Abstract
In this paper, we attempt to scientifically understand the economic pressure of population aging in China by quantifying the coordination between population aging and economic development. We use the author’s AECI method and the most recent data from the United Nations, World Bank, and other authoritative institutions to perform a systematic, quantitative study. The results indicate that population aging in China has surpassed and will continue to markedly outstrip economic development from 1980 to 2050, and demonstrate that the extent of this outstripping, expressed by the AECI value, may peak in 2040 or so. The extent to which population aging will outstrip economic development will rank China relatively high among nations of this study for a long time, and China will be near the fore of the nations with similar levels of economic development. This incoordination is even more evident within many regions of China (including the majority of western regions). We also quantitatively analyze the necessity and feasibility of adjusting fertility policies to alleviate future economic pressure from population aging in China. The AECI method, which made it possible to both quantify and compare the economic pressure of population aging, is the key innovation of this paper.
In that year it was included in China Renmin University’s Fuyin baokan ziliao: renkouxue [Copies of Periodical Materials: Demographics], no. 5. An English version of the paper was entered as a “poster paper” at the 26th annual World Population Conference, held in September through October in Morocco.
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Notes
- 1.
Other than a few nations for which we lack data, the 104 countries (and regions) included in this figure comprise all countries (and regions) in the world with a population of more than five million.
- 2.
This index was originally rendered “Ageing and Economic Coordination Index” in English, but in this translation, the American spelling “Aging” is used.–translator’s note.
- 3.
There is a degree of subjectivity and arbitrariness in dividing the three classifications of aging at the points AECI = 1 and AECI = –1, but it is based on the author’s experience.
- 4.
See the analysis of Li Jianmin (2006).
- 5.
To avoid randomness in demographic and economic phenomena in countries of small populations, except where specified otherwise, in this study we limit comparisons to only countries with populations of more than five million.
- 6.
In 2007, the EIU made projections on economic development (including GDP) for the 82 most economically developed countries (and regions) from 2007 to 2030. The 70 economies mentioned here are all countries (or regions) among the 82 in the EIU projections with a population estimated to be more than five million by 2030, excluding Chinese Taiwan (for which we lack population data). We excluded all countries (or regions) with a population of less than five million to avoid the effects of random demographic or economic phenomena from very small populations on the results of our study.
- 7.
The AECI values referred to in points three and four of this section were calculated from the world’s 70 largest economies using 2007 as the base year.
- 8.
It is impossible to conclude from Fig. 1.1 exactly when this peak will arrive between 2045 and 2050.
- 9.
Data missing for Chinese Taiwan and Singapore.
- 10.
All 31 of China’s provinces, autonomous regions, and centrally-administered cities had populations in excess of five million in 2007; as such, the comparison is warranted.
- 11.
All AECI values in parentheses calculated with 2007 as the base year, same hereinafter.
- 12.
It is generally thought that this demographic phenomenon is attributable to the outflows of young people from western regions, as well as sluggishness in changes to fertility rates.
- 13.
China’s position in Fig. 1.3 over the period 2030–2050 assuming both the high and the low scenarios are much higher than all other countries of a similar per capita GDP level in 2007.
- 14.
Meaning that this has so far not occurred at similar levels of economic development.
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Mo, L., Wei, Y. (2020). Quantitative Study of Coordination Between Population Aging and Economic Development in China from 1980 to 2050. In: China’s Demographic Dilemma and Potential Solutions. Research Series on the Chinese Dream and China’s Development Path. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1491-8_1
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