Skip to main content

Optimal Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups

A Mathematical Model

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
  • 1117 Accesses

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 646))

Abstract

When trying to influence legislators, interest groups can either try to persuade them by informative signalling or exert an indirect pressure by mobilizing voters through the launch of appropriate campaigns. Both activities require substantial efforts and the use of financial resources. Their allocation between the two strategies can be optimized as a function of the parameters contained in the mathematical model presented in this article. The sensitivity of the resulting allocation of resources with respect to the parameters can also be approximately estimated.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

References

  1. Baumgartner, F.R., Leech, B.L.: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science. Princeton University Press, Princeton (1998)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Hall, R.L., Deardorff, A.V.: Lobbying as legislative subsidy. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 100, 69–84 (2006)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. Downs, A.: An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper, New York (1957)

    Google Scholar 

  4. De Figueiredo, J., De Figueiredo, R.J.P.: The allocation of resources by interest groups: lobbying, litigation and administrative regulation. Bus. Politics 4, 161–181 (2002)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  5. Rosset, S., Neuman, E., Eick, U., Vatnick, N., Idan, I.: Evaluation of prediction for marketing campaigns. In: Proceedings of KDD-2001, pp. 456–461. AAAI Press, Menlo Park (2001)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Bard, Y.: Nonlinear Parameter Estimation. Academic Press, New York (1974)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  7. Huckfeldt, R., Sprague, J.: Political parties and electoral mobilization: political structure, social structure, and the party canvass. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 86, 70–86 (1992)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Wielhouwer, P.W.: In search of lincoln’s perfect list: targeting in grassroots campaigns. Am. Politics Res. 3, 632–669 (2003)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. Abramowitz, M., Stegun, I.A.: Handbook of Mathematical Functions. Dover Books, Mineola (1965)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  10. Solberg, R.S., Waltenburg, E.N.: Why do interest groups engage the judiciary? Policy wishes and structural needs. Soc. Sci. Q. 87, 558–572 (2006)

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Max-Sebastian Dovì .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer Science+Business Media Singapore

About this paper

Cite this paper

Dovì, MS. (2016). Optimal Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups. In: Zhang, L., Song, X., Wu, Y. (eds) Theory, Methodology, Tools and Applications for Modeling and Simulation of Complex Systems. AsiaSim SCS AutumnSim 2016 2016. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 646. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-2672-0_26

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-2672-0_26

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore

  • Print ISBN: 978-981-10-2671-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-981-10-2672-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics