similar to the authentic satellite signals. The intent of spoofing is to trick a receiver locking onto interference without awareness, so a navigational positioning result, which seems to be reliable but actually misleading, can be produced. In the worst case, a receiver may be controlled by spoofers. Under the impacts of spoofing, receivers usually are not aware of the spoofers, so consequently spoofing is more harmful than jamming.
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Wu, R., Wang, W., Lu, D., Wang, L., Jia, Q. (2018). Spoofing Countermeasure Techniques. In: Adaptive Interference Mitigation in GNSS. Navigation: Science and Technology. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5571-3_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5571-3_4
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