National Identities and Bilateral Relations in East Asia Over the Next Decade: Will the Downward Spiral Continue?

Abstract

National identities have wreaked havoc on diplomacy in East Asia, especially over the past few years, says Gilbert Rozman, and they demand keen attention if bilateral relations are to improve. Looking forward, Rozman analyses three perspectives: (1) differentiating national identity from nationalism, while linking the evolving expressions of identity in China, Japan, and South Korea to international relations; (2) specifying various dimensions of national identity—not just historical memory—that are affecting external relations with an eye to how their impact may be changing; and (3) anticipating factors that could affect the impact of identities on regional bilateral relations, keeping in mind the factors that left an imprint over the recent decade. His arguments draw on a multi-dimensional framework for the analysis of the national identities of East Asia and its application to bilateral relations: China and Japan, Japan and South Korea, China and South Korea, and China and the United States with attention to Japan-US and South Korea-US relations. Rozman concludes that, on all dimensions of national identity, the prognosis is not encouraging for narrower identity gaps between China and Japan or the United States. Ideology is reviving as China’s choice, raising the prospect that it will become the US choice, too. Despite some progress on global problem solving, as in the case of climate change, international relations—the world system, regionalism, and the role of the United States—show that the region’s main identity divides keep hardening. According to Rozman, this is the situation that threatens to complicate diplomacy, focused on expanding shared interests, over the coming decade.

The Trump Factor

Donald Trump is likely to have a far-reaching impact on national identities in East Asia and the way they affect bilateral relations. His thinking about national identity in the United States will diminish the moral authority of his country and impugn the ideals of an international community . Allies rallied around the notion that they were part of a US-led endeavor in support of universal values, democracy, human rights, and the “gold standard” of free trade, as exemplified by the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Seeing the United States disregard these ideals and resort to crass national interest as defined by a narcissist with scant interest in precedents and multilateralism, Japanese and South Koreans as well as others who embraced the beacon of US leadership can now be expected to look more to their own narrow identity narratives as an alternative. The leavening effect of a shared identity narrative will be seriously compromised.

Although the decline of the US model opens the door to greater Chinese influence, it is doubtful that China’s leaders can seize the opportunity. Their narrative of national identity has little appeal to neighboring nations. Increasing polarization in relations with the United States will lead many countries—above all, Japan —to stick closely to the US side. Despite President Trump’s unappealing image, the durability of the US image will keep other nations from straying far as they appeal for greater US engagement in East Asia and more consideration of their own priorities. When the Sino-US identity gap was narrower they had more room to maneuver diplomatically. Now that it is widening and Mr. Trump is in charge they will have more space to proceed on their own identity agendas, as in Abe’s quest for constitutional reform, but less likelihood of finding a common identity with other US allies and partners, as in Japan -South Korean relations.