Abstract
The 16th century was the golden age of piracy in East Asia. Raiders known pejoratively as wokou in China, wako in Japan and waegu in Korea raided the coasts of all three lands with reckless abandon. Helped by governmental lassitude in China and a lack of a central political authority in Japan, these international pirates enjoyed their greatest success in the middle of the century, after which time tactical and organisational improvements in China, the restoration of political order in Japan and the lifting of Ming China’s formal ban on overseas trade all conspired to bring an end to widespread piratical activity. Utilising a variety of primary and secondary sources, this paper examines the nature of amphibious warfare in 16th-century East Asia, focusing particularly on strategy and tactics while also considering the developments that led to the end of widespread piracy in East Asia towards the end of the century. In particular it discusses the tactical innovations pioneered by the famous Ming general Qi Jiguang (1528–88), whose methods became the blueprint for anti-pirate defence throughout East Asia. The chapter’s conclusion discusses the social, economic and political ramifications of piracy within the larger context of late 16th-century East Asia, including how the experiences of the Chinese and Koreans in the middle of the century shaped their tactical responses to the Japanese invasion of the Asian mainland at the end of the century.
I would like to thank the East Asian Studies Center of Indiana University for providing me with a travel grant to subsidise research conducted for this paper.
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Notes
- 1.
For a recent reappraisal of these invasions, see Thomas D. Conlan, In little need of divine intervention (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).
- 2.
See Gavin Menzies, 1421: The year China discovered America (New York: Perennial, 2003), and Menzies, 1434: The Year a magnificent Chinese fleet sailed to Italy and ignited the Renaissance (New York: William Morrow, 2008). For a scholarly rebuttal of Menzies that makes extensive use of Ming sources, see Edward Dreyer, Zheng He: China and the oceans in the Early Ming Dynasty (New York: AB Longman, 2007). A discussion of the scholarly debate over Menzies’ claims is beyond the scope of the present paper, but an incisive critique can be found in Robert Finlay, “How not to (re)write world history: Gavin Menzies and the Chinese discovery of America”, Journal of World History, vol. 15, issue 2 (Jun. 2004), pp. 229–42.
- 3.
The first pirates to be called “Japanese pirates” raided the coast of Korea in 1223. On the early years of wokou pirates, see Benjamin H. Hazard, “The formative years of the Wakō”, Monumenta Nipponica, vol. 22, issue 3 (1967), pp. 260–77.
- 4.
Robert Antony, Like froth floating on the sea: The world of pirates and seafarers in late imperial South China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), p. 19.
- 5.
Antony, p. 20, and Zhang Tingyu et al. comps., Mingshi, 12 vols. (Taipei: Dingwen shuju, 1994), p. 8350. Hereafter cited as MS.
- 6.
Fan Zhongyi and Tong Xigang, Mingdai wokou shilue (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2004), p. 18.
- 7.
See Fan and Tong, Mingdai wokou shilue, pp. 28–96, for an overview of the era from 1403–1522. The Koreans, incidentally, sometimes served as intermediaries between China and Japan, though there were occasional incidents and a series of fights in Korean trading ports in 1510 caused serious strains in Korean-Japanese relations.
- 8.
See MS, p. 8353.
- 9.
For a brief biography of Qi, see L.C. Goodrich and C.Y. Fang eds., Dictionary of Ming biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 220–24 (hereafter, cited as DMB). For more thorough treatments of his life and military career, see the sources listed in the notes below.
- 10.
The subject of piracy in 16th-century China is treated in a plethora of sources, including So Kwan-wai’s study, cited above. In Chinese, see Fan and Tong. Zheng Liangsheng, Mingdai Zhong-Ri guanxi yanjiu (Taipei: Wenshizhe chubanshe, 1985) offers a thorough overview of Sino-Japanese relations in the Ming period. For more specialised looks at specific campaigns, see Charles O. Hucker, “Hu Tsung-hsien’s campaign against Hsü Hai, 1556”, in Frank A. Kierman and John K. Fairbank eds., Chinese ways in warfare (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 273–307, and Ray Huang, 1587, a year of no significance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 159–66.
- 11.
See MS, pp. 8348–51.
- 12.
See Kwan-wai So, Japanese piracy in Ming China during the sixteenth century (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1975), p. 5 and R. Antony, Like froth floating on the sea: The world of pirates and seafarers in late imperial South China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), p. 23.
- 13.
See Merrilyn Fitzpatrick, “Local interests and the anti-pirate administration in China’s Southeast, 1555–1565”, Ch’ing-shih wen-t’I, vol. 4 (Dec. 1979), pp. 7–8.
- 14.
MS, pp. 8350–52.
- 15.
See Chouhai tubian, juan 4–5 for troop levels and garrison locations in Zhejiang and Fujian. Also see Fitzpatrick, “Local interests and the anti-pirate administration in China’s Southeast”, p. 12.
- 16.
Hucker, “Hu Tsung-hsien’s campaign against Hsü Hai”, pp. 285–86.
- 17.
Chouhai tubian 12, p. 5a. For Yu’s biography, see DMB, pp. 1616–18.
- 18.
Chouhai tubian 11, pp. 7a–7b, and Qi Jiguang Jixiao xinshu (Taipei: Wuzhou chubanshe, 2000), p. 11. Hereafter cited as JXXS.
- 19.
Hucker, “Hu Tsung-hsien’s campaign against Hsü Hai”, pp. 275–77.
- 20.
On the defeat of Xu Hai, see Chouhai tubian 9, pp. 12a–20b; MS, pp. 8353–55; and Hucker, “Hu Tsung-hsien’s campaign against Hsü Hai”.
- 21.
Huang, Year of no significance, pp. 164–65.
- 22.
JXXS, pp. 12–13.
- 23.
Huang, Year of no significance, p. 165. It could also be tied to the fact that simply keeping adequate supplies of gunpowder dry and on hand was difficult for raiders seeking to maximise mobility. John Guilmartin has also suggested that the type of gunpowder used by the Japanese was very susceptible to the effects of saltwater and humidity, making its transports overseas difficult (personal communication). Also see John F. Guilmartin, Jr., “The earliest shipboard gunpowder ordnance: An analysis of its technical parameters and tactical capabilities”, The Journal of Military History, vol. 71, issue 3 (Jul. 2007), pp. 649–70.
- 24.
Chouhai tubian 5, p. 25b.
- 25.
See Han Myǒnggi et al. comps., Imjin Waeran saryo ch’ongso [Ming foreign relations section] 11 vols. (Chinju: Chinju National Museum, 2002), 2, pp. 107–8. Hereafter cited as IWSC.
- 26.
See, for example, his discussion of spear forms in JXXS, pp. 172–79.
- 27.
See JXXS, pp. 24–29, which also includes formation diagrams. Also see Z.Y. Fan and X.G. Tong, Mingdai wokou shilue (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2004), pp. 261–64.
- 28.
Huang, Year of no significance, p. 169.
- 29.
Qi Jiguang, Lianbing shiji (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001), pp. 27–28.
- 30.
Huang, Year of no significance, p. 173.
- 31.
Qi, Lianbing shiji, pp. 78–86 and pp. 109–11, and JXXS, p. 59.
- 32.
Chouhai tubian 11, p. 35a.
- 33.
See Miyamoto Musashi (Thomas Cleary trans.), A book of five rings (Boston: Shambala, 1994).
- 34.
Chouhai tubian, 11, p. 38b.
- 35.
JXXS, p. 61.
- 36.
JXXS, p. 41.
- 37.
Hucker, “Hu Tsung-hsien’s campaign against Hsü Hai”, p. 287, suggests that southwestern aboriginals had not proved very reliable in combating wokou raiders. This may have been due to their unfamiliarity with the terrain (including lack of experience in amphibious warfare) or the fact that Japanese may not have been intimidated by their reputation to the same degree that Chinese would have been. In one event a large contingent was slaughtered in an ambush, despite warnings from supreme commander Hu Zongxian, See Hucker, “Hu Tsung-hsien’s campaign against Hsü Hai”, p. 290. Incidentally, Xu Jie, one-time Chief Grand Secretary and an official intimately involved with the piracy problem, also favoured the recruitment of local forces over aboriginals because the latter were ill-disciplined and unreliable. See So, Japanese piracy in Ming China during the sixteenth century, pp. 99–100.
- 38.
See Chouhai tubian 11, p. 24a, and JXXS, p. 19.
- 39.
See Qi Jiguang, Qi shaobao zouyi (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001), pp. 65–66.
- 40.
JXXS, p. 18.
- 41.
MS, p. 5610.
- 42.
On these issues, see Kenneth M. Swope, “The three great campaigns of the Wanli emperor, 1592–1600: Court, military, and society in late 16th-century China”, (Ph.D dissertation, University of Michigan, 2001), ch. 2; and Kenneth Chase, Firearms: A global history to 1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 166–71.
- 43.
See JXXS, pp. 299–326, and Lianbing shiji, pp. 310–18. An illustration of the war cart with the ‘grand general’ cannon can be found on p. 311.
- 44.
See So, Japanese piracy in Ming China during the sixteenth century, p.149, and JXXS, pp. 307–8, and 325–26.
- 45.
Gao Yangwen et al. comps., Qi shaobao nianpu qibian (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2003), p. 56.
- 46.
See Fan and Tong, Mingdai wokou shilue, pp. 259–308, for a discussion of these anti-pirate measures.
- 47.
IWSC 2, p. 108.
- 48.
MS, p. 8357.
- 49.
See Chouhai tubian 11, pp. 1a–3a.
- 50.
On the importance of the international silver trade for the late Ming economy, see William S. Atwell, “International bullion flows and the Chinese economy”, Past and Present, vol. 95 (May 1982), pp. 68–90; and William S. Atwell, “Notes on silver, foreign trade, and the late Ming economy”, Ch’ing shih wen-t’I, vol. 3, issue 8 (Dec. 1977), pp. 1–33.
- 51.
For a primary source pertaining to the initial establishment of these defences, see Chouhai tubian, especially juan 12.
- 52.
Chouhai tubian 12, p. 5b.
- 53.
Chouhai tubian, 12, pp. 5b–6a.
- 54.
Chouhai tubian 12, p. 14a.
- 55.
See Fan Shuzhi, Wan Ming shi , 2 vols. (Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 2003), p. 435. Professor Fan also takes up the issue of Ming China’s involvement in the global economy, mentioned above, in the first section of this work, pp. 1–187.
- 56.
See Huang, Year of no significance, pp. 184–88.
- 57.
See, for example, Matteo Ricci (Louis J. Gallagher trans.), China in the sixteenth century: The journals of Matthew Ricci, 1583–1610 (New York: Random House, 1953), pp. 260 and 300; and Michael Cooper trans. and ed., This island of Japon: Joao Rodrigues’ account of sixteenth-century Japan (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1973), pp. 43 and 76–78.
- 58.
For the Japanese-Korean relationship, see Kenneth Robinson, “Centering the King of Chosǒn: Aspects of Korean maritime diplomacy, 1392–1592”, Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 59, issue 1 (Feb. 2000), pp. 109–25; “Policies of practicality: The Chosǒn court’s regulation of contact with Japanese and Jurchens, 1392–1580s” (Ph.D dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1997); and Etsuko Hae-Jin Kang, Diplomacy and ideology in Japanese-Korean relations from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997).
- 59.
For standard interpretations of Wanli’s relationship with his civil officials, see Huang, Year of no significance, and Jie Zhao “A decade of considerable significance: Late-Ming factionalism in the making, 1583–1593”, T’oung Pao, vol. LXXXVIII (2002), pp. 112–50. For a more revisionist position, see Harry S. Miller, “State versus society in late imperial China, 1572–1644”, (Ph.D dissertation, Columbia University, 2001), pp. 185–343.
- 60.
See the discussion of sources and stories in L.S. Zheng, Mingdai Zhong-Ri guanxi yanjiu (Taipei: Wenshizhe chubanshe, 1985), pp. 564–65.
- 61.
See MS, p. 8357. Also see Li Guangtao comp., Chaoxian shiliao 5 vols. (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo, 1970), p. 1. Hereafter cited as CXSL.
- 62.
Cited in Joseph Needham, et al., Science and Civilisation in China, vol. 5, part 7: Chemistry and chemical technology: The gunpowder epic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 390.
- 63.
Qian Yiben comp., Wanli dichao [Collection of an array of documents of the Wanli period], 3 vols. (Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1982), p. 674. Hereafter cited as WLDC. Also see Tan Qian, Guoque [Relating to Ming history], 10 vols. (Taipei: Dingwen shuju, 1978), p. 4681. Hereafter cited as GQ.
- 64.
See Zheng Liangsheng comp., Mingdai wokou shiliao 5 vols. (Taipei: Wenshizhe chubanshe, 1987), p. 475. Hereafter cited as WKSL, The passages from this particular volume (two) are all taken from the Veritable records of the Ming Dynasty.
- 65.
WKSL, p. 476.
- 66.
WKSL, p. 477.
- 67.
WKSL, p. 477.
- 68.
See WLDC, pp. 692-693; and WKSL, p. 477.
- 69.
GQ, p. 4691.
- 70.
See Song Yingchang comp., Jinglue fuguo yaobian [Assisting in the recovery of Korea during the Imjin War], 2 vols. (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1986), p. 1. Hereafter cited as FGYB. Also see WLDC, p. 695.
- 71.
On the utility of Song’s work as a source for studying the war in Korea, also see Wang Xiangrong, pp. 264–88.
- 72.
FGYB, p. 15.
- 73.
FGYB, p. 16.
- 74.
WKSL, p. 479.
- 75.
FGYB, p. 80.
- 76.
On the supposed superiority of southern infantry versus northern cavalry in battling the Japanese, see Li Guangtao, Chaoxian Renchen Wohuo yanjiu (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Lishi yuyan yanjiusuo, 1972), pp. 103–108; and Li Guangtao, “Chaoxian Renchen Wohuo yu Li Rusong zhi dong zheng”, Lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan, vol. 22 (1950), pp. 290–92.
- 77.
The Ningxia mutiny is fully discussed in Kenneth M. Swope, “All men are not brothers: Ethnic identity and dynastic loyalty in the Ningxia Mutiny of 1592”, Late imperial China, vol. 24, issue 1 (Jun. 2003), pp. 79–129.
- 78.
WKSL, p. 484.
- 79.
FGYB, p. 49.
- 80.
By contrast, a recent estimate suggests that perhaps 30 per cent of Japanese fighters in Korea were equipped with firearms. See Samuel Hawley, The Imjin War (Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society, 2005), p. 102.
- 81.
FGYB, p. 48.
- 82.
FGYB, p. 52.
- 83.
FGYB, p. 53.
- 84.
FGYB, p. 59. For a more complete discussion of firearms used during the war, see Kenneth M. Swope, “Crouching tigers, secret weapons: Military technologies employed during the Sino-Japanese-Korean War, 1592–1598”, Journal of Military History, vol. 69, issue 1 (Jan. 2005), pp. 11–42.
- 85.
See the arguments in FGYB, p. 66, and p. 74. In terms of cost, mercenaries were paid six liang a month, with an additional one liang, eight qian provided for food. See FGYB, p. 77.
- 86.
On the siege of Ulsan, see Kenneth M. Swope, “War and remembrance: Yang Hao and the siege of Ulsan of 1598”, The Journal of Asian History, vol. 42, issue 2 (Dec. 2008).
- 87.
FGYB, pp. 94–95.
- 88.
FGYB, p. 103.
- 89.
FGYB, p. 105. On the extensive Ming use of gunpowder weapons, see Peter Lorge, War, politics, and society in early modern China, 900–1795 (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 125, and Kenneth Chase, Firearms: A global history to 1700, pp. 141–54.
- 90.
FGYB, p. 167.
- 91.
FGYB, p. 171.
- 92.
This was actually an avenue for social mobility during the Ming. In fact the famed late Ming commander Chen Lin, the most highly decorated veteran of the Ming intervention in Korea, had entered military service in just this fashion, answering a call to battle pirates in his native Guangdong. See MS, p. 6404.
- 93.
FGYB, p. 171. It is not clear if those from Nanjing are included in the estimate of 7000 troops.
- 94.
FGYB, p. 172.
- 95.
FGYB, p. 172.
- 96.
FGYB, p. 174.
- 97.
See Mao Yuanyi, comp. Wubei zhi 22 vols. (Taipei: Huashi chubanshe, 1987), pp. 4806–7. Hereafter cited as WBZ.
- 98.
FGYB, p. 174.
- 99.
FGYB, p. 175.
- 100.
Boats and naval defences are covered in juan 116-117 in volume 11 of the modern reprint.
- 101.
WBZ, pp. 4760–65.
- 102.
See the illustration in WBZ, p. 4797. For images of a Korean turtle boat, see Swope, “Crouching tigers. secret weapons”, p. 31.
- 103.
WBZ, p. 4821.
- 104.
WBZ, pp. 4783–89.
- 105.
WBZ, p. 4775.
- 106.
WBZ, p. 4779.
- 107.
See Ha Tae-hung trans., Imjin changch’o: Admiral Yi Sunsin’s memorials to court (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1981), p. 210.
- 108.
FGYB, p. 180.
- 109.
FGYB, pp. 180–81.
- 110.
FGYB, p. 176.
- 111.
FGYB, pp. 176–77. The reference to saving lives is interesting because it is not particularly common. Officials often speak of preventing harm to the people, but they do not generally speak specifically of saving lives as an end in itself.
- 112.
FGYB, p. 182.
- 113.
FGYB, p. 178.
- 114.
FGYB, p. 179.
- 115.
A zhang is approximately three feet.
- 116.
FGYB, p. 185.
- 117.
FGYB, pp. 186–187.
- 118.
FGYB, p. 179.
- 119.
Cited in Zheng, Mingdai Zhong-Ri guanxi yanjiu, p. 597.
- 120.
Zheng, Mingdai Zhong-Ri guanxi yanjiu, p. 597.
- 121.
Zheng, Mingdai Zhong-Ri guanxi yanjiu, p. 599.
- 122.
Fan, Qi Jiguang zhuan, p. 579.
- 123.
Fan, Qi Jiguang zhuan, pp. 579–80.
- 124.
IWSC 1, p. 306.
- 125.
So, Japanese piracy in Ming China during the sixteenth century, p. 148.
- 126.
IWSC 1, p. 253. For a biography of Liu Ting, see DMB, pp. 964–68.
- 127.
IWSC 1, p. 253.
- 128.
See Qi, Lianbing shiji, pp. 236–37, on the use of different firearms for different situations.
- 129.
IWSC 1, pp. 338–39.
- 130.
IWSC 2, pp. 72–74.
- 131.
IWSC 2, p. 131.
- 132.
IWSC 2, p. 132.
- 133.
See Eugene Park, Between dreams and reality: The military examination in late Chosǒn Korea, 1600–1894 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), pp. 51–52.
- 134.
MS, p. 6405. Incidentally Liu Ting commanded the land operations in the war’s climactic battle.
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Swope, K.M. (2017). Cutting Dwarf Pirates Down to Size: Amphibious Warfare in 16th-Century East Asia. In: Sim, Y. (eds) The Maritime Defence of China. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-4163-1_10
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