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Regional Disparity and Interaction in Environmental Effort

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Green Development in China

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Abstract

In our discussions about economic development and the environment in earlier chapters, we took each part of China (i.e. the Chinese regions) as isolated geographical regions and we have not bothered to consider the potential spatial interactive behavior among the different regions regarding pollution emission and pollution abatement efforts.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Abundant historical literature includes Williams (1966), Pauly (1970), Oates (1972), and Boskin (1973), Anselin (1988), Kelejian and Prucha (1998), Ladd (1992), Besley and Case (1995), Shroder (1996), Wilson (1996, 1999), Murdoch et al. (1997), Smith (1997), Bivand and Szymanski (1997, 2000), Brett and Pinkse (1997, 2000), Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998), Revelli (2001, 2002), Brueckner (2000, 2003), Saavedra (2000), Buettner (2001), Hayashi and Boadway (2001), Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), Fredriksson and Millimet (2002), and Edmark (2007).

  2. 2.

    Endogenous characteristics variables can be included, but finding instruments for them can be difficult.

  3. 3.

    The endogeneity issue is a hard problem: even those characteristics variables we have chosen to include in the regression equation may be argued to be endogenous too because the government’s environmental protection effort, as signaled by EPE over GDP, may have varying degrees of feedback effects on these chosen characteristics variables.

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Jiang, Y. (2016). Regional Disparity and Interaction in Environmental Effort. In: Green Development in China. SpringerBriefs in Economics. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-0693-7_8

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