Abstract
It is demonstrated how the concept of the Limit-Nash bargaining solution as defined in Forgó and Szidarovszky (Eur J Oper Res 147:108–116, 2003) can be carried over to the non-symmetric case. It is studied how externally given weights of the players and the relative magnitude of penalties for not being able to come to an agreement influence the solution.
Dedicated to Ferenc Szidarovszky for his academic and research achievements in the last 50 years.
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The author thanks for the invitation to be a contributor of this book. The research was supported by the grant NKFI K-119930.
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Forgó, F. (2017). The Non-symmetric L-Nash Bargaining Solution. In: Matsumoto, A. (eds) Optimization and Dynamics with Their Applications. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-4214-0_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-4214-0_2
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