Abstract
The illegal use of pesticides in China has increasingly produced adverse effects on human health and environmental sustainability.
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Notes
- 1.
Simpson and Rorie (2012) reviewed the most recent studies that critically look at the traditional economic rational choice model to crime and punishment, and collectively called them “modified versions of the perspective”. They concluded that these studies mainly focus on the limits on rationality (e.g., access to information, individual differences), the non-material costs and benefits of violation behavior, and the differences of the information needed and utilized by offenders among different types of offence, etc.
- 2.
Here “decentered” deterrence refers to a strand of study in regulatory theory that considers regulation no longer as the sole affair of the state but as a “de-centered” matter in which multiple state and non-state actors play regulatory roles including these of implementing the law (Van Rooij 2013).
- 3.
That is, (Cb-Cc)—(Vb-Vc), which indicates benefits of compliance minus costs of compliance subtracting benefits of violation minus costs of violation.
- 4.
In order to solve the misunderstanding problem, operational costs and benefits in relation to compliance with rules on the use of types of pesticides are operationalized separately to the price and effectiveness of pesticides.
- 5.
In order to solve the sensitivity problem, several strategies were employed, e.g., vegetable farmers were not directly asked to compare the costs and benefits of compliance and violation but rather asked to compare the costs and benefits of their own pesticide behaviors (compliant or noncompliant) and these of the alternative (noncompliant or compliant) pesticide behaviors (a specific example is provided in Part C of the Appendix).
- 6.
They are mainly Beccaria and Bentham. Both of them took the position that human beings behave in accordance with the principle of greatest happiness, that is, they pursue the greatest pleasure or happiness and reduce pain or suffering. This was later developed further by Bentham (1988) into full-scale utilitarianism. Based on the principle of utility, potential offenders can be deterred by increasing sanctions and thus more compliance occurs.
- 7.
William and Hawkins (1986), for instance, summarized relevant findings and argued that there is little evidence for the association between perceived sanction severity and self-reported involvement in crime.
- 8.
Here the “third parties” refer to all non-state actors involved in deterrence.
- 9.
“Acquaintance society” was primarily proposed by Fei Xiaotong, Xiangtu Zhongguo. Shanghai: Guancha, 1948 (translated as From the Soil: The Foundations of Chinese Society, Univ. of California Press, 1992). Fei was a pioneering Chinese researcher and professor of sociology and anthropology. Acquaintance society generally refers to interpersonal relationships.
- 10.
Guanxi describes the basic dynamic in personalized networks of influence and is a central idea in Chinese society (from Wikipedia).
- 11.
Unlike most objective deterrence literature that examines sanction severity, this study examines the regulated actors’ sanction impact, as it is more adaptive to the subjective approach.
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Yan, H. (2017). Subjective Rational Compliance Calculation and Deterrence: Theory and Empirical Evidence. In: Pesticide Law and Compliance Decision Making. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3917-1_3
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