Abstract
The notion of public goods, which are non-rival and non-excludable, was first introduced by Samuelson (1954). Examples of public goods include clean environment, national security, scientific knowledge, accessible public capital, technical know-how and public information. The non-exclusiveness and positive externalities of public goods constitutes major factors for market failure in their provision. The provision of public goods constitutes a classic case of market failure which calls for cooperative optimization. However, cooperation cannot be sustainable unless there is guarantee that the agreed-upon optimality principle can be maintained throughout the planning duration.
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Yeung, D.W.K., Petrosyan, L.A. (2016). Applications in Cooperative Public Goods Provision. In: Subgame Consistent Cooperation. Theory and Decision Library C, vol 47. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1545-8_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1545-8_12
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