Post Conflict Foreign Policy Challenges for Sri Lanka

Abstract

The ‘armed conflict’ in Sri Lanka that lasted nearly three decades from the early 1980s, had a complex external dimension that was clear and present throughout the conflict and beyond. India obviously played various overt and not so overt roles at different stages and in different aspects of the conflict—at its inception, progression and ending. Diaspora groups too made significant impacts including fund raising and external lobbying for the main armed group. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam—LTTE. From the early 2000s, Norway and an additional group of countries called ‘the Co-Chairs for Sri Lanka Peace process’ (The EU, United States and Japan) sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to end the conflict through negotiations. There was further involvement of countries like China, India, Pakistan and the United States in the realm of hardware and software assistance to Sri Lanka especially in the terminal phase of the conflict. Although the armed conflict ended in May 2009, conflict by other means seemed to continue unabated as consensual domestic processes for post conflict peace building lagged behind despite a potentially constructive impetus provided by the Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) of Sri Lanka. It appeared that the ‘externality’ had rolled over to the post conflict era as well, involving more foreign elements including the United Nations, Human Rights Council, EU and so on. In an Oration delivered in February, 2012 Mr. HMGS Palihakkara discussed some of the post conflict foreign relations challenges faced by Sri Lanka in this context arguing the axiom that when domestic processes and leaders fail to develop consensual approaches, room is created for external interference even in matters falling within ‘essentially domestic jurisdictions’. Published below are adapted excerpts.

Adapted excerpts from the Prof J.E. Jayasuriya Memorial Oration by H.M.G.S. Palihakkara, 14 Feb 2012. SLFI, Colombo.