Abstract
Homomorphic encryption allows a user to receive encrypted data and to perform arbitrary computation on that data without decrypting it. The homomorphic encryption scheme which supports only a bounded number of homomorphic operations is called “somewhat homomorphic encryption”. The scheme which supports arbitrary number of homomorphic operations is called “fully homomorphic encryption”. We need to construct an fully homomorphic encryption scheme which satisfies strong security for practical use to use a homomorphic encryption scheme practically, but essentially, we cannot construct a scheme which satisfies IND-CCA2 security Thus, one of the strongest security notions for homomorphic encryption is IND-CCA1 security. In this paper, we construct an fully homomorphic encryption scheme which satisfies IND-CCA1 security. Our construction has a restriction that our scheme can compute an arbitrary number of operations, but the arity of circuits is bounded. Our construction is based on the leakage-resilient bounded arity fully homomorphic encryption scheme proposed by Berkoff and Liu (TCC 2014). We show that their general construction can work for our construction.
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Acknowledgements
The second author was supported by Grant-in-Aid for JSPS Research Fellow and JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP16J10322. The third author was supported by Input Output Hong Kong, I-System, Nomura Research Institute, NTT Secure Platform Laboratories, JST OPERA, and JSPS KAKENHI 16H01705.
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Yasuda, S., Kitagawa, F., Tanaka, K. (2018). Constructions for the IND-CCA1 Secure Fully Homomorphic Encryption. In: Takagi, T., Wakayama, M., Tanaka, K., Kunihiro, N., Kimoto, K., Duong, D. (eds) Mathematical Modelling for Next-Generation Cryptography. Mathematics for Industry, vol 29. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5065-7_18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5065-7_18
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