A New Differential Scan-Based Side-Channel Attacks Against RSA Cryptosystem

Abstract

By analyzing the scanned data in cryptography circuit, scan-based side-channel attacks retrieve a secret key, which are considerable as a threat into cryptosystem LSI and therefore they are not permitted and we have to restrict them. In scan-based side-channel attacks which retrieve secret keys during a cryptography, one will have to register the data simply by employing a scan path, which suggest that one can retrieve a secret key in a cryptography LSI. This can be a scan-based side-channel attack. RSA is one of the most necessary cryptography algorithms and as a result it effectively realizes a public-key cryptography system. However, typical scan-based side-channel attacks cannot be applied to it because of its complicated algorithm structure. Paper proposes a scan-based side-channel attack that permits us to retrieve a secret key in an RSA circuit. The proposed planned technique is based on identifying intermediate values calculated in an RSA circuit. We tend to specialize in a one-bit time sequence that is restricted to some intermediate values. By examining the one-bit time sequence in the scan path, we can find out the register position specific to the intermediate value and, can recognize whether the intermediate value is calculated in the target RSA circuit or not.