Abstract
In Does Philosophy Have a Future? Sidney Hook describes philosophy as
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Notes
- 1.
Sidney Hook, “Does Philosophy Have A Future?” in 50 Sat. Rev. (1967), at 21.
- 2.
Michael Dutton, Policing and Punishment in China: From Patriarchy to“the People”, at 111.
- 3.
Here the English version was quoted from Melvin Richter, The Political Theory of Montesquieu (at 279) which slightly differs from the version of The Spirit of the Laws which was translated and edited by Anne M. Cohler et al., at 320. The last sentence of the quotation in the text seems to be more readable if it is translated as “Chinese legislators have had two objects: they have wanted the people to be both submissive and tranquil, and hardworking and industrious.” See Cohler’s version, at 321. For the influence of Montesquieu on the West, positive or negative, in perceiving Chinese law, cf., Geoffrey MacCormack, The Spirit of Traditional Chinese Law, at xiiv-xiv.
- 4.
Ibid., at 279–280.
- 5.
Georg F. W. Hegel, Philosophy of History, at 209–219.
- 6.
Henry Maine, Ancient Law, at 22.
- 7.
Hugh T. Scogin, Jr., “Civil ‘law’ in Traditional China: History and Theory”, in Kathryn Bernhardt and Philip C. C. Huang (eds.), Civil Law in Qing and Republican China, at 14–15.
- 8.
Philip M. Chen, Law and Justice: The Legal System in China, 2400 BC to 1960 AD, at 17.
- 9.
Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, Law in Imperial China, at 10.
- 10.
Ibid., at 2.
- 11.
Ibid., at 13, 560; cf., Michael Dutton, op. cit., at 112.
- 12.
Michael Dutton, op. cit., at 114.
- 13.
Geoffrey MacCormack, Traditional Chinese Penal Law, at 48–9; also cf., his The Spirit of Traditional Chinese Law, at xiv.
- 14.
Roberto M. Unger, Law in Modern Society: Toward A Criticism of Social Theory, at 91, 99–100; cf., William P. Al ford, “The Inscrutable Occidental? Implications of Roberto Unger’s Uses and Abuse of the Chinese Past”, in 64 Texas Law Review (1984), at 915–972.
- 15.
This paper was originally presented in Chinese in The National Taiwan University Law School (ed. and printed), Review and Foresight on the Modernization of Chinese Legal System, at 383–403. The quotation here is translated from this version.
- 16.
Yu Yi-sheng, “Consideration on Ancient Chinese Legal Culture”, in 3 Legal Study (1991), at 11–17.
- 17.
Cf., Gerhard Kobler, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte—Ein systematischer GrundriB, 4 Aufl, at 128.
- 18.
Cf., Hans Hattenhauer, Die geistesgeschichtlichen Grundlagan des deutschen Rechts, at 225ff.
- 19.
Cf., Jacques Ellul, Historie des institutions, t. 4, at 145. In “Chinese Values and Attitude towards Law in Mainland China”, Jean-Pierre Cabestan says that it is true the law in imperial China was not the expression of the general will. Is not it also the French situation under regime of Lous XVI? See his paper in Proceedings of International Conference on Value in Chinese Societies (I), at 453.
- 20.
Hugh T. Scogin, Jr., “Civil ‘Law’ in Traditional China: History and Theory”, in Kathryn Bernhardt and Philip C. C. Huang (eds.), Civil Law in Qing and Republican China, at 24–25.
- 21.
Cf., Donald E. Maclnnis, “Secularism and Religion in China: The Problem of Transcendence”, in F. J. Adelmann, S. J. (ed.), Contemporary Chinese Philosophy, at 119.
- 22.
Rodney L. Taylor, “The Religious Character of the Confucian Tradition”, in 48 Philosophy East and West (1998), at 80.
- 23.
George W. Paton, Jurisprudence, at 188–189.
- 24.
Ibid.
- 25.
H. L. A. Hart, Concept of Law, at 246.
- 26.
The term “interpretative cultural community” I suggest to use here is aspired by the notion “interpretative legal community”. On this point, see the studies done by M. Katz, “After the Deconstruction: Law in the Age of Post-structuralism”, in 24 University of Western Ontario Law Review (1986), at 51; also in general, Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies.
- 27.
Jack M. Balkin, “Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal Coherence”, in 103 Yale Law Journal (1993), at 107.
- 28.
Ibid., at 134.
- 29.
Antigone could be most relevant in exemplifying such a contradictory dichotomy. For the significance this case implies to the Western legal tradition see the study done by Margaret Davis, Asking the Law Question, at 57–59. By the way, one of the eight unique features of Western civilisation, scrutinized by Samuel Huntington in “The West: Unique, Not Universal”, is “separation of spiritual and temporal authority”. For details see his paper published in 75 Foreign Affairs (1996), or his The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, at 69–72.
- 30.
Cf., section Qingyi: an obscurity between subjectivity and objectivity in Chap. 2 of the book.
- 31.
Cf., LSM, Essential Meanings of the Chinese Culture (1949), 3: 119; cf., Xu Zhang-run, “Heaven Principle, Will of Human and Spirit of Law”, in 12 Journal of Comparative Law (1998), at 103–110.
- 32.
Tang Jun-yi, Carsun Chang, Xie You-wei, Xu Fu-guan and Mou Zong-san: A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture. It was first published in booklet form and later appeared in Chinese Culture (vol. III, no. 1, October 1960), and the English version I cite was reprinted in 2 Sino-American Relations 1998, at 92. Another passage in this article which I think is tremendously important in articulating my present theme is
We should not tackle the problem whether Chinese ideology admits the existence of God and true religion. The answer we seek should go beyond the mere existence of God, or religion itself and proceed to examine how Chinese cultural developments gave life to a “Reciprocal Conformity between Heaven and Man,” with Heaven descending to infuse itself as an intrinsic element of Man, while Man ascended upward to diffuse himself with Heaven. This theory may not be clearly understood by direct analogical interpretation from the Western point of view.
For details see ibid., at 80.
- 33.
Cf., LSM, “A Talk with Two Danish Professors” (1934), 5: 573–574.
- 34.
Cf., section Human reason: a presumption on and a expectation to humanity in Chap. 3 of this book.
- 35.
Tu Wei-ming, “Confucianism: Symbol and Substance in Recent Times”, in his Humanity and Self-Cultivation: Essays in Confucian Thought, at 285.
- 36.
For an explanation about the concept of shi (士) see the section Lisu: great tradition and little tradition in Chap. 2 of this book.
- 37.
LSM, Essential Meanings of the Chinese Culture (1949), 3: 207.
- 38.
Cf., in generally, Herbert Fingarette, Confucius: The Secular as Sacred.
- 39.
Leon Vandermeersch, “An Enquiry into the Chinese Conception of the Law”, in S. R. Schram (ed.), The Scope of State Power in China, at 23–24.
- 40.
LSM, Essential Meanings of the Chinese Culture (1949), 3: 211; cf., Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies (1921), 1: 522. For “li-fa formula” (礼法结构) see section Lisu: great tradition and little tradition in Chap. 2 of this book.
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Xu, Z. (2017). The Transcendence: Secular vis-à-vis Spiritual. In: The Confucian Misgivings--Liang Shu-ming’s Narrative About Law. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-4530-1_4
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