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Reflections on Human Inquiry pp 97–116Cite as

Yearning for Consciousness

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Abstract

The discipline called philosophy of mind aims to study the so-called mentalistic concepts like consciousness, belief , knowledge, perception and intentionality . The mind is also the subject of scientific inquiry in the cognitive sciences—most prominently in terms of the study of the brain and the nervous system. The study of consciousness lies at the center of the joint enterprise. However, the scientific study of the concept of consciousness is beset with so many fundamental problems that we might wonder if there is a genuine study of consciousness at all. Why is the concept in universal use then? What role does it play in our common life? We suggest that consciousness could be a concept whose importance and use in our common life need not mean that it picks out some property of some delineable object. The concept plays a singular role in anchoring the concept of a person; the concept shows up the moment we wish to extend the concept of a person to fetuses and fauna. We need the concept to form some conception of an ethical order consisting of fellow beings just as we need the concept of beauty to form a conception of an aesthetic order. Those needs are essentially normative with no demand for descriptive truth; hence, there is no demand for a theory.

Einstein’s brain turned out to be no bigger than normal. Just as Einstein captured the essence of energy and matter in his famous equation, so we seek to capture the essence of genius. Our pursuit perhaps reveals more about ourselves than about the nature of genius.

Hao Wang (1987)

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Before we proceed, let me emphasize that it is need, rather than interest. So ascriptivism cannot be rephrased as interest-relative worldviews (Goodman 1978; Putnam 1981).

  2. 2.

    Although the example might suggest otherwise, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is not relevant here; there are other related distinctions which we need to set aside.

  3. 3.

    For whatever it is worth, I guess Strawson might have used the term description in descriptive metaphysics following the influence of Wittgenstein’s distinction between explanation and description, but he meant ‘ascription’ in the sense under discussion here.

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  1. University of Delhi, Delhi, India

    Nirmalangshu Mukherji

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Mukherji, N. (2017). Yearning for Consciousness. In: Reflections on Human Inquiry. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5364-1_7

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