Abstract
This study used game theory to analyze the extraction behavior of fishermen around Southern Songkhla Lake, Southern Thailand. The field experiments were designed based on the concept of noncooperative game theory to investigate fishermen’s behavior in response to four management policy options: external regulations with individual transferable quotas (ITQ) and with individual quotas (IQ) and co-management with ITQ and with IQ.
The analysis examined fishermen’s responses under scenarios of high and low fish stocks, which arise due to the seasonal salinity of the lake. Results showed that higher fish stocks encouraged fishermen to increase their extraction. A co-management policy led to significantly better results than imposed external regulation in terms of reducing extraction, ensuring resource sustainability, and lessening violation behaviors. There were no significant differences between “with ITQ” and “with IQ” in terms of reduction of extraction and sustainability of resource use. However, there were significantly less violation behaviors in ITQ than in IQ. ITQ provided more flexibility for fishermen who wanted to increase their extraction while still following conservation guidelines. Therefore, this study recommends implementing ITQ but with appropriate penalties.
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Notes
- 1.
In the developing world, the probability of being monitored is one tenth of total monitoring (Moreno-Sanchez and Maldonado 2008).
- 2.
The sustainability of the resource can be measured as the proportion of rounds that a group reached optimal level (or high abundance) during a phase of the game; it ranges from 0 % to 100 %. The closer the number to 100, the more the number of the times the resource was high in abundance and, therefore, the more the sustainability in the use of the resource (Moreno-Sanchez and Maldonado (2008). In this study, therefore, the percentage of rounds that reached optimal extraction value was observed for sustainability.
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Appendix
Appendix
Process of calculating the payoffs
Dynamic component of the experiments
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Pornpinatepong, K., Chantarasap, P., Seneerattanaprayul, J., Hemtanon, W., Saelim, P. (2016). Response of Fishermen to Fishing Control Policies in Southern Songkhla Lake, Thailand: A Field Experiment. In: Olewiler, N., Francisco, H., Ferrer, A. (eds) Marine and Coastal Ecosystem Valuation, Institutions, and Policy in Southeast Asia. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-0141-3_15
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