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Response of Fishermen to Fishing Control Policies in Southern Songkhla Lake, Thailand: A Field Experiment

  • Kunlayanee PornpinatepongEmail author
  • Pathomwat Chantarasap
  • Jumtip Seneerattanaprayul
  • Wittawat Hemtanon
  • Papitchaya Saelim
Chapter

Abstract

This study used game theory to analyze the extraction behavior of fishermen around Southern Songkhla Lake, Southern Thailand. The field experiments were designed based on the concept of noncooperative game theory to investigate fishermen’s behavior in response to four management policy options: external regulations with individual transferable quotas (ITQ) and with individual quotas (IQ) and co-management with ITQ and with IQ.

The analysis examined fishermen’s responses under scenarios of high and low fish stocks, which arise due to the seasonal salinity of the lake. Results showed that higher fish stocks encouraged fishermen to increase their extraction. A co-management policy led to significantly better results than imposed external regulation in terms of reducing extraction, ensuring resource sustainability, and lessening violation behaviors. There were no significant differences between “with ITQ” and “with IQ” in terms of reduction of extraction and sustainability of resource use. However, there were significantly less violation behaviors in ITQ than in IQ. ITQ provided more flexibility for fishermen who wanted to increase their extraction while still following conservation guidelines. Therefore, this study recommends implementing ITQ but with appropriate penalties.

Keywords

Songkhla Lake Fishery Field experiments Fishermen’s behavior Co-management 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Singapore 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kunlayanee Pornpinatepong
    • 1
    Email author
  • Pathomwat Chantarasap
    • 1
  • Jumtip Seneerattanaprayul
    • 1
  • Wittawat Hemtanon
    • 1
  • Papitchaya Saelim
    • 1
  1. 1.Faculty of EconomicsPrince of Songkla UniversitySongkhlaThailand

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