Skip to main content

Shift of Mode: From a Mass Line Approach to a Bureaucratic Approach

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Corruption Control in Post-Reform China
  • 364 Accesses

Abstract

As discussed earlier, the status of law in a society is significant as it shows whether the society has reached rule of law or rule by law. There is always a three-stage argument that societies have to go through: rule by man, rule by law and rule of law in order. The Fifteenth Chinese Communist Party Congress, convened in September 1997 in Beijing, proposed for the first time that the Party would give its highest priority to the rule of law. The second plenary session of the Ninth National People’s Congress, held in March 1999, declared that a new constitutional amendment would be made to give constitutional legitimacy to the “rule of law”. Meanwhile, former President Jiang Zemin and other major leaders argued that the rule of law is a key to the building of Chinese democracy. It means that Chinese government changed mode of anticorruption from mass line approach to bureaucratic approach gradually.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Renmin ribao  (People’s Daily), March 14th 1999.

  2. 2.

    For a full text of Jiang Zemin’s report delivered at the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on September 12th 1997, see China Daily, September 23rd 1997.

  3. 3.

    In official document, the PLC is declared to function to maintain social order, coordinate between law enforcement departments, monitor law enforcement departments, and carry out policies from central government. Retrieved on May 8, 2006 from http://www.yfzs.gov.cn/gb/info/xsll/2005-12/24/2252034058.html.

  4. 4.

    It is not always the case in Xi Jinping’s era.

  5. 5.

    In Chinese, it is called Jia Zhang Zhi (家长制) or Yi Yan Tang (一言堂), or Yi Ba Shou Zhi (一把手制度). They refer to patriarchy system, one-voice system, and the first man in command correspondingly.

  6. 6.

    Wang Wei, vice mayor of Liuan City in Anhui Province. He was charged of taking 525 thousand yuan bribes, and 15 thousand US dollar. In the investigation stage, he wrote an 11 page long penitence called “my introspection.” In his penitence, he summarized three causes of his degeneration. See Procuratorate Daily, Dec 18, 2006. Also retrieved on Sept 15, 2007 from http://www.shu163.com/html/show.aspx?id=3971&cid=5.

  7. 7.

    Retrieved on May 10, 2017 from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/05/world/asia/china-national-peoples-congress-npc.html?_r=0.

  8. 8.

    The upper level supervises the lower level. The candidates for the lower departments are usually nominated by the standing committee of CCP committee (lower level), however, the upper judicial supervision can also nominate. The situation depends on the interaction between upper judicial supervision and the local CCP standing committee.

  9. 9.

    Article 44 of the CCP Constitution, 《党政干部党内监督和纪律处分规定》, 中国法制出版社, 2004, p. 61.

  10. 10.

    Article 8 of The Trial Regulations of the Inner Party Supervision of the CCP,《党政干部党内监督和纪律处分规定》,中国法制出版社, 2004, pp. 2–3.

  11. 11.

    Article 43 of the CCP Constitution, 《党政干部党内监督和纪律处分规定》, 中国法制出版社, 2004, p. 60.

  12. 12.

    Article 45 of the CCP Constitution, 《党政干部党内监督和纪律处分规定》, 中国法制出版社, 2004, p. 61.

  13. 13.

    Article 18 of the Administrative Supervision Law of P.R. China. 《党政干部党内监督和纪律处分规定》, 中国法制出版社, 2004, p. 65.

  14. 14.

    Article 11. Administrative Supervision Law of P.R. China.

  15. 15.

    Retrieved on Jan. 18, 2008 from http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/71387/71590/4855973.html.

  16. 16.

    For more information, refer to http://www.jcrb.com/200803/ca688925.htm.

  17. 17.

    Retrieved on Fen 10, 2008 from http://www.spp.gov.cn/site2006/2006-02-25/000504600.html.

  18. 18.

    Retrieved on April 1, 2008 from http://yfj.mos.gov.cn/yfj/news.jsp?mid=20071109026296.

  19. 19.

    Retrieved on Aug 20, 2007 from http://guancha.gmw.cn/show.aspx?id=1634.

  20. 20.

    Refer to “The Central Authority Controls Secretary of Discipline Inspection Committee at Provincial Level so as to Control Anticorruption”. Wenhui News (文汇报), Hong Kong, December 6, 2006. Also can be retrieved on August 20, 2007 from http://www.sina.com.cn/2006-12-06/094711713873.shtml.

  21. 21.

    People’s daily, January 6, 2006.

  22. 22.

    Retrieved on Feb 10, 2008 from http://english.cri.cn/2946/2006/09/27/189@144586.htm.

  23. 23.

    Retrieved on Feb 10, 2008 from http://english.cri.cn/2946/2006/09/27/189@144586.htm.

  24. 24.

    Xinhua News Agency July 29, 2005.

  25. 25.

    Retrieved on Feb 18, 2008 from http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2005-07/28/content_3277859.htm.

  26. 26.

    Heilongjiang Broadcast and TV News summarizes the scenario in which Ma of collects “black money”: pass away of parents-in-law, son’s entering university, hospitalization, Chinese traditional holidays, and cadres’ reallocation. The former four are moments to show gratitude, congratulations, cares, and greeting in Chinese culture. The last is moment for cadres to get promoted or maintain current posts. And at any moment, any greetings, or congratulations need to be accompanied with a large amount of cash. Retrieved on March 1, 2008 from http://www.hlj.xinhuanet.com/zfzq/2006-03/23/content_6553880.htm.

  27. 27.

    Retrieved on Aug 20, 2007 from news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-08-25/17153494259s.shtml.

  28. 28.

    Actually, the CDI of Suihua has no such authority to make such a decision. The decision must be made by the CDI of Heilongjiang or other authorities.

  29. 29.

    China Youth News, Aug. 25, 2004.

  30. 30.

    Retrieved on March 10, 2007 from http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-04/07/content_2799104.htm.

  31. 31.

    Sentenced 17 years imprisonment in August 2005.

  32. 32.

    Wei Hong (2006), 襄樊官腐并发症, 《民主与法制》, 2006, Jan 3.

  33. 33.

    Or in English idiom, a skeleton in the cupboard, 家仇可不外扬 in Chinese.

  34. 34.

    Legal Daily, 2006, Nov. 14.

  35. 35.

    The second most influential one is litigant and their family. The litigants are most related, therefore judges’ decision brings a lot impacts on their interests. When unfair decisions found, they will make every effort to get justice. Sometimes, they will try to obtain decision leaning to them by inappropriate or illegal behaviors. Judges have to take into their pressure into account in decision making. In the Zhao Jianxin case, a report from Legal Daily (法制日报) exposed what a judge had in mind: “supervisors ordered to finish the case; the victim’s family requested to execute the criminal; pressed from both the above and bottom, we had no other choice but to finish the case as soon as possible. Facing the pressure from the victim’s family, judicial organizations don’t dare to release the initially detained suspect, although the evidences are not strong. Moreover, given several requests for retrial by Supreme Court, plus the victim family’s non-stopping demonstrations, what we can do is to stand on the side that makes case stronger.” The case confirms that judiciary is not independent at all. Retrieved on August 20, 2007 from http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/rwzk/20061121/sz/200612060020.asp.

  36. 36.

    Article 1 of the Administrative Supervision Ordinance of the P.R. China. Retrieved on April 1, 2008 from http://www.jxxdxy.com/News_Detail.asp?NewsID=2898.

  37. 37.

    Article 1 of the Case Inspection Ordinance for the CCP Disciplinary Organizations. 《党政干部党内监督和纪律处分规定》, 中国法制出版社, 2004, p. 192.

  38. 38.

    Article 28 of the Case Inspection Ordinance for the CCP Disciplinary Organizations, 《党政干部党内监督和纪律处分规定》, 中国法制出版社, 2004, p. 195.

  39. 39.

    Refer to Jinghua Shibao (京华时报), 2006, 11, 29, p. 9.

  40. 40.

    Retrieved on August 18, 2007 from http://news.163.com/06/1220/02/32OJUHKT000120GU.html.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Guoping Jiang .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2017 Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Jiang, G. (2017). Shift of Mode: From a Mass Line Approach to a Bureaucratic Approach. In: Corruption Control in Post-Reform China. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-4050-4_5

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-4050-4_5

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore

  • Print ISBN: 978-981-10-4049-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-981-10-4050-4

  • eBook Packages: Social SciencesSocial Sciences (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics