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How to Strengthen the Security of Signature Schemes in the Leakage Models: A Survey

  • Yuyu WangEmail author
  • Keisuke Tanaka
Chapter
Part of the Mathematics for Industry book series (MFI, volume 29)

Abstract

We give a survey on generic transformations that strengthen the security of signature schemes, which are exploited in most cryptographic protocols, in the leakage models. In ProvSec 2014, Wang and Tanaka proposed a transformation which converts weakly existentially unforgeable signature schemes into strongly existentially unforgeable ones in the bounded leakage model. To obtain the construction, they combined a leakage resilient chameleon hash function with the Generalized Boneh–Shen–Waters (GBSW) transformation proposed by Steinfeld, Pieprzyk, and Wang. In ACISP 2015, Wang and Tanaka proposed another transformation in the continual leakage model. To achieve the goal, they defined a continuous leakage resilient (CLR) chameleon hash function and constructed it based on the CLR signature scheme proposed by Malkin, Teranishi, Vahlis, and Yung. Then they improved the GBSW transformation by making use of the Groth–Sahai proof system and then combine it with CLR chameleon hash functions. In Security and Communication Networks, Wang and Tanaka additionally gave an instantiation of (restricted) fully leakage resilient strong one-time signature based on leakage resilient chameleon hash functions, following the construction of strong one-time signature by Mohassel. They also proved that by combining a (restricted) fully leakage resilient strong one-time signature scheme with the transformation proposed by Huang, Wong, and Zhao, another transformation that can strengthen the security of fully leakage resilient signature schemes without changing signing keys can be obtained.

Keywords

Bounded leakage resiliency Continual leakage resiliency Signature Strong existential unforgeability Chameleon hash function Generic transformation 

Notes

Acknowledgements

The first author is supported by a JSPS Fellowship for Young Scientists and JSPS KAKENHI 16J10697. The second is supported by Input Output Hong Kong, I-System, Nomura Research Institute, NTT Secure Platform Laboratories and JSPS KAKENHI 16H01705.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Mathematical and Computing SciencesTokyo Institute of TechnologyTokyoJapan
  2. 2.National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST)TokyoJapan

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