Abstract
Intensional logics are formal systems that differentiate an expression’s intension (broadly, its connotation or sense) from its extension (its ordinary referent or denotation).
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Notes
- 1.
Of course, scientists now assert that the number of planets is 8 rather than 9. However, the old numbering is assumed here and throughout the rest of this work simply to facilitate discussion of the intensionality literature of the past in which (10) and (11) were popular examples, and it was held that 9 numbered the planets.
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Parsons, D. (2016). Introduction. In: Theories of Intensionality . Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-2484-9_1
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