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The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency and the 2005 Great New Orleans Flood: A Deinstitutionalized Response Organization Facing Unknown Unknowns

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Abstract

The New Orleans Flood in the summer of 2005 caused by Hurricane Katrina ranks as one of the biggest US natural disasters in terms of human and economical loss (Howitt and Leonard in Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 30(1):215–221, 2006; Waugh in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 604(1):10–25, 2006).

When normal plans do not work and new working procedures are required, managers need to demonstrate competencies in sense-making and adaptation. But, rigidity in plans inhibited them from exerting leadership in adapting to changing factors of Hurricane Katrina.

—Oh (2012: 9)

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The levee system in New Orleans is the most complex one in terms of water control in the United States.

  2. 2.

    According to Senator Mary Landrieu (D-LA) in CNN’s report on August 27, 2005, the figure is about 30% of the population in New Orleans.

  3. 3.

    Currently the organization falls under the governor’s office, which is named the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness.

  4. 4.

    The Mitigation function is becoming weak according to a recent GAO report released on September 7, 2011, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining in Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11. There is no section in the report mentioning the mitigation function or the National Flood Insurance Program.

  5. 5.

    According to the history section on FEMA’s website, Federal Disaster Assistance Administration in the Department of Housing and Urban Development established in 1949 managed most major federal disaster response and recovery operations before FEMA was created.

  6. 6.

    The agency was later renamed as the Government Accountability Office.

  7. 7.

    Conventional emergency management professionals and scholars argue that Witt was the first FEMA director with emergency management experience. However, Julius Becton, who served as the director of FEMA from 1985 to 1989, had been the administrator of US office of Foreign Disaster Assistance before came into FEMA. Becton’s experience with disaster response [maybe mostly in foreign countries] is acknowledged, and Witt was truly the first director with experience of domestic emergency management in the US (Bosner 2011). Witt is described as the “first agency director with experience as a state emergency manager” on the history section of FEMA’s website.

  8. 8.

    The National Governors’ Association initiated Comprehensive Emergency Management in 1979.

  9. 9.

    FEMA press release number 1293-71 “Project Impact, building a disaster resistant community”.

  10. 10.

    According to Bosner in the PBS interview. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/storm/view/#morelink (accessed on August 30, 2011).

  11. 11.

    Notably, the International Association of Emergency Managers and the National Emergency Management Association provided certified emergency managers and associated emergency managers credentials (FEMA 2010).

  12. 12.

    For more about relationship between political appointment and performance, see Lewis (2008), Chap. 6, on the case of FEMA.

  13. 13.

    For more about the evolution of the presidential role in emergency and disaster management in the US, see Kapucu et al. (2011: 1–3).

  14. 14.

    For more about the US history of focus shift after leadership change in relation to different disaster agents, like terrorism events, environmental hazards, nuclear attacks, see Sylves and Cumming (2004).

  15. 15.

    This office was created in the 1980s, which did not draw much attention in Witt’s era.

  16. 16.

    The creation of DHS ranked as the most substantial federal agencies reorganization after the 1947 National Security Act, which put all the military agencies under the Defense Department.

  17. 17.

    Although the circle was broken in FEMA, the newly created DHS still held a leading position in emergency management among federal agencies. It is fair to say that FEMA itself as an independent organization was downplayed to implement parts of its emergency management functions as a sub-organization of DHS. For the customer of homeland security service, there is still one unified organization, DHS, to represent the federal government.

  18. 18.

    After Hurricane Katrina, the 2006 Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act relocated most preparedness programs to FEMA, which restored the cycle of emergency management (preparedness, response and recovery).

  19. 19.

    The mitigation programs were criticized as a waste of money with little improvement in the performance, as lacking responsibilities, and being full of moral hazards. For more, see Platt (1999).

  20. 20.

    Local partners protested the cancelation of the mitigation program. For instance, just after the magnitude 6.8 Nisqually Earthquake in the Puget Sound area of Washington State in 2001, Seattle’s Mayor strongly praised strongly the Project Impact program for reducing the damage of the earthquake in his city (Bosner 2011).

  21. 21.

    For details about the historical origin and evolution of the concept and ideology of homeland security, see Beresford (2004).

  22. 22.

    The National Response Framework replaced the National Response Plan in 2008.

  23. 23.

    Hurricane Katrina made its first landfall in Florida in the morning of August 25 as a tropical storm.

  24. 24.

    These include reports from the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina and from the United States House of Representatives and its supplements (Selected Committee), US department of Homeland Security, White House, Governmental Accountability Office, Federal Coordination Officer, and U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs.

  25. 25.

    A NSR is sent at 5:30 every morning by email to top officials at FEMA, DHS, DoD, and other relevant agencies and key organizations, such as the Red Cross. The report summarizes the daily information on the potential disaster threats and preparedness situations, ongoing disaster response and recovery. Currently, only NSRs issued after Hurricane Katrina can be found on FEMA’s website. The web address is http://www.fema.gov/emergency/reports/index.shtm (accessed on October 10, 2011). The reports issued during Hurricane Katrina was removed from the FEMA website. I downloaded these reports from http://www.hazus.org/KATRINA/ (accessed on October 10, 2011).

  26. 26.

    FEMA’s National Situation Reports on August 27, 28 and 29.

  27. 27.

    FEMA’s National Situation Report on August 28.

  28. 28.

    FEMA’s National Situation Report on August 27 and 28.

  29. 29.

    NIMS-ICS is a framework and command system adopted by different levels of government for a quick mobilization during an emergency response, which originated from the response to wild land fires by the US forest service in South California.

  30. 30.

    Terry Ebbert, LOHSEP, Katrina Conference Call Number 10, 7:30 a.m. CT, August 29, 2005.

  31. 31.

    This release on FEMA’s website has been deleted, retrieved from http://www.zijin.net/get/englishversion/en_COMMUNICATION/2005_09_11_9279.shtml (accessed on Oct. 2, 2012).

  32. 32.

    Overtop means water comes over the top of levee, but the levee structure still stands well.

  33. 33.

    HSOC spot report #013. Bahamonde planned the helicopter overflight by the Coast Guard on August 28 when he came to New Orleans.

  34. 34.

    HSOC spot report #30, 2 a.m., Aug. 31, 2005.

  35. 35.

    Video conferences on Aug. 30 and 31, 2005.

  36. 36.

    JTK was activated on August 30, 2005 by the North Command, which was designed to coordinate the military efforts in disaster relief, including National Guard and Coast Guard.

  37. 37.

    FEMA’s Mission assignment #1509-32649, Sep 2nd, 2005.

  38. 38.

    The exact date and time cannot be confirmed in the testimony document.

  39. 39.

    In sensemaking theory, the term “retention” is used to describe how the successful interpretation of uncertainty is stored for future use. For detailed information, see the section Coping with uncertainty as a sensemaking/organizing process in Chap. 2.

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Lu, X. (2017). The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency and the 2005 Great New Orleans Flood: A Deinstitutionalized Response Organization Facing Unknown Unknowns. In: Managing Uncertainty in Crisis. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3990-4_4

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