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Optimal Policy and the Threat of Secession

  • Moriki HosoeEmail author
Chapter
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Part of the New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives book series (NFRSASIPER, volume 24)

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the possibility of integration and secession between a majority region and a minority region. There is assumed to be a different preference for public policy between two regions, and a government is assumed to have to offer a constant level of public goods. We introduce two forms of governance, i.e., centralized integration and decentralized integration. Then, when small level of public good is necessary, the form of governance is shown to change from centralized integration to secession and to decentralized integration as the size of the minority region becomes large. And when large level of public good is necessary, the form of government is shown to change from centralized integration to decentralized integration as the size of the minority region becomes large.

Keywords

Secession Decentralization Policy conflict 

JEL-Code:

D720 D740. 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Singapore 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsKumamoto Gakuen UniversityKumamotoJapan

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