The Crucial Naval Battle Near Penghu

Abstract

Penghu, or the Pescadores, consists of thirty-six isles, lying approximately 150 km from the Fujian coast. It took seventeenth-century Fujianese travelers a day and two nights to reach. Admiral Shi Lang considered Penghu the gateway to Taiwan from the outset. In 1664 and then in 1665, he tried twice to invade Penghu in vain because of bad weather. But weather did not change his strategy.

Penghu, or the Pescadores, consists of thirty-six isles, lying approximately 150 km from the Fujian coast. It took seventeenth-century Fujianese travelers a day and two nights to reach.¹ Admiral Shi Lang considered Penghu the gateway to Taiwan from the outset. In 1664 and then in 1665, he tried twice to invade Penghu in vain because of bad weather. But weather did not change his strategy. In his memorials dated May and November 1665 Shi repeatedly asserted that in order to take Taiwan the capture of the strategically important Penghu was indispensable.² In 1668, Shi was summoned to Beijing, where he had since stayed thirteen long years. Thanks to the successive recommendations from Yao Qisheng and Li Guangdi, Shi Lang at last got the job he wanted. Kangxi sent Shi back to Fujian to command the navy. The emperor received and entertained Shi with a banquet on 25 September 1681. At the age of 61, Shi assumed his duty in Xiamen on November 15.³ After prolonged absence, Admiral Shi’s return in his advanced age did not affect his fighting spirit. He understood well how difficult the task was and how heavy the responsibility he bore. In order to get the difficult job done, he would have to take full control without any interference. Hence, soon after his arrival, he requested the Qing court to give him the sole authority to coordinate the task of conquering Taiwan. To put it more bluntly, he wished both Governor-general Yao and Governor Wu in Fujian to get out of his way. Neither Yao nor Wu, however, wanted to be excluded in the forthcoming campaign. As Yao told the emperor, he and Wu had raised the funds, trained the men, and built the ships for a long time and were most reluctant to be left out. Yet, Shi did not simply arrogate power to himself; really, he tried to prevent anyone from disrupting his strategy, which he made clear in a secret message to the court soon after his arrival in Xiamen.

9.1 Controversy Over Strategy

As Shi Lang stated more than decade ago, his strategy was to seize Penghu as the stepping stone to conquer Taiwan. As he put it,

Once Penghu is captured, we would know the enemy better and could then move on to take Taiwan successfully. Should the enemy retreat to Taiwan and hold up tight, our military forces at Penghu could still exert enormous pressure on them in short distance, waiting for their fall like a ripen fruit. Otherwise, we could also use Penghu as a jumping board to invade and eliminate enemy on Taiwan in the time of early spring.⁴

Admiral Shi’s war plan can be summarized as follows: (a) to invade Penghu and eliminate the Zheng’s main military forces; (b) to occupy Penghu and use it as menace to Taiwan, hoping for its quick surrender; (c) if the Zhengs were not to surrender, the Qing fleet could then make thrust from Penghu into Taiwan. What eventually had happened was pretty much to follow his plan, even though he did not anticipate that Zheng surrendered before a forcible entrance into Taiwan as originally had planned.

As it turned out, Governor-general Yao did not fully agree with Admiral Shi’s strategy. Although Yao conceded that Penghu had to be taken before moving onward to Taiwan, he did not think a successful invasion could solely depend on the single route. Instead, Yao suggested that he and Governor Wu be allowed to assault Danshui in northern Taiwan to assist Admiral Shi’s advance to Penghu to the south. Yao pled to the Qing court that he would not feel at ease to let the admiral, who had just recently taken his job, go to the war alone. He assured the court that he was most anxiously looking forward to the battle and his participation in the expedition would not affect the security of Fujian, while he would surely reinforce the admiral’s armed forces to complete the great historical task.⁵

But Shi Lang regarded Yao’s suggestion as utterly unrealistic, and feard the governor-general might rock the boat of his strategy. He was thus even more convinced than any time earlier that he had to have the control of the entire operation. Specifically, the invasion should be accomplished in two steps: first to concentrate all the forces to destroy the enemy’s naval stronghold in Penghu and then moved on to the next step of conquering Taiwan. Hence, in his follow-up message to Kangxi dated 1 March 1682, Shi pled for “the total command of the expedition” (zhuanzheng 专征) . He straightforwardly stated that the governor-general, a northerner, knowing little of naval affairs, was inappropriate to supervise the sea-crossing campaign against Taiwan. Instead, as Shi requested, Yao should stay behind in his headquarter at Xiamen for coordination, and his responsibility be limited to logistical matters at which Yao was good. In other words, Shi Lang would not subordinate to Governor-general Yao so far as the command of all the invasion forces were concerned.⁶

When General Lahada 喇哈达 , the commander of Manchu troops in Fujian, incidentally revealed to Yao the above-mentioned Shi’s request in a secret message to the throne, Yao was so upset that he delivered rebuttal in a memorial to Kangxi, in which he answered Shi’s criticism almost point by point: “Although I am a northerner, I have been fine when sailing to the seas just recently and how does [Shi] know I could not do my best at high sea?” He protested that he would rather die at sea than stay behind in Xiamen.⁷ Yao appeared adamant. In his reply dated 6 December 1681, Kangxi confirmed Yao as the supreme commander of all the forces in Fujian to assist Shi in the event of invasion. His Majesty, however, excused Governor Wu Xingzuo of Fujian from being involved in any military matter.⁸ Consequently, Shi Lang did not get what all he wanted. Clearly, Kangxi did not want to undermine the legitimate power of a governor-general. His Majesty might also want to have a balance between the senior Yao and the able Shi. But Shi refused to give up his request. To be sure, Shi knew that Yao was one of those who strongly recommended him to take the post, but he seemed genuinely believed that Yao’s misplaced suggestion and incompetence in the high sea would be a serious obstacle to his success.⁹ As well, the unyielding Yao was resentful of Shi’s obstruction, as understandably he was most reluctant to miss such a great event. How Kangxi resolved the “Shi-Yao rivalry?” Although the repeated postponements of the Taiwan invasion were due mainly to weather, it could be easily related to the rivalry of the two leaders in Fujian.

Kangxi’s imperial order of invasion reached Yao and Shi on 6 June 1682, and four days later Shi and Yao placed the Fujian fleet in battle formation and on June 10 brought the expeditionary forces to Tongshan, where to wait for favorable winds and currents before setting sail. The monsoonal climate brings cool wind from northern Asia from October to March, and brings warm wind from May to September. But the winds and currents were unfavorable on June 11, and the task force had to turn back to the port. Shi and Yao were now locked in dispute about which direction of wind they should wait for, that is whether they should attack Penghu from north or from south. Shi insisted on using the south wind all along because it is relatively gentle and more secured when approaching to the enemy-occupied islands. Yao, however, argued that south wind though facilitated to invade Penghu would not be able to reach Taiwan afterward, while north wind could bring the invading forces to both Penghu and Taiwan.¹⁰ Yao thus proposed for a 5-month postponement in order to wait for favorable north wind in November. But Shi disagreed with postponement and considered it reckless to try to assault Penghu and Taiwan at the same time. All along, his strategy was to secure Penghu first and then move on to Taiwan. Some years after the conquest of Taiwan, when chatting with Li Guangdi, Shi told how he reached Penghu by using south wind. The relatively gentle winds and calm seas had kept his large fleet sailing in an orderly fashion. The only risk was the unpredictable typhoon, but it was a matter of luck beyond his consideration.¹¹

Although Admiral Shi held up his strategy tight, Governor-general Yao insisted on his way. Given the fact that officially Yao was the superior, Shi had to concede, however unwillingly.¹² The Qing court, indeed, went along with Yao’s proposal to postpone the invasion to November.¹³ To cut down excessive military expenses, Lahada’s Manchu corps left Fujian for Beijing on 29 September 1682.¹⁴ The invasion was thus temporarily called off. Yao brought his fleet back to Tongshan while Shi’s to Yunxiao. Shi waited no time to discredit Yao. He told the emperor that Yao had made him miss the timely July south wind to invade Penghu.¹⁵ He reiterated that the Zhengs would not submit themselves to the Qing without resorting to force, and that he was willing to take the full responsibility for the invasion.¹⁶ Yao might also be anxious to get the invasion re-started, Shi said, but he suffered from terrible seasick. On board a ship earlier, as Shi went on, Yao vomited badly, barely keeping up his body straight. Shi suspected Yao could be intimated by hazardous sea and thus become hesitating in action. In this long memorial, while again trying hard to keep Yao out from commanding the expeditionary forces, Shi tried to impress Emperor Kangxi with his knowledge and confidence in getting the job done successfully.¹⁷

The Shi-Yao controversy and the repeated postponements annoyed the emperor, who showed visible displeasure at Shi’s repeated attempts to exclude Yao from the expedition.¹⁸ Since the controversy involved competing judgments and strategies, the emperor had to make a prudent choice. His Majesty instructed the Grand Secretary Mingzhu to look into the matter and study potential candidates for leading this vitally important and yet extremely difficult campaign. The celebrated Fujian scholar Li Guangdi told Mingzhu that Shi Lang was the man. On 4 November 1682, in the court session, Mingzhu reported the decision of approving Shi’s request on the ground that let Yao and Shi both lead the campaign could “impede each other by the elbow.” The emperor conceded and made Shi the commander-in-chief of the invasion. Both Governor-general Yao and Governor Wu, the emperor added, should assist Shi with regard to all the logistical matters without any mishaps. His Majesty did not forget to remind all his officials how important the matter was.¹⁹ The Shi-Yao rivalry thus came to conclusion.

In retrospect, personal animosity aside, it was indeed involved a major strategic difference in the conduct of war. Yao’s proposed strike at Zheng’s weak point in northern Taiwan to obtain a foothold could be dilatory and uselessly wasteful. Shi’s persistent insistence on launching the first and decisively strikes on the enemy’s naval stronghold in Penghu proved effective. Only after the enemy’s naval power was destroyed could then safely move on to conquer Taiwan.²⁰ Shi also opposed to Yao’s unfailing hope for a political settlement of the conflict. In spite of Zheng’s repeated refusal to surrender on the Qing’s terms, Yao still considered that it would be better if the costly invasion could be avoided after all. For Shi, “friendly persuasion” would work only when a military solution was feasible. At no time did he believe that the invasion was impracticable. Past experience indicated to Shi that negotiations only allowed the enemy to buy time for releasing military pressure. He was truly convinced that short of using force the Taiwan question would never be fully resolved.²¹

Without doubt the Kangxi emperor’s decision was made after careful deliberation. He realized the bickering between the governor-general and the admiral could inflict damage on his endeavor of subjugating Taiwan. When he had to make the choice, the priority of Shi’s ability and experiences in naval warfare was clearly placed above the seniority of Yao. The brilliant Kangxi wisely dropped the Shi-Yao joint venture in favor of a division of labor. Incidentally, Yao showed his strength in supplying logistical provisions at rear and in attracting the enemies to surrender, while Admiral Shi Lang fought bravely on the frontline.

On the eve of the invasion, Yao succeeded in winning tens of thousand Zheng officers and soldiers to come over, thus lowering significantly the Zheng morale in Taiwan. The political turmoil following the death of Zheng Jing plus economical stress made so many Zheng followers despair. On his part, Governor-general Yao, taking the advantage of the enemy’s low morale, set up an apparatus which he called “xiulai guan” 修来馆 (the houses for soliciting defectors) to welcome the disillusioned from the enemy camp with rewards and the promise of settling them down in the mainland. As Yao noted in his report, the response was overwhelming. Besides placing the aged and the weak back to their respective home towns, no less than several thousand officers and tens of thousand soldiers were assigned to various different jobs. The rest would settle down in the newly available lands which had been evacuated during the time of maritime interdict.²²

Admiral Shi was fairly contended after he was given the supreme command of the invasion. Even though he was still officially subordinate to Yao, he enjoyed the privilege of bypassing Yao to exchange secret notes with the emperor. This unpublicized privilege allowed the admiral to upstage the governor-general. The admiral was worthy of the trust, as he meticulously executed his plan of invasion. With the emperor’s trust, Shi virtually got a free hand to pursue the historical mission.

9.2 The Naval Battles off the Penghu Islands

The imperial edict dated 18 November 1682, which formally authorized Shi Lang to assume the supreme commander and to restrict Yao’s duties to logistical matters, reached Shi at Xiutu 秀涂 in Quanzhou Bay, where the admiral was drilling his naval armada. The emperor, though granted Shi what Shi wanted, also took Yao’s advice not to close the door for peace. The imperial instruction clearly stated that the rebels should be given yet another chance to surrender before starting the invasion.²³ Yao, however, borrowed the emperor’s instruction to argue that Taiwan could be subjugated without resorting to war, when Shi Lang was preparing the imminent invasion. In a report dated 8 February 1683, Yao stated as follows:

The rebels in Taiwan are not easy to be persuaded into giving up, nor do we have obtained the opportunity of war. [Hence I] propose to cut off any supplies [to Taiwan] from three coastal provinces [Fujian, Guangdong, and Zhejiang], block Taiwan’s foreign trade, disrupt the pirates [the Zhengs]’ farming [on land], and use espionage to create confusion, [the end result of which] would make [the enemy] want of food, fall in a woeful predicament, and seed discords among their soldiers and officers. [When that happen], [the Zhengs] would give up whether [we] use force or not. Therefore, it is not to say that Taiwan could not be pacified by force, but that [Taiwan] could be subjugated not just by force.²⁴

Yao’s intention was clear: he wanted to find an alternative to Shi Lang’s single-minded preparedness for war. He could still upstaged Shi, if he should be able to compel the Zhengs on Taiwan to surrender by espionage and economic blockade. Shi quickly dismissed Yao’s strategy as unrealistic. He recognized serious enemy dissension and so many defectors from Penghu and Taiwan, but he never believed the enemy would quit so easily. Although the massive defections from Taiwan indicated the severe trouble inside the island, the Zheng leadership was still adamantly unyielding. It would not give in lest the Qing should grant the status compatible to that of Korea or Ryukyu. Besides enjoying the full autonomy, the Zhengs also refused to shave their heads as subjugation. Yet as all the Qing officials publicly stated repeatedly that the people in Taiwan were mainly Fujianese and they could never be exempt from shaving heads.²⁵ Therefore, there was really no chance for peaceful solution.

Shi and his armada were ready to go at any favorable moment in early 1683.²⁶ Even on the eve of Shi’s departure for invasion, however, pessimism remained unabated. Yao Qisheng continued to work for a solution short of war, and Wan Zhengse, now the army commander in Fujian, endorsed Yao’s efforts by pointing out three insurmountable obstacles to the invasion, namely, the decades-old enemy too strong to deal with, the ocean crossing warfare too hazardous to take, and the Zheng naval vessels too well-equipped to defeat.²⁷ Shi Lang’s repeated delays in setting off always added doubt about the expedition. Nevertheless, Shi wasted no time to rebut pessimism. He pronounced the day of invasion not just imminent but near. The Zhengs troubled by massive desertion could not hold long after his strike. He was confidant enough to state on 12 May 1683 that the enemy’s day was numbered.²⁸

Admiral Shi Lang received sufficient supplies for his 21,000 troops, 70 big black warships, 103 supply ships, and 65 double mast vessels in early December 1682. Shi dispatched some of his scouting vessels approaching to Penghu to spy on Zheng’s defense apparatus on the islands and returned safely. The admiral then moved forward to deploy his main forces north to Pinghai 平海 island at the Bay of Xinghua 兴化 . His battleships included “eagle boats” and “double headed boats;” the latter could be steered at both ends.²⁹ The “white bottomed boats” built at the port of Quanzhou could also be used in battle. It was, as I.A. Donnelly describes, “a wonderful sea boat of not more than 75 feet in length by about 15 feet beam on deck”.³⁰ Admiral Shi’s armada, indeed, appeared very impressive.

At Pinghai the admiral reported that he found the unusual dry well yielding fresh water. The well was thus named as “the navy’s spring” (shiquan 师泉) and the people at the time considered it a good omen on the eve of the invasion. Shi publicized the event to compliment the emperor and to bolster the morale of his men.³¹ Now Shi’s main concern was weather. Bad weather, such as sudden changes in winds and currents, had turned back his fleet many times before. He knew well that every additional postponement would cost him political support. He made two attempts to set sail to Penghu in February 1683. Both failed because of shift in winds. But he used every opportunity to train his men during the abortive voyages. ³²

The Zhengs on Taiwan had been nervous ever since their 1680 retreat from the mainland coast. Giving up seven prefectures and nineteen garrisons in two years was bad enough. Worse still, tremendous loss in materials and heavy casualties were decidedly depressing and painful to the Zhengs. The defection of the able naval commander Zhu Tiangui together with him numerous men and ships to the Qing struck Zheng a violent blow. In fact, Zheng Jing had lost his will to rule. He made his elder son Kezang 克臧 the acting ruler. But this did not enhance Kezang’s chance to succession. A bloody coup took place shortly after the death of Zheng Jing on 16 March 1681. The younger son, Keshuang 克塽 murdered his brother Kezang with the encouragement and support of his father-in-law, the powerful minister Feng Xifan 冯锡范 . Such a vicious power struggle alienated many Zheng followers.³³ The threat of an attack from the mainland exerted tremendous pressure on the island inhabitants. The rumor of an imminent invasion on northern Taiwan caused a panic in 1681.³⁴ Under the circumstances, the constant Qing enticement attracted many Zheng followers to go over. Suspicion and tension soon arose among the Zhengs. In September 1681, the Zheng authorities replaced Dong Teng 董腾 , the garrison commander of Penghu, with Admiral Lin Sheng because Dong’s aide, Wang Yibao 王一保 , had entertained a peace envoy sent from the mainland. Wang committed suicide for fear of persecution.³⁵ Then there came the Fu Weilin 傅为霖 case. As a wealthy merchant, Fu had collaborated with three prominent Zheng officials in making secret contacts with the Qing Governor-general Yao across the Taiwan Strait. All the conspirators were sentenced to death. The trial was not unfair, but Feng Xifan used it to implicate his political foe, Shen Rui 沈瑞 , and to confiscate his properties. All these generated fear and anger among the Zheng followers in Taiwan.³⁶

Deteriorated finance caused deeper dissatisfaction among the island inhabitants. High taxes were levied to meet government needs. The most oppressive of all was the so-called “housing tax” which compelled many homeowners to burn down their houses in order to avoid unbearable payments. In 1682, more misfortunes deepened the crisis. An epidemic in northern Taiwan killed many garrison soldiers in February, a big fire destroyed one thousand and more houses at Anping in July, and a famine caused rice prices skyrocket and brought about widespread starvation from December on.³⁷

What happened in Taiwan assisted Governor-General Yao’s renewed effort for attracting defectors in 1683. Indeed, Zheng’s deputy Commander Liu Bingzhong responded to a call made by Yao on 28 January 1683 and surrendered with his ships and men from Penghu. Liu’s defection increased Yao’s hope for a peaceful solution. He sent Huang Chaoyong 黄朝用 to meet with Liu Guoxuan who, arguably the ablest commander in Zheng’s camp, had contributed to strengthen the defense in Penghu since 1681. Liu constructed additional walls and trenches, placed large pieces of cannon, and installed fortifications on numerous island posts. In the opening of 1683, under his leadership, a respectable defense forces of 120 battleships and 6000 combat men were assembled around Penghu.³⁸ The Qing court, too be sure, still retained a ray of hope for a solution short of war. When Governor-general Yao reported that the Zhengs would accept nothing but full autonomy, however, Kangxi threw his lot with Admiral Shi who advocated war all the time.³⁹ When realizing that the invasion was inevitable, Liu Guoxuan, who rose to prominence during the Feudatory War, reinforced Penghu with additional 19 gunboats, 60 small battleships and 6000 fresh troops.⁴⁰ The defense of northern Taiwan was also strengthened by General He You 何佑.⁴¹

In 1683, between April and July, Admiral Shi watched anxiously for an opportunity to invade. He maneuvered ceaselessly in the strait but could find no favorable southbound wind for sailing to Penghu. In July, under the pressure of Kangxi’s repeated requests to move ahead, he decided not to wait any longer lest he miss the last chance of the year to cross the strait. Postponing the invasion to next year might mean the diminished trust of the emperor and arouse the suspicion of many Qing officials. But a quick decision could be a risky gamble, for the typhoon season had just begun and he could have sailed, after a few fine summer days, into a severe storm and faced almost certain disaster.⁴²

In his lengthy memorials, Admiral Shi kept the emperor informed about his Penghu campaign in detail. The admiral had gathered a gigantic flotilla at Tongshan harbor since late June 1683. In addition to the naval forces, he received 3000 additional land troops from Governor-general Yao’s logistical headquarters in Xiamen. When all preparations were completed, the admiral gave a lavish banquet to all his commanders on July 5 and appointed General Lan Li 蓝理 as his vanguard. Finally, having offered sacrifices to the Sea Goddess for good luck, the armada of 238 ships and over 21,000 men set sail on July 8.⁴³ The curtain of arguably the greatest naval warfare in the seventeenth century was lifted.

The command post at Penghu detected the movement of enemy fleets across the strait, but considered it another false alarm. Liu Guoxuan, the supreme commander of approximately 30,000 men⁴⁴ at Penghu, thought Shi was only trying to prove his resolve to his Qing ruler and would soon turn back. In the morning of July 9, however, Liu’s vanguard units at small islands in the northwest sighted “a wall of masts.” The command headquarters immediately alerted all the Zheng forces. From the very beginning of the battle, Commander Liu chose a highly defensive strategy. To a large extent, he lodged his hope in the storm season that would sooner or later blow off the advancing enemy fleets. He rejected the suggestion that he should aggressively make the first strike on Shi’s armada immediately upon its arrival.⁴⁵

Admiral Shi’s armada left Xiamen for Tongshan on 16 June 1683, waiting for the right moment to sail. On 8 July 1683, the armada sailed into open sea, entered the Penghu waters in darkness, and cast anchor off two small islands, Maoyu 猫屿 and Huayu 花屿 , where Zheng forces were minimal. Having sighted the large enemy fleets, the Maoyu commander Wang Xian 王顯 and others escaped under full sail to Niang’magong 娘马宫 (the present Magong 马公) on the main island of Penghu.⁴⁶ Commander Liu, however, made no attempt to intercept the enemy ships throughout the night, except for instructing each commander to prevent enemy ships from closing up. The day of July 10 dawned fine and clear. Admiral Shi took a northeasterly course toward Niang’magong. The action was joined at the entrance of the bay. The Zheng fleet consisted of no less than 200 ships, large and small, and they were backed up by gunfire from the shores of Xiyu 西屿 (the western isles.)⁴⁷ Following the exchange of gunfire from distance, Shi Lang’s vanguard took the offensive. Strenuous efforts of the Zheng fleets, however, forced the enemy to retreat. Soon Qiu Hui 邱辉 and Jiang Sheng 江升 , two able Zheng naval commanders, took advantage of the receding tide to follow in hot pursuit. Shi Lang’s flagship was attacked from both sides. During the fierce battle, the 63-year old admiral was hit in the right eye. His vanguard, Admiral Lan Li, quickly came to the rescue and provided cover with heavy fire to ease a withdrawal. While Shi was rescued, Admiral Lan was badly wounded in the stomach.⁴⁸ The Zheng side also sustained heavy losses, men as well as ships, and thus made the supreme commander Liu reluctant to take the risk and make the pursuit, which might have delivered a sledgehammer blow against Shi’s disarrayed forces. Even though Commander Lin Sheng, next only to Liu in rank, was severely wounded, Liu Guoxuan was apparently content with having driven the enemy off. He believed that this initial victory would permit him to hold the isles until a storm came to drive back all the enemy ships.⁴⁹ Indeed, Liu reported a “great victory” (dajie 大捷) back to Taiwan.

Liu Guoxuan was not a bad commander. He had performed brilliantly during the Feudatory War in Fujian and won the respect of enemy commanders. But inexperienced in deep-sea battle, he was passive and indecisive. On the opposite side, Shi Lang was far more familiar with naval warfare, and confident even in the wake of an initial setback and his injury. On July 11, regardless his bad wound, he regrouped his squadrons at Bazhao 八罩 , wherefrom he quickly sent for urgent reinforcements from Haitan, Tongshan, and Jinmen, transported Admiral Lan to Xiamen for medical treatment, rewarded or punished commanders according to their performances, and alerted his men throughout the night for a possible surprised attack. When the enemy did not launch the night assault, he set up a rest camp ashore at Bazhao and made a thorough review of whom he should reward or punish. Several captains who had not done their duty were condemned to death. They were, however, given a chance to redeem themselves in the next battle. In short, Shi assessed the situation intelligently and promptly took all measures he deemed necessary after a daylong fierce battle.⁵⁰

Admiral Shi restored his strength by July 12, and then dispatched a small squadron to the channel between Hujing 虎井 and Tongpan 桶盘 to spy out the enemy deployment. In the following two days, he continued patrolling the bay to record currents, the depth of water, and the general natural features. Not until July 16, when a reinforcement of several big ships arrived, did Admiral Shi renew his offensive. On the eve of the offensive, he ordered that each ship raise its commander’s flag at the mast, so he could judge the performances of each commander. Reportedly, at the suggestion of Commander Wu Ying 吴英 , Admiral Shi employed the “five plum blossom formation” (wumeihua zhen 五梅花阵) —using five battleships, like the five leaves of a plum, to encircle one enemy battleship and to concentrate fire on it. The ships, which were not to take part in the main battle, were assigned to patrol the area for interception and support.⁵¹ A recent scholar, however, has raised the doubt about the feasibility of such formation, given the fact that Shi’s ships did not enjoy much numerical superiority over the enemy.⁵² Since Shi had practiced this formation a long time ago when he worked for Zheng Chenggong, he seemed to have no reason not to use it during the Penghu campaign. It seems that the idea is simply to attack one enemy ship with more ships at a time, not necessarily requiring five times of ships to make the strategy work.

The main striking forces were divided into eight squadrons of seven ships each with Admiral Shi in the middle.⁵³ They moved toward Niang’magong in three waves on the morning of July 16. A veteran by the name of Chen Mang 陈蟒 , who took part in Zheng Chenggong’s invasion of Taiwan some twenty years ago, defected to the Qing and accompanied Admiral Shi Lang as advisor. The battle formation was as follows: Admiral Shi commanded the central squadron with his son Shi Shiji 施世骥 to command the central squadrons in the second wave. To the left was Commander Wu Ying’s squadron with Commanders Chen Long 陈龙 , Chen Chang 陈昌 in the second wave. To the right was Commander Zhu Tiangui together with Commanders He Yingyuan 何应元 and Luo Shizhen 罗士珍 in the second wave. The last wave of two squadrons was commanded by Lin Xian 林贤 to the right and Yang Jiarui 杨嘉瑞 to the left. Soon after this large invasion fleet departed, two flotillas of 50 small ships each started their cruise in two different directions as a diversion: one to the Niuxin 牛心 cove in the northwest and the other to the Jilongshan 鸡笼山 isles in the northeast. The remaining vessels of various kinds served as rear reinforcements. Admiral Shi’s offensive was much better organized this time.⁵⁴

The defenders on Penghu were on full alert, and assembled no less than hundred battle ships, but Commander Liu again made no effort to gain the initiative. Upon sighting the invasion forces, he instructed the garrison commanders to send a cannonade into them from Niang’magong base. Then he set out with his ships from the harbor to meet the challenge. A fierce engagement took place in the bay. The naval warfare had become much fierce since the days of Zheng Chenggong’s invasion of Penghu and Taiwan little over two decades ago. Apart from involving far more numerous vessels on both sides, the belligerent battle ships deployed heavy cannons up approximately 20,000 lb in weight, including some Dutch ones, in comparison to Zheng Chenggong’s ship which had the capacity of installing mere 1767 lb cannon. As the big cannon was said to mount both on bow and stern, the battle ship had to make 180° turn after gunfire but to allow the time for reloading and kept firing by turning the ship around constantly. This large scale of naval warfare, in terms of firepower, greatly dwarfed the one Zheng Chenggong fought the Dutch at the Dayuan bay.⁵⁵ Commander Zhu Tiangui was the first high-ranking officer to die in the battle. Zhu, who had defected to the Qing earlier, had many friends and relatives among the Zheng ranks. While trying to talk them into surrender during the battle, he overly exposed himself to gunfire and thus being killed. Governor-general Yao, in his report to the Qing court, sang lavish praises of Zhu’s bravery in battle. After the war, the Kangxi emperor honored Zhu posthumously.⁵⁶

At the critical moment, Admiral Shi concentrated fire on one big enemy ship at a time. The Zheng navy, though armed with Dutch cannons, took a severe beating. One of their commanders, Jiang Sheng, burnt himself to death after being encircled. Other commanding ships were also hit and sunk. Qiu Hui , arguably the bravest Zheng commander, tried in vain to get out of the enemy trap. After having set many enemy ships aflame with firearms and having killed many Qing warriors with shotguns and arrows, Qiu was eventually pinned down. He lit gunpowder kegs when the enemy soldiers were boarding his ship and reportedly died with sword in hand.⁵⁷ Qiu was a victim of the Qing’s “Evacuation Law” in Guangdong, and joined the Zhengs in 1666 to become a naval commander and in the end died from resisting the Qing.

Zheng’s supreme commander Liu Guoxuan participated in the battle in person. He too ran into trouble. Five captains under his command went down with their ships. Several sources mention that Liu looked forlorn in the moments of defeat. When he sighted dark clouds on the horizon, he thought that a storm was finally coming to his assistance. But thunder, which suggests the subsiding of the winds, suddenly disappointed him and, in fact, destroyed his will to fight.⁵⁸ He was now fully convinced that he suffered incredibly bad luck and was destined to lose the battle. Thus, instead of returning to Niang’magong, he abandoned all his damaged battle ships and escaped with dozens of small vessels to Taiwan through the hazardous waterway of Houmen 吼门.⁵⁹

At the end of the day, July 17, virtually all of Zheng’s battle ships were either damaged or sunk and approximately 12,000 Zheng men perished.⁶⁰ Upon hearing of Liu Guoxuan’s escape, most garrison commanders surrendered. According to Admiral Shi’s own account, altogether 165 Zheng officers and 4800 fighting men surrendered themselves.⁶¹ Only Wu Qian 吴潜 , the Zheng commander at Xiyu in the west, refused to give up. He attempted to help his colleagues on the main island. But he had no ship to go. So he simply fired cannons to show defiance. When the battle was totally lost, he committed suicide. His deputy Lin Hao 林好 handed over the remaining Zheng forces. By the dawn of July 18, all of Penghu had fallen into Admiral Shi Lang’s hands.⁶²

This 7-day sea battle for Penghu was tense and fierce. Liu Guoxuan lost the battle in part because of his reckoning on storm to come to his rescue; however, his was not entirely a wishful thinking. It was already in typhoon season. As Governor-general Yao informed the Qing court, the campaign enjoyed the several critical days of incredible calm and unruffled sea. Indeed, the unusually good weather throughout the week made Admiral Shi the victor.⁶³ To be sure, there was an element of luck, but the willingness to take the calculated risk showed his valor.

As Shi later told his friend, he was also pleased to know that Liu Guoxuan was the commander of Penghu not because of Liu’s weakness but because of Liu’s strength. Only the defeat of the capable Liu could then convince the Zhengs in Taiwan to surrender.⁶⁴ No doubt, Shi as well showed personal perseverance, brilliant admiralship, and tactical acumen in the use of his forces. He certainly had a group of talented and dedicated commanders, as well as dozens of loyal relatives, to work with him. His high-ranking commander Lin Xian and crews, for example, fought so courageously that they either severely wounded or dead. Even Governor-general Yao, Shi’s rival, dutifully managed the logistic matters so well for him.

In his report of success to Emperor Kangxi, Admiral Shi Lang estimated damaged or sank specifically 194 enemy ships of all sorts, and killed 12,347 enemy soldiers, of whom 47 were identified as high-ranking commanders. The victors were most likely exaggerating the enemy’s loss, while minimizing their own. The initial report about the casualties on the Qing side, given the magnitude of naval warfare, were unbelievably small, only 2000 dead and wounded. However, Yao reported to the court that Admiral Shi would prepare a report to list the names of the dead and wounded officers and men.⁶⁵ Most notably Admiral Lan Li and Commander Lin Xian, the two prominent figures in Shi’s ranks, both sustained severe wounds; the former survived the wound, while the latter did not. Chen Long 陈龙 , the commander of Jinmen, mentioned that his right hand was hit by enemy gunfire during the fierce battle.⁶⁶ Moreover, given the repeated reinforcement from the mainland and prolonged recuperation at Penghu, the victorious navy under Shi Lang’s command must have also sustained great losses, men as well as materials.

When the report of the Penghu victory reached the Qing court on 18 August 1683, the emperor specifically pointed out the difficulty and hazard of the naval operation and attributed the success mostly to Shi Lang. The capture of Penghu and the fall of Taiwan at hand, the emperor concluded, truly deserved compliments.⁶⁷ The triumph greatly excited the Qing, from the court to field commanders, and the morale of the invasion forces ran high. Governor-general Yao in his memorial to the Kangxi emperor praised Admiral Shi Lang, once his arch rival, without reservation. The admiral, Yao said, commanded the armada in person at the forefront, deployed forces so methodically, and decidedly defeated the enemy after two bloody battles. Yao admitted, however, that he was, indeed, worried for the admiral about typhoon. Luckily the campaign was conducted in a lengthy period of calm sea. At last, with Penghu taken, Yao congratulated the emperor that the decades-long enemy would soon be totally exterminated.⁶⁸

9.3 Shi’s Policy of Rehabilitation

Remarkably, after the Penghu victory, Admiral Shi displayed statesmanship during rehabilitation of the land he had just occupied. Knowing that Zheng’s administration of Penghu was harsh and brutal, Shi made a great effort to be kind to the residents. He promised them an early return to a normal life. To help the poverty-stricken natives, he declared a 3-year tax and corvée exemption.⁶⁹ Taking care of the surrendered Zheng soldiers, Shi provided them with food, clothes and medical care. He even offered assistance to those who wanted to join their families in Taiwan.⁷⁰

It is not too farfetched to say that the admiral won not only the crucial battle but also the hearts of his enemies. The morale of the Zheng forces was thus broken and collapsed. By all accounts, the Penghu victory was the most decisive step toward the solution of the Taiwan question. Without it, the Zhengs would have, almost surely, refused to surrender, and the Qing dynasty would not have had the means to conquer Taiwan.

The impressive victory at Penghu evidently pleased the Kangxi emperor a great deal. He gave instruction that the good news be published, and generously rewarded all the participants in the campaign. Honors were given to the dead. He also dispatched Subai 苏拜 , the Deputy President of the Board of Works ( gongbu 工部) , to Fujian on 18 September 1683 to ensure that Admiral Shi Lang had everything he needed to carry on this very important task to the end.⁷¹ But the price paid for the victory was also high. In addition to the death of Commander Zhu Tiangui, as many as 329 officials, sailors and soldiers were killed and 1800 of them wounded, including the vanguard Lan Li. Admiral Shi Lang himself was also severely wounded. The cost in ships damaged or lost was so serious that an immediate invasion of Taiwan was impossible. In his memorial sent from Penghu, Shi reported this situation to the court with a request for a reinforcement of 4000 land troops, 100 shallow water vessels, ship-builders and materials for repairing damaged ships.⁷²

9.4 The Beginning of the End

Governor-general Yao back in Fujian earnestly requested to seize the momentum of victory to launch a quick assault on the newly defeated enemies in Taiwan. “In the wake of losing nearly the whole armed forces,” Yao insisted, “the enemy should be timely pursued all the way to Taiwan.” It would be regretful, he added, should the enemy be allowed to reinforced itself in Taiwan. He delivered this message to the court as well as to Admiral Shi.⁷³

Yao’s strategy was just contradictory to Shi’s. Yao had doubts about Shi’s use of decisive force against Penghu, and now he wanted Shi to launch immediate hot pursue into Taiwan when Shi believed that with the decisive victory at Penghu, he could subdue Taiwan without battle. Shi’s decision of war or peace solely depended upon situation. As he put it, having Penghu in hand, he held Taiwan by throat, thus the enemy would collapse themselves. Even if force had to be used, so many damaged Qing ships needed to be repaired and provisions fully replenished, before moving onward to Taiwan.⁷⁴ In any event, Shi was able to do what he thought fit. What he did while staying at Penghu in the main facilitated his later success. He kindly treated the Zheng captives, providing them with food as well as medical attention, and even releasing them for home if so wished.⁷⁵ Shi understood his emotional entanglement with Zheng Chenggong in the past would make the Zhengs in Taiwan filled with apprehensions. Hence, he was confident that his generous enemy policy could free the enemies from misgivings. Indeed, as the contemporary Fujianese Ruan Minxi observed, Shi’s extraordinary kindness to the Zheng captives at Penghu hastened the disintegration of the Zheng regime as well as encouraged the Zheng followers to come over and pledged allegiance.⁷⁶

The combination of kindness and might truly inspired an ever increasing number of defectors to come over from Taiwan. Governor-general Yao had opened a special bureau at Zhangzhou since 1679 to welcome Zheng defectors. The program worked very well, as defectors came by the tens of thousands. Yao’s success was due largely to his delivery of emplacing defectors, either finding for them suitable positions or helping them settle down.⁷⁷ The fall of Penghu, indeed, collapsed the Zheng morale, and defectors turned in by thousands. Not just a few Zheng generals in Taiwan secretly made contacts with the Qing. As a recent writer notes, defection in the past was individual case, but now it became the trend.⁷⁸