Abstract
Recently, Sean Cordell has raised a dilemma for those Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists who take the demands of social roles seriously (Cordell 2011).
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Notes
- 1.
I here have to offer some brief remarks about “humaneness” (ren). I acknowledge the rather complicated debate regarding whether or not early Confucianism has a conceptual analog to “morality” in the widest sense. However, throughout this paper, I will treat “morality” and “humaneness” interchangeably. Also, following the work of P. J. Ivanhoe (2000, 2002) and Bryan Van Norden (2007), I recognize a distinction, especially marked in the Analects and Mencius, between “humaneness” as the perfection or excellence of human individuals, and “humaneness” or “benevolence” as a specific virtue; these senses of the term are not to be confused. One relevant motivation for treating “humaneness” and “morality” interchangeably is that the proponent of a Confucian role ethic needs a significant overlap between these two concepts to show how a role ethic can take its place in an ethical theory.
- 2.
I am not assuming that the classical Confucians are some variant of virtue ethicists, though I use a virtue ethic vocabulary throughout the paper. I wish to remain agnostic regarding the appropriate ethical classification of Confucianism. However, I am assuming that the three classical Confucians share a similar ethical system—they all practice Confucianism—and that, though they may use different words, they utilize similarly functional concepts. Mencius once uses Confucius’ notion of “sympathetic reasoning” (shu 恕) (Mencius 7A1), but his notions of “reflection” (si 思) and extension are functionally similar to shu. So, I assume that ren/junzi and zhong/li function similarly (enough) throughout the three texts.
- 3.
I am not interested here in resolving conflicts between the demands of two different roles, for example, the conflict that arises from one’s obligations as a doctor and as a parent. Moreover, one might maintain that we all possess a fundamental and essential role—the role of being a person. This position has the consequence of turning all role conflicts into role-to-role conflicts, avoiding the role dilemma per se. However, two considerations suggest that the “person” role is a conceptual mistake. The first is relevant to a Confucian role ethic, which maintains that persons are constituted by their roles. Admitting the “person” role entails a redundancy since persons are constituted by their roles (mother, daughter, person). A Confucian role ethic seems to be offering a nontrivial thesis about personhood. Second, roles are hierarchically relational and “person” (or “friend”) does not suggest a corresponding ordinate or subordinate role as do “elder/younger” or “parent/child.”.
- 4.
The details of this example come from Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (1962).
- 5.
Alternatively, an externalist might maintain a third position, that the immersion of oneself within the role creates an ethical standpoint of the role. I will not consider this alternative here, though I am suspicious that Xunzi might exemplify this strategy. For more on identification and the ethical perspective of roles, see Hardimon (1994) and Sciaraffa (2009).
- 6.
When a constitutive account is suggested, such an account is often offered by disciples and not by Confucius himself. In Analects 1.2 Youzi claims that filial piety and respect for elders constitute ren; Zengzi elucidates Confucius’ comment about his single thread at Analects 4.15. I do not put much worth in the “single thread” account of Confucius’ thought, since it is often understood as a much later interpolation.
- 7.
Interestingly, in the following section of the Mencius (4A18), Gongsun Chou raises another dilemma—one that arises from the conflict between one’s various roles.
- 8.
For more see Van Norden (2007, 117–120, 214).
- 9.
See my “Mengzi’s Externalist Solution to the Role Dilemma”(draft).
References
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Ramsey, J. (2017). The Role Dilemma in Early Confucianism. In: Yao, X. (eds) Reconceptualizing Confucian Philosophy in the 21st Century. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-4000-9_9
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