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Subgame Consistent Cooperation pp 371–404Cite as

Collaborative Environmental Management

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Part of the book series: Theory and Decision Library C ((TDLC,volume 47))

Abstract

After several decades of rapid technological advancement and economic growth, alarming levels of pollutions and environmental degradation are emerging all over the world. Due to the geographical diffusion of pollutants, unilateral response on the part of one country or region is often ineffective. Though cooperation in environmental control holds out the best promise of effective action, limited success has been observed. Existing multinational joint initiatives like the Kyoto Protocol or pollution permit trading can hardly be expected to offer a long-term solution because there is no guarantee that participants will always be better off within the entire duration of the agreement. This Chapter presents collaborative schemes in a cooperative differential game framework and derives subgame consistent solutions for the schemes.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center of Game Theory, Saint Petersburg State University, St Petersburg, Russia

    David W. K. Yeung

  2. SRS Consortium for Advanced Study in Cooperative Dynamic Games, Hong Kong Shue Yan University, Hong Kong, Hong Kong

    David W. K. Yeung

  3. Faculty of Applied Mathematics-Control Processes, St Petersburg State University, St Petersburg, Russia

    Leon A. Petrosyan

Authors
  1. David W. K. Yeung
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  2. Leon A. Petrosyan
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© 2016 Springer Science+Business Media Singapore

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Yeung, D.W.K., Petrosyan, L.A. (2016). Collaborative Environmental Management. In: Subgame Consistent Cooperation. Theory and Decision Library C, vol 47. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1545-8_13

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