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Abstract

This chapter proposes a new scheme for global carbon mitigation cooperation. The scheme meets three requirements. Firstly, meet the emission reduction requirements. This chapter proposes a new scheme for global carbon mitigation cooperation. The scheme meets three requirements. Firstly, meet the emission reduction requirements. In specific, global temperature should not exceed 2 °C in 2100. Secondly, match the principle of Pareto improvement. Thirdly, keep fairness as much as possible. Based on these requirements, sensitive analysis is given for the important parameter, the discount rate. The scheme is cheese by the integrated assessment model using game theory, EMRICES. The results show that the alteration of discount rate will not change the no-cooperation Nash equilibrium but it does affect the Pareto improvement solution.

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Acknowledgements

We are grateful for the financial support which was provided by Grant No. 2012CB955804 from the National Basic Research Program of China (973 Program).

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Correspondence to Zheng Wang .

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Wang, Z., Wu, J., Liu, C., Gu, G. (2017). EMRICES. In: Integrated Assessment Models of Climate Change Economics. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3945-4_4

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