Abstract
Questions have persisted regarding China’s commitment to achieving the stated aims of sanctions and implementation. They reflect statements such as “sanctions in themselves are not the end” and the way to resolve the nuclear issue and pursue peace is through diplomacy. China objects to the inspection of cargos to and from the DPRK. Its many interests, held by different actors and entering the political space at different stages, are played out in how sanctions are implemented. It has played a pivotal role in preventing the expansion of the list of sanctioned persons and entities. While maintaining that it is a “responsible power,” China ensures the stability of the regime in Pyongyang by not allowing sanctions to reach close to key government figures and by a liberal interpretation of what counts as luxury goods.
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Notes
- 1.
United Nations Document S/RES/1718 (2006).
- 2.
“China resolutely opposes DPRK nuclear test,” Xinhua, October 9, 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-10/09/content_5180203.htm, accessed August 8, 2013; see also “China urges North Korea not to test missile,” China Daily, June 29, 2006, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/29/content_628845.htm accessed Nov 1, 2013; Joseph Kahn, “Angry China is likely to toughen its stand on Korea,” The New York Times, October 10, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/10/world/asia/10china.html, accessed November 1, 2013.
- 3.
In 2006, China’s condemnation of the DPRK was almost immediate, and resolution 1718 was passed within days of the nuclear test. In contrast, resolution 1874 in 2009 took two weeks for China to approve. “Shades of Red: China’s debate over North Korea,” Asia Report, No. 179, Crisis Group, 2009.
- 4.
United Nations Documents: S/PV.5551, 4; SC/8853, 4; United Nations Yearbook 2006, 446, http://unyearbook.un.org/2006YUN/2006_P1_CH4.pdf, March 13, 2013.
- 5.
United Nations Documents S/PV.5551, 4; S/PV.6141, 3.
- 6.
“China does not approve of the practice of inspecting cargo to and from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. We therefore have reservations about the relevant provisions of the resolutions,” United Nations Document S/PV.5551, 4; “I wish to stress that the issue of cargo inspection is complex and sensitive. Countries need to act prudently and in strict accordance with domestic and international law and on the condition of reasonable grounds and sufficient evidence.” United Nations Document S/PV.6141, 3.
- 7.
David Cortright and George Lopez, “Bombs, Carrots, and Sticks: The use of incentives and sanctions” Arms Control Today 35, no. 2 (March 2005): 19–24 (full text also available from http://legacy.armscontrol.org/act/2005_03/Cortright, accessed September 23, 2015); George Lopez and David Cortright, “Economic Sanctions and Human Rights: Part of the problem or part of the solution,” International Journal of Human Rights 1, no. 2 (1999): 1–25.
- 8.
United Nations Document S/2010/571 (2010), 11 (paragraph 18).
- 9.
See United Nations Documents: S/Res/1718 (2006); S/Res/1874 (2009); S/Res/2087 (2013); S/Res/2094 (2013); S/Res/2270 (2016); S/Res 2321 (2016).
- 10.
China has been cited as being the key to success of sanctions against North Korea; however, it has failed to act on the resolutions with sufficient vigilance to ensure the sanctions are successful. Marcus Noland, “The (non) impact of UN sanctions on North Korea,” East-West Centre Working Papers, no. 98 (2009): 3–4; for a more extensive look at the trade links between China and the DPRK see: Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, “Engaging North Korea: the efficacy of sanctions and inducements,” in Etel Soingen, ed., Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 241–243.
- 11.
This synthesis is derived from a number of sources. Key documents that discuss China’s multiple interests include Ren Xiao, “Rowing Together: A Chinese Perspective,” Issues and Insights 13, no. 9 (2013).
- 12.
Dick K. Nanto and Mark E. Manyin, “China-North Korea Relations,” (CRS report No. R41043) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010), fn10; “Top DPRK leader meets Chinese vice-president on relations,” Xinhua, July 26, 2013.
- 13.
Abanti Bhattacharya, “North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Challenges and Options for China,” Strategic Analysis 30, no. 4 (October 2006); Gregory J. Moore, “How North Korea Threatens China’s interests: understanding China’s ‘duplicity’ on the North Korean Nuclear issue,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 8 (2008):1–29; North Koreans that are currently in the border area are already perceived to be potential problems for China’s security. See: Carla Freeman and Drew Thompson, China on the Edge: China’s Border Provinces and Chinese Security Policy (Centre for the National Interest and Johns Hopkins SAIS, April 2011), 25; Nanto and Manyin, 2010, 5.
- 14.
China “offers diplomatic cover and minimizes any punishment that might be agreed upon by the international community,” Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman, “The ‘illogic’ of China’s North Korea policy,” Asia Times Online, May 19, 2012, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/NE19Ad02.html; see also Jane Perlez, “China says it won’t forsake North Korea, despite support for UN sanctions,” The New York Times, March 9, 2013; Jasper Kim, “Will the China-NK alliance remain stable?” Global Times, February 17, 2013; Moore, 2012, 19; furthermore, this relationship is described by some as being “sealed in blood,” Freeman and Thompson, 2011, 5.
- 15.
This is seen by some to be a prestige issue for China; Ding Gang, “More open North Korea an asset to China,” Global Times, May 1, 2013.
- 16.
As China stated at the meeting on July 15, 2006, its first objective is to maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula rather than preventing the development of nuclear capabilities, United Nations Document S/PV.5490 (2006), 5. Xi Jinping is quoted as saying in April 2013, “No one should be allowed to throw a region and even the whole world into chaos for selfish gain,” Jane Perlez and Choe Sang-Hun, “China Hints at Limits to North Korea Actions,” The New York Times, April 7, 2013; Malcolm Moore, “China and Russia urge North Korea to step back from missile launch,” The Telegraph, April 10, 2013; “Russia, China urge North Korea to drop rocket launch plan,” Reuters, December 3, 2012; “China urges North Korea not to test missile,” China Daily, June 29, 2006; David McNeill, “China warns North Korea it will not tolerate ‘troublemaking,’” The Independent, April 11, 2013.
- 17.
Ben Blanchard, “China’s anger at North Korea overcomes worry over US stealth flights,” Reuters, April 1, 2013; Joseph Kahn, “Angry China is likely to toughen its stand on Korea,” The New York Times, October 10, 2006; also Moore, 2008.
- 18.
Moore, 2008.
- 19.
Bhattacharya, 2006.
- 20.
The argument that there are many actors in Chinese foreign policymaking can be found in a number of works, e.g., Linda Jacobsen and Dean Knox, New Foreign Policy Actors in China, SPIRI Policy Paper No. 26, September 2010; Gilbert Rozman, ed., Chinese Foreign Policy: Who Makes It, and How Is It Made? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); and, Shaun Breslin, “China and the South: Objectives, Actors and Interactions,” Development and Change 44, no. 6 (2014):1273–1294.
- 21.
United Nations Document S/Res1718 (2006).
- 22.
United Nations Document S/Res1874.
- 23.
The Ocean Maritime Management Company has been investigated by the PoE since 2013 when the ship the Chong Chon Gang was interdicted in Panama and found to have sanctioned items on board encased in sugar. Since the interdiction, the PoE have continued their reports.
- 24.
UN Security Council Report 2015, Monthly Forecast August 2015, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2015-08/, accessed September 18, 2015, 10.
- 25.
United Nations Document S/2012.422, fn. 12.
- 26.
The problems and costs of controlling private companies are highlighted in Daniel W. Drezner, “Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When is cooperation counterproductive?” International Organization 52, no. 1 (2000): 73–102.
- 27.
Personal interview with the author, New York, February 1, 2013.
- 28.
Breslin, 2014.
- 29.
Both Japan and Australia keep Open access lists of “luxury goods.” For Australia’s list see: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea),” http://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/security/sanctions/sanctions-regimes/pages/democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea-north-korea.aspx%20, accessed September 23, 2015; for a more detailed discussion of the implications of China’s approach to luxury goods see: Kevin Stahler, “In the lap of luxury” North Korea: Witness to Transformation, Peterson Institute, published April 29, 2015 at http://blogs.piie.com/nk/?p=14078, accessed September 23, 2015.
- 30.
United Nations Document S/2015/131, 42.
- 31.
United Nations Document S/2013/337, para. 54.
- 32.
It falls on the PoE in this case to find out whether appropriate laws are “on the books” in each country around the world; in many countries, there are anti-terrorism laws fit for this purpose, and in some countries, international laws are, a priori, domestic laws.
- 33.
Nanto and Manyin, 2010, 15–16.
- 34.
Freeman and Thompson, 2011, 24.
- 35.
Stephan Haggard, Jennifer Lee, and Marcus Noland, “Integration in the absence of institutions: China-North Korea Cross-Border exchange,” Asian Journal of Economics, no. 23 (2012): 130–145.
- 36.
Ibid., 132.
- 37.
Drew Thompson, Silent Partners: Chinese Joint Ventures in North Korea, US-Korea Institute at SAIS Report, February 2011.
- 38.
An example is Ryonha Company and its various partners and alias, United Nations Documents S/2015/131, 66–67.
- 39.
“DPRK woos investors at China expo,” Xinhua, October 20, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-10/20/c_133729778.htm, accessed May 14, 2015; “North Korea wins $1.3 billion investments pledges from China,” Chosun Ilbo, October 22, 2014, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/10/22/2014102201179.html, accessed May 14, 2015.
- 40.
“China, North Korea to open border trade zone —media,” Xinhua, July 13, 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/07/13/uk-china-northkorea-trade-idUKKCN0PN1C820150713%20, accessed September 23, 2015.
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Jones, C. (2018). China’s Interests, Actors, and the Implementation of Sanctions against North Korea. In: Rozman, G., Radchenko, S. (eds) International Relations and Asia’s Northern Tier. Asan-Palgrave Macmillan Series. Palgrave, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3144-1_15
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