Abstract
An essential characteristic of time – and hence decision making over time – is that though the individual may, through the expenditure of resources, gather past and present information, the future is inherently unknown and therefore (in the mathematical sense) uncertain. An empirically meaningful theory must therefore incorporate time-uncertainty in an appropriate manner. This Chapter considers subgame consistent cooperation in stochastic differential games. It provides an integrated exposition the works of Yeung and Petrosyan (2004), Chapter 4 of Yeung and Petrosyan (2006b), and Chapter 8 of Yeung and Petrosyan (2012a).
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References
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Yeung, D.W.K., Petrosyan, L.A. (2016). Subgame Consistent Cooperation in Stochastic Differential Games. In: Subgame Consistent Cooperation. Theory and Decision Library C, vol 47. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1545-8_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1545-8_3
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