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Permanent Migrants and Cross-Border Workers: The Effects on the Host Country

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The Economics of International Immigration

Part of the book series: New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives ((NFRSASIPER,volume 27))

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Abstract

When we use the word “migrants,” we tend to disregard the variation in their behavior. We can in fact classify migrants according to length of stay, purpose of migration, geographical origin, or historical background. In this paper, I focus on the time interval of migration and distinguish the three types of migrants: permanent migrants, temporary migrants, and cross-border workers.

This paper was originally published by the Journal of Regional Science as an article in its vol. 38 (1999) issue.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Migrants repeating their migratory trips are called periodic migrants. The length of each stay in the host country may be several years or several seasons. Those Mexicans who live near the border and come to the United States many times during their lifetime belong in this category. Concerning the place where they spend their income, we may regard periodic migrants as a kind of temporary migrants. See the final section for the analysis of this type of migration.

  2. 2.

    Concerning return migration, Mueller (1982) and Bohning (1984) concluded that return migration took place when migrants’ target saving levels were satisfied. Waldorf and Esparza (1991) emphasized the importance of assimilation in the host country and strong ties to the home country. Kau and Sirmans (1977) analyzed the influence of information cost and uncertainty on migration pattern. Chau (1997) emphasized the role of migrant networks in determining patterns of migration. Using a theoretical approach, Hill (1987) analyzed periodic migrants’ behavior, and Djajić and Milboune (1988) analyzed legal temporary migrants’ optimal behavior.

  3. 3.

    Various authors have tried to explain certain aspects of a migrant’s behavior (e.g., whether he or she decides to migrate or not, chooses to be a permanent migrant or a temporary migrant). Djajić and Milboune (1988) studied the optimal behavior of a temporary migrant who can endogenously choose his optimal staying period. On the other hand, Djajić (1989) and Bhagwati et al. (1984) studied the “gastarbeiter system” in which the staying period of a migrant is arranged beforehand. Future uncertainty may also affect the behavior of migrants. McCall and McCall (1987), Dustmann (1997), and O’Connell (1997) investigated the role of uncertainty. Finally, Bhagwati and Hamada (1982) paid attention to the role of education.

  4. 4.

    Lundahl (1985), Thompson (1984), Rivera-Batiz (1984), and Quibria (1989) analyzed the real income of each factor in the home country. Their results, the counterparts of our Proposition 2.1, items (1) and (2), which apply to the host country, are consistent with our results.

  5. 5.

    Some recent papers also studied about remittance of immigrants. Shen et al. (2010) developed a model to study the effects of migration and remittances on inequality in the origin communities. Mandelman and Zlate (2012) used data on border enforcement and macroeconomic indicators from the United States and Mexico to estimate a two-country business cycle model of labor migration and remittances.

  6. 6.

    This kind of demand function may be introduced if it is assumed that income earned by native labor and immigrants and income from capital have the same influence on demand.

  7. 7.

    Equation 2.6 is valid for equilibrium values of L M and p N .

  8. 8.

    Ottaviano and Peri (2012) empirically studied the effects of immigration on wages of US-born workers and concluded it should be positive because positive effects on high-educated workers dominate negative effects on low-educated workers. Dustmann et al. (2013) studied the effects of immigration on the distribution of native wages.

  9. 9.

    This follows directly from the magnification effect in Jones (1965).

  10. 10.

    To obtain the clear conclusions of this section, I have benefited from the helpful suggestions by anonymous referees of the Journal of Regional Science.

  11. 11.

    Assuming that capital owners, native workers, and permanent migrants have identical homothetic preferences

  12. 12.

    Wong (1995) studied the welfare effects of international migration by GDP function approach. Detailed information is included in Appendix 2.

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Appendices

Appendix 1

With p N being constant, total differentiation of Eqs. 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 with respect to L N , L T , K N , K T , and L M yields

$$ \begin{array}{cc} & {p}_N{N}^{LL}d{L}_N+{p}_N{N}^{LK}d{K}_N-{T}^{LL}d{L}_T-{T}^{LK}d{K}_T=0,\\[6pt] & {p}_N{N}^{KL}d{L}_N+{p}_N{N}^{KK}d{K}_N-{T}^{KL}d{L}_T-{T}^{KK}d{K}_T=0,\\[6pt] & d{L}_T+d{L}_N-d{L}_M=0,\\[6pt] & d{K}_T+d{K}_N=0,\end{array} $$
(A2.1)

where N LL∂N L /∂L N and N LK , N KL , N KK , T LL , T LK, and T KK are defined in a similar way.

Because N(L N , K N ) and T(L T , K T ) are linearly homogeneous, we apply Euler’s theorem and obtain,

$$ \begin{array}{l}{N}^{LL}{L}_N+{N}^{LK}{K}_N=0,\\ {N}^{KL}{L}_N+{N}^{KK}{K}_N=0,\\ {T}^{LL}{L}_T+{T}^{LK}{K}_T=0,\\ {T}^{KL}{L}_T+{T}^{KK}{K}_T=0.\end{array} $$
(A2.2)

The first two equations of (A2.1) can be expressed as follows by substituting other equations:

$$ \begin{array}{ll} & \left[\begin{array}{c@{\quad}c} {p}_N{k}_N{N}^{LK}+{k}_T{T}^{LK} & -\left({p}_N{N}^{LK}+{T}^{LK}\right) \\[6pt] -\left({p}_N{N}^{LK}+{T}^{LK}\right) & {p}_N\left(1/{k}_N\right){N}^{LK}+\left(1/{k}_T\right){k}_T{T}^{LK} \end{array}\right]\left[\begin{array}{c} d{L}_T \\[6pt] d{K}_T \end{array}\right]\\[12pt] & \quad =\left[\begin{array}{c} {k}_N{p}_N{N}^{LK} \\[6pt] -{p}_N{N}^{LK} \end{array}\right]d{L}_M.\end{array} $$
(A2.3)

Let Φ stand for the determinant of the two-by-two matrix in (A2.3), then \( \Phi =\left[{\left({k}_T-{k}_N\right)}^2/{k}_T{k}_N\right]{p}_N{N}^{LK}{T}^{LK}>0. \) Therefore,

$$ \frac{d{L}_T}{d{L}_M}=\frac{1}{\Phi}{p}_N{N}^{LK}{T}^{LK}\frac{k_N-1}{k_T}=\frac{k_N}{k_N-{k}_T}, $$
$$ \frac{d{K}_T}{d{L}_M}=\frac{1}{\Phi}{p}_N{N}^{LK}{T}^{LK}\left({k}_T-{k}_N\right)=\frac{k_T{k}_N}{k_N-{k}_T}, $$
$$ \frac{d{L}_N}{d{L}_M}=1-\frac{d{L}_T}{d{L}_M}=\frac{-{k}_T}{k_N-{k}_T}, $$
$$ \frac{d{K}_N}{d{L}_M}=-\frac{d{K}_T}{d{L}_M}=\frac{-{k}_T{k}_N}{k_N-{k}_T}. $$

Hence, \( d{L}_T/d{L}_M>\left(<\right)0,d{K}_T/d{L}_M>\left(<\right)0,d{L}_N/d{L}_M<\left(>\right)0, \) and \( d{K}_N/d{L}_M<\left(>\right)0, \) according to \( {k}_T-{k}_N<\left(>\right)0 \). Thus, \( dT/d{L}_M>\left(<\right)0 \) and \( dN/d{L}_M<\left(>\right)0 \) if \( {k}_T-{k}_N<\left(>\right)0 \). The sign of dL T /dL M is opposite to that of dL N /dL M , implying that in view of the third equation of (A2.1), dL N /dL M must be greater than unity when \( d{L}_N/d{L}_M>0 \).

Next, holding L M constant, total differentiation of Eqs. 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 with respect to p N , L N , L T , K N , and K T gives

$$ \begin{array}{cc} & {N}^Ld{p}_N+{p}_N{N}^{LL}d{L}_N+{p}_N{N}^{LK}d{K}_N-{T}^{LL}d{L}_T-{T}^{LK}d{K}_T=0,\\[6pt] & {N}^Kd{p}_N+{p}_N{N}^{KL}d{L}_N+{p}_N{N}^{KK}d{K}_N-{T}^{KL}d{L}_T-{T}^{KK}d{K}_T=0,\\[6pt] & d{L}_T+d{L}_N=0,\\[6pt] & d{K}_T+d{K}_N=0.\end{array} $$
(A2.4)

The first two equations of (A2.4) can be expressed, by substituting the other two equations of (A2.4) and (A2.2), as

$$ \begin{array}{ll} & \left[\begin{array}{c@{\quad}c} {p}_N{k}_N{N}^{LK}+{k}_T{T}^{LK} & -\left({p}_N{N}^{LK}+{T}^{LK}\right) \\[8pt] -\left({p}_N{N}^{LK}+{T}^{LK}\right) & {p}_N\left(1/{k}_N\right){N}^{LK}+\left(1/{k}_T\right){k}_T{T}^{LK} \end{array}\right]\left[\begin{array}{c} d{L}_T \\[8pt] d{K}_T \end{array}\right]\\[10pt] & \quad =\left[\begin{array}{c} -{N}^L \\ -{N}^K \end{array}\right]d{p}_N,\end{array} $$
(A2.5)

and

$$ \displaystyle\frac{d{L}_T}{d{p}_N}=\frac{1}{\Delta}\left|\begin{array}{c@{\quad}c} -{N}^L & -\left({p}_N{N}^{LK}+{T}^{LK}\right) \\[6pt] -{N}^K & {p}_N\left(1/{k}_N\right){N}^{LK}+\left(1/{k}_T\right){k}_T{T}^{LK} \end{array}\right|, $$
$$ \displaystyle \frac{d{K}_T}{d{p}_N}=\frac{1}{\Delta}\left|\begin{array}{c@{\quad}c} {p}_N{k}_N{N}^{LK}+{k}_T{T}^{LK} & -{N}^L \\ -\left({p}_N{N}^{LK}+{T}^{LK}\right) & -{N}^K \end{array}\right|, $$

where Δ is the determinant of the left-hand-side matrix of (A2.5). To obtain the result of Eq. 2.8, it is necessary to use (A2.2) to substitute T LL = k T T LK, and then substitute the expressions for dL T /dp N and dK T /dP N , given above.

Appendix 2

Following Wong (1995), let us define the gross domestic product (GDP) function as

$$ g\left(p,v\right)=\underset{Q}{\mathrm{Max}}\left\{pQ:\Gamma \left(Q,v\right)\le 0\right\}, $$

where v denotes the m-dimensional vector of factor endowments, Q denotes the n-dimensional vector of outputs, p denotes the n-dimensional vector of goods prices, and \( \Gamma \left(Q,v\right)\le 0 \) denotes the production possibility set of the economy. Let \( v^0 \) be factor endowment before immigration and \( v^e \) represent the number of factors flowing into and working in the economy. The total factors available to domestic firms are \( {v}^t={v}^0+{v}^e \).

First, let us consider the case of a small country and the scenario where every good is tradable. Then, the vector of goods prices can be expressed as p w, which remains constant after international factor mobility. The profit maximization behavior of each firm can be interpreted as expenditure minimization behavior, and this implies a minimization of payments to factors. Thus, factor prices before migration, w 0, can be expressed as

$$ g\left({p}^w,{v}^0\right)=\underset{w}{\mathrm{Min}}\left\{wv:{p}_i^w\le {c}_i\left({w}^0\right),i= 1,.\dots, n\right\}={w}^0{v}^0, $$

where c i (w) denotes the unit cost function of good i. Similarly, factor prices after immigration, w 1, can be expressed as

$$ g\left({p}^w,{v}^t\right)={w}^1{v}^t. $$

Remember that w 0 is the vector of factor prices that minimize expenditure to employed factors \( v^0 \); w 1 is the vector prices for factors \( v^t \), not \( v^0 \). Thus, we can assert that

$$ {w}^0{v}^0<{w}^1{v}^0, $$
(A2.6)

under the assumption that \( {w}^1\ne {w}^0 \) and a strictly convex production possibility set. Now, let us define the indirect utility function of domestic residents as

$$ {V}^0\left(\,p,v,b\right)=\underset{C}{\mathrm{Max}}\left\{u(C):pC\le g\left(\,p,v\right)-b\right\}, $$

where C is the aggregate consumption bundle, u(C) is the social welfare level, and b is income transfers to immigrants. Before immigration, the factor endowment is \( v^0 \), and payment for those employed factors can be expressed as \( v^0w^0 \). Thus, the utility level of domestic residents before immigration yields \( V^0(p^w,v^0,0) \). On the other hand, after immigration, the factor endowment is \( v^t \), and payment for those employed factors can be expressed as \( v^tw^t \). In this case, there exists transfer b, which equals \( w^1v \). Thus, the utility level of domestic residents after immigration yields \( V^0(p^w,v^t,b) \).

Equation A2.6 implies that the income of domestic workers will increase after immigration. Bearing in mind that the price vector remains constant and indirect utility is a strictly increasing function of income, we obtain

$$ {V}^0\left({p}^w,{v}^0,0\right)<{V}^0\left({p}^w,{v}^t,b\right), $$
(A2.7)

which implies that immigration enhances the welfare of domestic residents.

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Kondoh, K. (2017). Permanent Migrants and Cross-Border Workers: The Effects on the Host Country. In: The Economics of International Immigration. New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives, vol 27. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-0092-8_2

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