Abstract
In this chapter a formalisation of Scheffler’s inscriptionalist approach will be attempted. As noted at the end of the previous chapter, the aforementioned formalisation will rely heavily on the work of Goodman , Quine , Martin and Woodger . Martin’s work is of particular importance.
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Notes
- 1.
In The Notion of Analytic Truth (1959) Martin came up with a definition of analytic truth which may be regarded as capturing necessity construed semantically. However, the definition which he provided there was not intended for an inscriptional meta-language. As far as I am aware Martin never attempted to supply an inscription-friendly definition of analytic truth.
- 2.
In the previous chapter it was suggested that Scheffler’s analysis may be adapted to handle de re reports in such a way that open-sentence inscriptions would (on occasion) be denoted by his that-clause predicates. Should this approach be adopted, axiom ThatR1 must be altered slightly. This approach would also require that a triadic (or higher) belief relation between agents, open-sentences and individuals be introduced, along with an axiom governing this relation. None of this creates any difficulties. However, to simplify matters, the system presented in this chapter won’t include this extra material.
References
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Parsons, D. (2016). An Inscriptional Meta-Language. In: Theories of Intensionality . Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-2484-9_13
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