Abstract
The word “international migration” usually refers to labor inflows for highly developed countries (HDCs) such as Germany, Japan, and the United States. For lower developed countries (LDCs) such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, and most African countries, migration implies an outflow of labor. Most of the economic literature has focused on mutual relationships between the source and host countries and studied the effects of international migration on the economies of those countries. However, globalization in the more recent past has resulted in several new types of international migration. In observing the recent expansion of multilateral economic integration between countries at various phases of development, we recognize that several medium-developed countries (MDCs) are playing a new role in the international labor market. These MDCs export labor to HDCs and, simultaneously, import labor from LDCs. In other words, these countries are coincidentally host as well as source countries and are at the midstream of international labor flows.
This paper was originally published by International Journal of Population Research, in 2014 (ID: 858460).
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Notes
- 1.
See Hamberger (2010) for detailed information about the present situation of migration in Romania.
- 2.
Following World Bank data, remittances sent home by Romanians abroad flat at USD 3.6 bln in 2013.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
Concerning with the current situation about Mexican labor market, see Mariel (2011), for example.
- 6.
- 7.
This specified production function has a quite convenient property that marginal product of labor is the linear decreasing function of labor input. This property is assumed by MacDougall (1960), and most of the extension studies of this study adopt this assumption.
- 8.
We assume the number of domestic skilled workers in country A’s industrial sector is not sufficient and the marginal products of labor is higher than \( {\overline{w}}_A^S \). Then for this sector, it is possible to enlarge total outputs and GDP by introducing some skilled workers from country B, L S AB , until the marginal products of labor are equal with \( {\overline{w}}_A^S \). Thus, legal migration of skilled workers is just to satisfy this shortage of workers. Another story is that immigration policy of country A is quota and introduces a fixed number of skilled workers from less developed countries. By the existence of social policy like livelihood protection system, we assume those migrants’ expected income is not less than a crucial standard.
- 9.
- 10.
Djajić and Michael (2009, 2013), respectively, studied the political interactions between the host and the source countries in the case of temporary workers and skilled workers’ migration. In addition, Djajić et al. (2012) studied similar subjects under the guest worker system. To simplify our study, we consider only that the host country can introduce some restriction policies.
- 11.
National income of country B is just equal with the sum of domestic skilled workers’ income (including both emigrants and those left behind) and domestic unskilled workers’ income. As we focus on the nationality, regardless of the existing fraction of immigrants settled in their new homeland, immigrants’ income is not included. In this study, as the number of emigrants and their wage rates are exogenously given, the government intends to maximize the sum of domestic unskilled workers’ income, area OKDR, and remaining skilled workers’ income, area GLA. Therefore, in reality, area OGEDR does not include emigrants’ income; in this study, we call this national income for convenience. We need to remark that the GDP of country B equals with area OGEN, while unskilled immigrants’ income is area RDEN.
We need to remark that in Case 1, L U BC denotes the number of immigrants from C to B, while in Case 2, it denotes aggregate illegal immigrants including both succeeded and failed. The number of existing illegal workers is \( \left(1-\rho \right){L}_{BC}^U. \)
- 12.
This model can be interpreted for legal migration where the government can maximize national income by imposing income tax on the wage of unskilled immigrants optimally.
- 13.
Another scenario of country B is optimal restriction of skilled emigration. Similar analysis can be done considering optimally controlled tax rate imposed on the income of emigrants.
- 14.
From (13.6) and (13.10), we can conclude that there are no unskilled immigrants, L U BC , in the case that \( {L}_B^S={\tilde{L}}_B^S\equiv \left(-{a}^{\prime }{\overline{L}}_C^U+{T}_C+a{L}_B\right)/\left(1-p+a\right) \). We consider certain value of parameters \( {\overline{w}}_A^S, \mu, \tau \), and γ 1 which guarantees that the number of skilled domestic workers L S B which satisfies (13.5) without unskilled immigrants is larger than \( {\tilde{L}}_B^S \). In this case, we obtain two equilibrium points, E 1 and E 2, of two respective cases.
- 15.
If p that is determined by (13.5) satisfies \( p>1-\frac{a-{\lambda}_i}{1+b} \), which implies \( d{L}_{BC}^U/d{L}_B^S<2 \), \( d\left[{L}_B^U+{L}_{BC}^U\right]/d{L}_B^S \) is positive in sign, and it could be smaller than unit. As from (13.2), we have \( d{w}_B^S=\left(d{L}_B^U+d{L}_{BC}^U\right)-bd{L}_B^S=\left[\frac{d\left({L}_B^U+{L}_{BC}^U\right)}{d{L}_B^S}-b\right]d{L}_B^S \) and \( d{w}_B^U=d{L}_B^S-a\left(d{L}_B^U+d{L}_{BC}^U\right)=\left[1-a\frac{d\left({L}_B^U+{L}_{BC}^U\right)}{d{L}_B^S}\right]d{L}_B^S \), remembering that after restriction \( d{L}_B^S<0 \), we can conclude that \( d{w}_B^S>0 \) if \( d\left[{L}_B^U+{L}_{BC}^U\right]/d{L}_B^S<b \) and \( d{w}_B^U<0 \) if \( d\left[{L}_B^U+{L}_{BC}^U\right]/d{L}_B^S<1/a \).
- 16.
Parameter a denotes the marginal change of marginal products of unskilled labor in country B, and in reality, it seems not constant and not so large in midstream countries like Thailand. As we specify the production function as (13.2), parameter a is independent of skill formation, the ratio of skilled/unskilled domestic labor. This simplified assumption is strong, but it shows the existence of a counterintuitive result clearly which should be possible under more general production function case.
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Kondoh, K. (2017). Emigration, Immigration, and Skill Formation: The Case of a Midstream Country. In: The Economics of International Immigration. New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives, vol 27. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-0092-8_13
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