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Enforcement of EU Trade and Investment Agreements

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Public Services in EU Trade and Investment Agreements

Part of the book series: Legal Issues of Services of General Interest ((LEGAL))

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Abstract

This chapter examines the tangible effects flowing from the enforcement of EU trade and investment agreements. To this end, it considers how the rules of EU agreements are enforced. The chapter’s first port of call, undertaken in Sect. 7.2, is to map the different dispute settlement mechanisms found in EU trade and investment agreements. The mapping exercise reveals the EU’s agreements contain both diplomatic and quasi-adjudicate means of dispute resolution, the latter of which has been expanded to include investor-state arbitration. The chapter’s second task is to consider how such forms of dispute resolution may affect the public services of member states. In this endeavour, Sects. 7.3 and 7.4 consider the direct and indirect effects stemming from the surveyed enforcement mechanisms. Thereafter, Sect. 7.5 draws various conclusions regarding the tangible effects of EU trade and investment agreements for public services.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    As defined by Peters 2003, p. 3. Alternative definitions have relied on the international nature of the parties to the dispute, see Bilder 1986, pp. 3–5.

  2. 2.

    Thies 2017, p. 136.

  3. 3.

    A frequently cited example is Article 33(1) of the United Nations Charter, which outlines that states can settle their international disputes by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or another peaceful means of their choice.

  4. 4.

    Perhaps the best illustration of this is the CJEU. Its role, along with the General Court, is to settle disputes between member states, institutions as well as natural and legal persons. From an international perspective, EU member states can be viewed as having consented to disputes being resolved by a permanent judicial body and whose ‘prosecutorial’ role distinguishes from other settlement mechanisms. See Tallberg and Smith 2014, pp. 120–121.

  5. 5.

    The WTO’s DSB merges elements of both diplomatic and adjudicative dispute resolution. To this end, it provides for both consultations, and mediation as well as binding arbitration. See WTO, Annex 2: Understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes, Articles 4, 5 and 6.

  6. 6.

    Merrills 2017, p. 88; Peters 2003, p. 4.

  7. 7.

    Spain 2014, p. 11.

  8. 8.

    Tanaka 2018, p. 22.

  9. 9.

    A broad overview is found in Vajda 2018, pp. 206–211.

  10. 10.

    Association Agreement between Turkey and the EEC, [1963] OJ L/217 (hereinafter ‘EU-Turkey’), Article 25 allows contracting parties to submit a dispute to the Council of Association. This is comprised of member states government representatives, the EU and the Turkish government. It has the power, acting unanimously, to take decisions in order to obtain the objectives laid down by the agreement and has done numerously. For further consideration, see Eeckhout 2011, pp. 276–277.

  11. 11.

    Agreement on the European Economic Area, [1994] OJ L1/3, Article 108 establishes an EFTA Court, comprising only 3 members, for the purposes of extending the internal market to its participating states (Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland). For greater detail, see Baudenbacher 2016, p. 139. An account of its role ensuring homogeneity between EEA and EU law can be found in Fredriksen and Franklin 2015, pp. 631–637.

  12. 12.

    Although EU-Switzerland relations are based on more than 100 bilateral agreements, each agreement has its own DSM known as a Joint Committee. Their role is the management and supervision of the proper functioning of the agreements and are composed of EU and Swiss representatives. A thorough discussion of the institutional framework of the main EU-Swiss agreements is found in Breitenmoser 2003, pp. 1153–1158. An exception to the above description is the EC-Switzerland Transport Agreement that provides for the exclusive role of the CJEU to solve disputes concerning decisions of EU institutions made under the agreement. See Kaddous 2008, p. 241.

  13. 13.

    Bercero 2006, p. 389.

  14. 14.

    Gomula 1995, p. 116.

  15. 15.

    Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, of the other part, [2005] OJ L267/1 (hereinafter ‘EU-Algeria’), Article 100; Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, of the other part, [2004] OJ L304/38 (hereinafter ‘EU-Egypt’), Article 82; Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the State of Israel, of the other part, [2000] OJ L147/1 (hereinafter ‘EU-Israel’), Article 75; Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, of the other part, [2002] OJ L129/1 (hereinafter ‘EU-Jordan’), Article 97; Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Community and its Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Lebanon, of the other part, [2006] OJ L143/1 (hereinafter ‘EU-Lebanon’), Article 82; Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part, [2000] OJ L70/2 (hereinafter ‘EU-Morocco’), Article 86; Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade and cooperation between the European Communities and the PLO for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, [1997] OJ C128/2 (hereinafter ‘EU-Palestine’), Article 67; Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Tunisia, of the other part [1998] OJ L97/2 (hereinafter ‘EU-Tunisia’), Article 86.

  16. 16.

    EU-Algeria, Article 100(2)–(3); EU-Egypt, Article 82(2)–(3); EU-Israel, Article 75(2)–(3); EU-Jordan, Article 97(2)–(3); EU-Lebanon, Article 82(2)–(3); EU-Morocco, Article 86(2)–(3); EU-Palestine, Article 67(2)–(3); EU-Tunisia, Article 86(2)–(3).

  17. 17.

    Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Albania, of the other part, [2009] OJ L107/2, Article 119; Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, of the other part, [2004] OJ L84/13, Article 111.

  18. 18.

    EU-Algeria, Article 100(4); EU-Egypt, Article 82(4); EU-Israel, Article 75(4); EU-Jordan, Article 97(4); EU-Lebanon, Article 82(4); EU-Morocco, Article 86(4); EU-Tunisia, Article 86(4).

  19. 19.

    The exception are those agreements with a specific dispute settlement protocol, which is considered in the following section.

  20. 20.

    Robles 2006, p. 14.

  21. 21.

    Only the EU-Palestine agreement does not explicitly state this. See EU-Palestine, Article 67.

  22. 22.

    Melillo 2019, p. 107.

  23. 23.

    Broude 2007, p. 325. Mavroidis and Sapir reach a similar conclusion and suggest preferential trade partners prefer to resolve their disputes through diplomatic mechanisms even though quasi-judicial mechanisms are available. See Mavroidis and Sapir 2015, p. 362.

  24. 24.

    Broude 2007, p. 330.

  25. 25.

    Bercero 2006, pp. 390–1.

  26. 26.

    European Commission (2017) Dispute settlement in a nutshell. http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/dispute-settlement/. Accessed 18 December 2019.

  27. 27.

    For an overview of the suspension of obligations under the WTO, see Appleton 2009, pp. 3–6.

  28. 28.

    Over the last few years, the US has blocked appointments to the WTO Appellate Body. As of 11 December 2019, there is only one sitting member. Consequently, the Appellate Body can no longer meet the three-member quorum required to review appeals and the WTO’s system of dispute resolution has ground to a halt. For earlier suggestions on how to avoid this crisis, see Sen (2018) The Appellate Body in Crisis. In: TradeLinks. https://www.linklaters.com/en/insights/blogs/tradelinks/the-appellate-body-in-crisis. Accessed 18 December 2019.

  29. 29.

    Appleton 2009, p. 26.

  30. 30.

    While not the focus of this chapter, the amicable and conciliatory intention of trade dispute settlement stems from the WTO and its preceding dispute settlement procedure developed under the auspices of the GATT. See Palmeter and Mavroidis 2012, pp. 6–16.

  31. 31.

    The operation of the WTO dispute settlement is governed by Annex 2: Understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes. For a detailed overview of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding, see Trebilcock et al. 2013, pp. 172–226.

  32. 32.

    Malacrida and Marceau 2018, pp. 53–54.

  33. 33.

    Each agreement specifies that ‘[a]s long as the dispute is not resolved, it shall be discussed at every meeting’ of the relevant Stabilisation and Association Council.

  34. 34.

    Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the other part, [2015] OJ L164/1 (hereinafter ‘EU-Bosnia’), Article 126; Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and Kosovo, of the other part, [2016] OJ L78/1 (hereinafter ‘EU-Kosovo’), Article 137; Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part, [2010] OJ L108/3 (hereinafter ‘EU-Montenegro’), Article 130; Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part, [2013] OJ L278/16 (hereinafter ‘EU-Serbia’), Article 130.

  35. 35.

    EU-Bosnia, Protocol 6: Dispute Settlement, Articles 3, 6 and 9; EU-Kosovo, Protocol V: Dispute Settlement, Articles 3, 6 and 9; EU-Montenegro, Protocol 7: Dispute Settlement, Articles 3, 6 and 9; EU-Serbia, Protocol 7: Dispute Settlement, Articles 3, 6 and 9.

  36. 36.

    Leal-Arcas 2019, p. 234. For a detailed discussion of EU’s role in the WTO dispute settlement system, see Billiet 2005.

  37. 37.

    Found in Article 13 of the above-mentioned protocols.

  38. 38.

    This concern should be viewed in light the development of EU external legal autonomy in Opinion 1/91 Draft agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and the countries of the European Free Trade Association, on the other, relating to the creation of the European Economic Area, EU:C:1991:490, Opinion of 14 December 1991 (hereinafter ‘Opinion 1/91’). Here, the ‘interpretation of the Community rules [by the EEA Court]’ was held to conflict ‘with Article 164 of the EEC Treaty and, more generally, with the very foundations of the Community’. In this ruling, the Court’s aim was to protect the so-called ‘autonomy of EU law’, which required that no body other than CJEU was capable of interpreting and applying EU law. For an overview of the Court’s jurisprudence on autonomy, see Odermatt 2016, pp. 5–10.

  39. 39.

    Agreement establishing an Association between the European Union and its Member States, on the one hand, and Central America on the other, [2012] OJ L346/3 (hereinafter ‘EU-Central America’), Articles 310–311, 314 and 317; Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Chile, of the other part, [2002] OJ L352/3 (hereinafter ‘EU-Chile’), Articles 183–184 and 188–189; Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, [2014] OJ L161/3 (hereinafter ‘EU-Ukraine’), Articles 305–306, 311 and 315; Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part, [2014] OJ L261/4 (hereinafter ‘EU-Georgia’), Articles 246–247 and 254. Decision No 2/2001 of the EU-Mexico Joint Council [2001] OJ L70/77 (hereinafter ‘EU-Mexico’), Articles 38–39 and 41–43, established the EU-Mexico’s DSM.

  40. 40.

    As will be clear from previous discussions, the Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, [2008] OJ L289/I/2 (hereinafter ‘EU-CARIFORUM’) should be placed in the stronger bracket with the other EPAs falling into the weaker bracket.

  41. 41.

    Interim Agreement with a view to an Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Central Africa Party, of the other part, [2009] OJ L57/1 (hereinafter ‘EU-Central Africa’), Article 67; Economic partnership agreement between the West African States, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part (hereinafter ‘EU-West Africa’), Article 73; Interim Partnership Agreement between the European Community, of the one part, and the Pacific States, of the other part [2009] OJ L272/2 (hereinafter ‘EU-Pacific’), Article 48; Interim Agreement establishing a framework for an Economic Partnership Agreement between the Eastern and Southern Africa States, on the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, on the other part, [2012] OJ L111/2 (hereinafter ‘EU-ESA’), Article 55; Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the SADC EPA States, of the other part, [2016] OJ L250/3 (hereinafter ‘EU-SADC’), Article 76. The exceptions are EC-CARIFORUM, and Economic Partnership Agreement between the East African Community Partner States, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States of the other part (hereinafter ‘EU-EAC’). https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153845.pdf. Accessed 13 February 2020.

  42. 42.

    EC-CARIFORUM, Article 210; EU-Central Africa, Article 76; EU-West Africa, Article 71; EU-Pacific, Article 55; EU-ESA, Article 55; EU-SADC, Article 83; EU-EAC, Article 115.

  43. 43.

    EC-CARIFORUM, Article 213; EU-Central Africa, Article 77; EU-West Africa, Article 74; EU-Pacific, Article 58; EU-SADC, Article 86; EU-EAC, Article 117. The exception is the EU-ESA that does not contain such a provision.

  44. 44.

    EU-SADC, Article 75.

  45. 45.

    Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part, [2017] OJ L11/23 (hereinafter ‘CETA’), Articles 29(4)–(6), (14); Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Colombia and Peru, of the other part, [2012] OJ L354/3 (hereinafter ‘EU-Columbia, Ecuador and Peru’), Articles 301–2, 310 and 322; Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part, [2011] OJ L127/6 (hereinafter ‘EU-Korea’), Articles 14(3)–(4) and (11); Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore (hereinafter ‘EU-Singapore’), Chapter 14: Articles 14(3)–(4), (12), and Chapter 15. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961. Accessed 13 February 2020; Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (hereinafter ‘EU-Vietnam’), Chapter 15: Articles 15(3)–(5) and (15). http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437. Accessed 13 February; Agreement between the European Union and Japan for an Economic Partnership, [2018] OJ L330/3 (hereinafter ‘EU-Japan’), Articles 21(5)–(7), (20) and (22). The EU-Korea Agreement is the outlier, as it makes no provision for mediation.

  46. 46.

    CETA, Article 18.1(1).

  47. 47.

    Investment Protection Agreement between the European Union and its member states, of the one part, and Socialist Republic of Vietnam, of the other part (hereinafter ‘EU-Vietnam BIT’), Chapter 3: Dispute Settlement, Section A: Resolution of Dispute Between Parties. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437. Accessed 13 February 2020; Investment Protection Agreement between the European Union and its member states, of the one part, and the Republic of Singapore, of the other part (hereinafter ‘EU-Singapore BIT’), Chapter 3: Dispute Settlement, Section B: Resolution of Dispute Between Parties. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961. Accessed 13 February 2020.

  48. 48.

    EU-Vietnam BIT, Article 3.2; EU-Singapore BIT, Article 3.25.

  49. 49.

    An informal database of disputes is maintained by Law Offices of Amelia Porges (2019) Regional trade agreement dispute settlement. https://www.porgeslaw.com/rta-disputes. Accessed 18 December 2019. The majority of state-state disputes listed here arisen under either North or Latin American agreements. Historically, dispute of between the EU and its partners are rare. See European Commission 2018, p. 45. However, the EU has recently commenced initiated dispute settlement procedures under its PTAs with Korea, Ukraine and the Southern African Customs Union.

  50. 50.

    This is also borne out in the study of Horn et al. 2009. An interesting finding of this study is that PTAs include WTO equivalent rules as well as obligations outside the WTO’s scope (for instance environmental or labour obligations) and those within its scope but go beyond what has been achieved at the multilateral level.

  51. 51.

    Davey 2006, p. 355.

  52. 52.

    Porges 2011, p. 478.

  53. 53.

    For Stabilisation AAs this is outlined in Article 16 of their respective Dispute Settlement Protocols. For those AAs with strong trade component: EU-Mexico, Article 43; EU-Central America, Article 326; EU-Chile, Article 189; EU-Georgia, Article 269; EU-Ukraine, Article 324. For the EPAs: EC-CARIFORUM, Article 222; EU-Central Africa, Article 86; EU-West Africa, Article 84; EU-Pacific, Article 66; EU-SADC, Article 95; EU-EAC, Article 126. The exception here is the EU-ESA. For the FTAs: CETA, Article 29.3; EU-Columbia, Peru and Ecuador, Article 319; EU-Korea, Article 14.19; EU-Singapore, Article 14.21; EU-Vietnam, Article 15.24; EU-Japan, Article 21.27. For its BITs: EU-Singapore BIT, Article 3.45; EU-Vietnam BIT, Article 3.24.

  54. 54.

    The first action was initiated on 18 December 2018 and concerned the perceived failure of Korea to respect the freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. See European Union (2018) Republic of Korea—compliance with obligations under Chapter 13 of the EU—Korea Free Trade Agreement. Request for Consultations by the European Union. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/december/tradoc_157586.pdf. Accessed 18 December 2019. The second action began on 16 January 2019 and concerns Ukraine’s export restrictions on unprocessed wood. See European Union (2019) Note Verbale No.005/2019. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/january/tradoc_157625.pdf. Accessed 18 December 2019. The third action commenced on 14 June 2019 and results from the imposition of safeguard tariffs by the Southern African Customs Union on frozen bone-in chicken cuts from the EU. See European Union (2019) Note Verbale NV/2019. https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/june/tradoc_157928.pdf. Accessed 24 January 2019.

  55. 55.

    The feasibility of a multilateral investment system was first muted in European Commission (2010) Towards a comprehensive European international investment policy, COM(2010) 343, p. 7. This was expanded further in European Commission (2015) Investment in TTIP and—the path for reform: Enhancing the right to regulate and moving from current ad hoc arbitration towards an Investment Court. Concept Paper. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF. Accessed 3 July 2019. It was finally settled upon in European Commission (2015) Trade for All: Towards a more responsible trade and investment policy, COM(2015) 497 final.

  56. 56.

    Malmström (2015) Remarks at the European Parliament on Investment in TTIP and Beyond. https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153430.pdf. Accessed 24 January 2020.

  57. 57.

    European Commission (2015) Investment in TTIP and beyond—the path for reform, above n. 55.

  58. 58.

    European Commission (2016) Investment provisions in the EU-Canada free trade agreement (CETA). http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151918.pdf. Accessed 26 January 2018.

  59. 59.

    CETA, Article 8.29; EU-Vietnam BIT, Article 3.41; EU-Singapore BIT, Article 3.12.

  60. 60.

    Opinion 2/15, Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore, ECLI:EU:C:2017:376, Opinion of 16 May 2017, paras 285–293.

  61. 61.

    Council of the European Union (2018) Draft Council conclusions on the negotiation and conclusion of EU trade agreements—Adoption, 8622/18 MB/asz, p. 3. See also European Commission (2017) A Balanced and Progressive Trade Policy to Harness Globalisation, COM(2017) 492 final, pp. 15–16.

  62. 62.

    In France, CETA passed a major legal obstacle when the Constitutional Council ruled that CETA complies with the French Constitution. See Conseil Constitutionnel, Accord économique et commercial global entre le Canada, d’une part, et l’Union européenne et ses États membres, d’autre part, Decision no. 2017-749 DC of 31 July 2017. http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-date/decisions-depuis-1959/2017/2017-749-dc/version-en-anglais.149908.html. Accessed 19 December 2019. In Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court rejected a claim for a preliminary injunction on the basis that provisional application of CETA would violate rights guaranteed by the German Constitution. See Bundesverfassungsericht, über die Verfassungsbeschwerde des Herrn Prof. Dr. Bevollmächtigter, Judgment of the Second Senate of 13 October 2016, 2 BvR 1368/16 -, Rn. (1-73). https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2016/10/rs20161013_2bvr136816.html. Accessed 19 December 2019.

  63. 63.

    A request for the CJEU’s opinion on this issue was submitted by Belgium on 6 September 2017. See Belgium (2017) Belgian Request for an Opinion from the European Court of Justice. https://diplomatie.belgium.be/sites/default/files/downloads/ceta_summary.pdf. Accessed 24 January 2020. This resulted from the Belgian government’s agreement with the Wallonian regional government to make a request in exchange for the consent to the signing and provisional application of CETA.

  64. 64.

    To this end, the EU Parliament gave its consent on 15 February 2017. Although a necessary precondition, a Council decision will also be required and will not be taken until all Member States have ratified. So far, 14 member states have ratified CETA or are at an advanced stage of doing so. These are Latvia, Denmark, Malta, Spain, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ireland, Portugal, Estonia, Sweden, and Lithuania. See European Parliament (2018) Legislative Train Schedule: A balanced and progressive trade policy to harness globalization. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-a-balanced-and-progressive-trade-policy-to-harness-globalisation/file-ceta. Accessed 19 December 2019.

  65. 65.

    CETA, Article 8.2(1); EU-Vietnam BIT, Article 3.27(1); and EU-Singapore BIT, Article 3.1(1).

  66. 66.

    NAFTA, Article 1118 reads ‘[t]he disputing parties should first attempt to settle a claim through consultation or negotiation.’

  67. 67.

    CETA, Article 8.20; EU-Vietnam BIT, Article 3.30–31; EU-Singapore BIT, Article 3.3–4.

  68. 68.

    CETA, Article 8.22(1)(b); EU-Vietnam BIT, Article 3.35(b); EU-Singapore BIT, Article 3.7(b).

  69. 69.

    Ibid.

  70. 70.

    UNCTAD 2003, pp. 23–25.

  71. 71.

    In light of its criticisms of ISDS, the EU’s agreements require that an investor, on the initiation of the arbitral claim, withdraw any parallel domestic or international claims it may have. See: CETA, Article 8.22(f); EU-Vietnam BIT, Article 3.34(1); EU-Singapore BIT, Article 3.7(f).

  72. 72.

    CETA, Article 8.21(1)–(3); EU-Vietnam BIT, Article 3.32(1)–(2); EU-Singapore BIT, Article 3.5(1)–(2).

  73. 73.

    CETA, Article 8.21(4)(a); EU-Vietnam BIT, Article 3.32(3)(a); EU-Singapore BIT, Article 3.5(3)(a).

  74. 74.

    CETA, Article 8.21(4)(b); EU-Vietnam BIT, Article 3.32(3)(b); EU-Singapore BIT, Article 3.5(3)(b).

  75. 75.

    CETA, Article 8.22(f)–(g); EU-Vietnam BIT, Article 3.34(1)–(4); EU-Singapore BIT, Article 3.7(1)(f).

  76. 76.

    CETA, Article 8.23(1); EU-Vietnam BIT, Article 3.33(1); EU-Singapore BIT, Article 3.6(1).

  77. 77.

    CETA, Article 8.27(2); EU-Vietnam BIT, Article 3.38(2); EU-Singapore BIT, Article 3.9(2).

  78. 78.

    CETA, Article 8.23(5); EU-Vietnam BIT, Article 3.38(9); EU-Singapore BIT, Article 3.9(9).

  79. 79.

    CETA, Article 8.39(1)(a)–(b); EU-Vietnam BIT, Article 3.53(1)(a)–(b); EU-Singapore BIT, Article 3.18(1)(a)–(b).

  80. 80.

    CETA, Article 8.39(3)–(4); EU-Vietnam BIT, Article 3.53(3)–(4); EU-Singapore BIT, Article 3.18(3)–(4).

  81. 81.

    CETA, Article 8.28(9); EU-Vietnam BIT, Article 3.54(1); EU-Singapore BIT, Article 3.19(1).

  82. 82.

    CETA, Article 8.28(1); EU-Vietnam, Chapter 8: Section 3, Article 13(1); EU-Singapore BIT, Article 3.10(1). The additional grounds set out in Article 52(1) are: (a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers; (c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal; (d) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or (e) that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based.

  83. 83.

    While there is a well-known procedure for annulment under the ICSID convention this cannot be considered an appeal mechanism as it allows only for review on the basis of procedural grounds rather than substantive issues. See UNCTAD 2003, pp. 60–61.

  84. 84.

    CETA, Article 8.41(1)–(3); EU-Vietnam BIT, Article 3.57(1); EU-Singapore BIT, Article 3.22(1).

  85. 85.

    CETA, Article 8.28(9)(c); EU-Vietnam BIT, Article 3.55(1); EU-Singapore BIT, Article 3.18(4).

  86. 86.

    CETA, Article 8.31(1); EU-Vietnam BIT, Article 3.42(4); EU-Singapore BIT, Article 3.13(2).

  87. 87.

    CETA, Article 8.31(2); EU-Vietnam BIT, Article 3.42(3); EU-Singapore BIT, Article 3.13(2), Footnote 1.

  88. 88.

    Opinion 1/17, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the European Union and Canada, ECLI:EU:C:2019:72, Opinion of 30 April 2019, paras 122–131 (hereinafter ‘Opinion 1/17’).

  89. 89.

    Opinion 1/17, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the European Union and Canada, ECLI:EU:C:2019:72, Opinion of Advocate General Bot delivered on 29 January 2019, para 138.

  90. 90.

    Opinion 1/17, above n. 88, paras 131–133.

  91. 91.

    In its own words, ‘[t]he EU remains a staunch supporter of the multilateral trading system and firmly believes that the WTO is indispensable in ensuring free and fair trade’. See European Commission (2018) WTO Modernisation: Introduction to future EU proposal. Concept Paper. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/september/tradoc_157331.pdf. Accessed 11 November 2019.

  92. 92.

    In this scenario, the international law in question may be described as ‘self-executing’. See Henckaerts 1998, p. 56. See also Nollkaemper 2014, p. 109–110 (providing a general overview of the concept of direct effect).

  93. 93.

    A useful discussion of the two is provided in Jackson 1992, pp. 313–316.

  94. 94.

    An example is the European Communities Act 1972, described as the ‘conduit pipe’ through which EU law becomes (and now became) part of UK domestic law. See UK Supreme Court, R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, [2017] UKSC 5, [2017] 2 W.L.R. 583, Judgment given on 24 January 2017, paras 60–65.

  95. 95.

    It was open to the Court to find that EU law was the same as classic international law that can (or cannot) be self-executing, as described in the previous section. It declined to do so as a consequence of the ontological qualities of the new legal order. For a more detailed discussion, see Martines 2014, pp. 136–137.

  96. 96.

    Case C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Administratie der Belastingen, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1, Judgment of the Court of 5 February 1963, pp. 12–13.

  97. 97.

    For an account of this expansion, see Pescatore 1983, pp. 633–637. Equally impressive overviews are provided in de Witte 2011, p. 323; Robin-Olivier 2014, pp. 168–176.

  98. 98.

    Winter 1972, pp. 427–428.

  99. 99.

    Zipperle 2017, p. 12. Similarly, Prechal defines the doctrine as ‘[d]irect effect is the obligation of a court or another authority to apply the relevant provisions of Community law, either as a norm which governs the case or as a standard for legal review’, see Prechal 2000, p. 1048.

  100. 100.

    de Witte 2011, pp. 323.

  101. 101.

    Winter 1972, p. 427; Le Sueur et al. 2016, p. 824. Others describes this as member states no longer possessing the power to decide whether measures become the ‘law of the land’. See Hinarejos 2008, p. 625.

  102. 102.

    Brand 1997, p. 575.

  103. 103.

    Pernice 2010, p. 47.

  104. 104.

    Cases C-6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L., ECLI:EU:C:1964:66, Judgment of the Court of 15 July 1964, p. 594; C-106/77 Simmenthal, ECLI:EU:C:1978:49, Judgment of the Court of 9 March 1978, paras 21–22; Opinion 1/09, Draft agreement – Creation of a unified patent litigation system, EU:C:2011:123, Opinion of 8 March 2011 (hereinafter ‘Opinion 1/09’), para 65.

  105. 105.

    Cases C-61/94 Commission v. Germany, ECLI:EU:C:1996:313, Judgment of the Court of 10 September 1996 (hereinafter ‘Commission v. Germany’), para 52; C-308/06 Intertanko, ECLI:EU:C:2008:312, Judgment of the Court of 3 June 2008 (hereinafter ‘Intertanko’), paras 42–45; C-402/05P Kadi, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, Judgment of the Court of 3 September 2008, paras 306–307 (hereinafter ‘Kadi’).

  106. 106.

    Cases C-12/86 Demirel, ECLI:EU:C:1987:400, Judgment of the Court of 30 September 1987 (hereinafter ‘Demirel’), para 9; C-13/00 Commission v. Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2002:184, Judgment of the Court of 19 March 2002, para 14; C-239/03 Commission v. France, ECLI:EU:C:2004:598, Judgment of the Court of 7 October 2004, para 25; C-459/03 Commission v. Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2006:345, Judgment of the Court of 30 May 2006, para 84.

  107. 107.

    Eeckhout 2011, p. 260.

  108. 108.

    Casteleiro 2016, p. 33.

  109. 109.

    Important academic contributions to this debate include Pescatore 1979 (providing an early account of Court’s case law); Maresceau 1979 (discussing the effect of EU international agreements in the UK legal system); Mendez 2010a (arguing the views of CJEU on the direct effect of EU international agreements depend on whether it is member state or Union action that is being challenged); Mendez 2010b (arguing enforcement of EU international agreement places a greater burden on member states than the Union itself).

  110. 110.

    Case C-181/73 Haegemann v. Belgian State, ECLI:EU:C:1974:41, Judgment of the Court of 30 April 1974, para 5.

  111. 111.

    Mendez 2013, p. 64.

  112. 112.

    Koutrakos 2006, p. 185.

  113. 113.

    Case C-87/75 Bresciani v. Amministrazione delle finanze, ECLI:EU:C:1976:18, Judgment of the Court of 5 February 1976.

  114. 114.

    Ibid., paras 16–18 and 23.

  115. 115.

    Case C-270/80 Polydor and Others v. Harlequin and Others ECLI:EU:C:1982:43, Judgment of the Court of 9 February 1982. In light of member states’ concerns, the Court was reluctant to extend direct effect to the EEC-Portugal Agreement [1972] OJ L/301.

  116. 116.

    Case C-17/81 Pabst & Richarz KG v. Hauptzollamt Oldenburg, ECLI:EU:C:1982:129, Judgment of the Court of 29 April 1982.

  117. 117.

    Ibid., para 27.

  118. 118.

    Case C-104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v. Kupferberg & Cie., ECLI:EU:C:1982:362, Judgment of the Court of 26 October 1982 (hereinafter ‘Kupferberg’).

  119. 119.

    In reaching this conclusion, it emphasised the need for uniformity in effect of EU international agreements. See ibid., para 14.

  120. 120.

    Ibid., paras 22–26.

  121. 121.

    Conversely, the international agreements have to sometimes make express provision for direct effect. For example Article 15(1) of the Agreement on the establishment of a European Common Aviation Area, [2006] OJ L285/3. This states ‘each contracting party shall ensure the rights which devolve from this agreement may be invoked before a national court.’

  122. 122.

    The text of the EU-Korea agreement was concluded on 15 October 2009, approximately two and a half months before the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. See European Commission (2010) EU and South Korea sign free trade deal. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-10-1292_en.htm?locale=en. Accessed 19 December 2019.

  123. 123.

    Bronckers 2015, p. 663.

  124. 124.

    Cases C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:864, Judgment of the Court of 21 December 2011, para 49; Kupferberg, above n. 118, para 17; C-149/96 Portugal v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:1999:574, Judgment of the Court of 23 November 1999 (hereinafter ‘Portugal v. Council’), para 34.

  125. 125.

    Semertzi 2014; De Luca (2016) Direct effect of EU’s investment agreements and the Energy Charter Treaty in the EU. In: Eurojust.it Rivista. http://rivista.eurojus.it/direct-effect-of-eus-investment-agreements-and-the-energy-charter-treaty-in-the-eu/. Accessed 29 December 2019; Thym (2015) The Missing Link: Direct Effect, CETA/TTIP and Investor-State Dispute Settlement. In: EU Law Analysis. http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2015/01/the-missing-link-direct-effect-cetattip.html. Accessed 29 December 2019.

  126. 126.

    Opinion 1/17, above n. 88, para 77.

  127. 127.

    Ibid.

  128. 128.

    Hix 2013, p. 98.

  129. 129.

    Semertzi 2014, p. 1129.

  130. 130.

    Opinion 1/91, above n. 38, para 40; Opinion 1/09, above n. 104, para 74.

  131. 131.

    Opinion 1/00, Proposed agreement between the European Community and non-Member States on the establishment of a European Common Aviation Area, EU:C:2002:231, Opinion of 18 April 2002, para 26; Opinion 1/09, above n. 104, para 76; Kadi, above n. 105, para 282.

  132. 132.

    Lavranos 2004, pp. 237–8; MacLeod et al. 1996, pp. 137–8. In Opinion 1/17, above n. 88, paras 119 and 148–150, the Court both summarised the relevant conditions and clarified that regulatory discretion was also a relevant considerations.

  133. 133.

    The decisions of the EU-Turkey Association Council are available online at https://www.ab.gov.tr/association-council-decisions_116_en.html. Accessed 29 December 2019.

  134. 134.

    Case C-30/88 Greece v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1989:422, Judgment of the Court of 14 November 1989, para 13.

  135. 135.

    Decision No. 2/76 of the Association Council on the implementation of Article 12 of the Ankara Agreement; Decision No. 1/80 of the Association Council of 19 September 1980 on the development of the Association. The former provided that a Turkish worker employed legally in a member state for five years would enjoy free access to any paid employment of his choice. The latter outlined that a Turkish worker duly registered as belonging to the labour force of a member state would enjoy free access to any paid employment in that state after four years’ legal employment. Both decisions are available at https://www.ab.gov.tr/files/_files/okk_eng.pdf. Accessed 29 December 2019.

  136. 136.

    Case C-192/89 Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, ECLI:EU:C:1990:322, Judgment of the Court of 20 September 1990 (hereinafter ‘Sevince’), paras 15–26. The same approach was taken in Cases C-355/93 Eroglu, ECLI:EU:C:1994:369, Judgment of the Court of 5 October 1994, paras 13-17; C-262/96 Sürül, ECLI:EU:C:1999:228, Judgment of the Court of 4 May 1999, para 74.

  137. 137.

    Demirel, above n. 106, paras 24–25.

  138. 138.

    Sevince, above n. 136, para 21.

  139. 139.

    Koutrakos 2015, p. 280. For an opposing view, see MacLeod et al. 1996, p. 237.

  140. 140.

    Note that Bronckers has considered the legal status of EU DSMS decisions several times. See Bronckers 2007, p. 613; Bonckers 2008, p. 895.

  141. 141.

    Portugal v. Council, above n. 124, paras 47–8. The reasoning adopted by the Court compliments its approach taken to the GATT 1947, whose ‘spirit’, ‘general scheme’ and ‘terms’ provides ‘great flexibility’ that precludes direct enforcement, see Case C-21/72 International Fruit Company, ECLI:EU:C:1972:115, Judgment of the Court of 12 December 1972, paras 7, 8, 18–28. The general status of WTO law has within the EU legal order is not strictly the focus of this chapter. It has however sparked significant academic debate. See generally: Errico 2011 (discussing private claims for damage caused by the EU’s noncompliance with WTO law as determined by the DSB); Fabri 2014 (expressing doubt as to whether WTO law should be given direct effect within the EU legal order); Berkey 1998 (arguing against the direct effect of the GATT 1947).

  142. 142.

    Case C-93/02P Biret International v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2003:517, Judgment of the Court of 30 September 2003 (hereinafter ‘Biret’), paras 65–76. Mendez takes the view that the Court ‘left open the possibility’ of legality review vis-à-vis a WTO DSB decision, see Mendez 2004, p. 524.

  143. 143.

    Case T-19/01 Chiquita Brands and Others, ECLI:EU:T:2005:31, Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 3 February 2005 (hereinafter ‘Chiquita’), para 162.

  144. 144.

    Case C-377/02 Van Parys, ECLI:EU:C:2005:121, Judgment of the Court of 1 March 2005 (hereinafter ‘Van Parys’), paras 48–54.

  145. 145.

    WTO Appellate Body, EC—Bed Linen, WT/DS141/AB/R, Report of 12 March 2001, para 86.

  146. 146.

    Case C-351/04 Ikea Wholesale, ECLI:EU:C:2007:547, Judgment of the Court of 27 September 2007 (hereinafter ‘Ikea Wholesale’), paras 29–31.

  147. 147.

    Case C-120/06P FIAMM and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2008:476, Judgment of the Court of 9 September 2008 (hereinafter ‘FIAMM’), paras 121–125. The context was the EU’s banana import regime that gave preferential treatment to bananas originating in certain African, Caribbean and Pacific States. This had been found to breach the EU’s WTO obligations. See WTO Appellate Body, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, Report of 9 September 1997.

  148. 148.

    Similar arguments have been made in relation to WTO Panel and Appellate Body reports in EU law. See Thies 2013, p. 88; Eeckhout 1997, p. 53.

  149. 149.

    Rosas 2001, p. 139.

  150. 150.

    FIAMM, above n. 147, para 131.

  151. 151.

    As suggested by Hillion 2008, p. 826.

  152. 152.

    Opinion 1/17, above n. 88, para 118.

  153. 153.

    von Bogdandy 2005, p. 58.

  154. 154.

    FIAMM, above n. 147, para 130.

  155. 155.

    Schütze 2007, p. 6. Internally, it is possible for non-directly effective law to have indirect effects. See C-14/83 Von Colson and Kamann, ECLI:EU:C:1984:153, Judgment of the Court of 10 April 1984, para 26.

  156. 156.

    Hix 2013, p. 5.

  157. 157.

    Commission v. Germany, above n. 105.

  158. 158.

    Ibid., para 52.

  159. 159.

    Ibid.

  160. 160.

    Case C-301/08 Bogiatzi, ECLI:EU:C:2009:400, Opinion of Advocate General Mazák delivered on 25 June 2009, paras 46–8.

  161. 161.

    Kadi, above n. 105, paras 291 and 303–4. For further discussion of the principle of consistent interpretation and the Treaties, see Alì 2013, p. 881.

  162. 162.

    Eeckhout 2011, p. 356.

  163. 163.

    Koutrakos 2015, p. 308.

  164. 164.

    For cases involving the WTO, see: Cases C-92/71 Interfood GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg Ericus, ECLI:EU:C:1972:30, Judgment of the Court of 26 April 1972, para 6; C-79/89 Brown Boveri v. Hauptzollamt Mannheim, ECLI:EU:C:1991:153, Judgment of the Court of 18 April 1991, paras 15–19; T-163/94 NTN Corporation v. Council, ECLI:EU:T:1995:83, Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 2 May 1995, para 65; C-53/96 Hermès International v. FHT Marketing Choice, ECLI:EU:C:1998:292, Judgment of the Court of 16 June 1998, paras 27–31; C-245/02 Anheuser, ECLI:EU:C:2004:717, Judgment of the Court of 16 November 2004 (hereinafter ‘Anheuser’), para 42; C-306/05 SGAE, ECLI:EU:C:2006:764, Judgment of the Court of 7 December 2006, paras 34–5 and 41; C-428/08 Monsanto Technology, ECLI:EU:C:2010:402, Judgment of the Court of 6 July 2010, paras 70–74. For cases involving other international agreements found incapable of direct effect, see: Intertanko, above n. 105, para 52; Case C-286/90 Anklagemyndigheden v. Poulsen, ECLI:EU:C:1992:453, Judgment of the Court of 24 November 1992, para 11 (EC regulation on fisheries conservation interpreted consistently with, amongst others, the UNCLOS); Case C-377/98 Netherlands v. Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2001:523, Judgment of the Court of 9 October 2001, para 67 (reviewing EC biotechnology directive against, amongst others, United Nations 1992 Convention on Biodiversity).

  165. 165.

    Case T-35/01 Shanghai Teraoka Electronic, ECLI:EU:T:2004:317, Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 28 October 2004, para 145.

  166. 166.

    Case T-274/02 Ritek, ECLI:EU:T:2006:332, Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 24 October 2006, paras 97–106.

  167. 167.

    Cases T-45/06 Reliance Industries, ECLI:EU:T:2008:398, Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 24 September 2008 (hereinafter ‘Reliance Industries’), paras 107–9; T-409/06 Sun Sang Kong Yuen Shoes Factory (Hui Yang) Corp. Ltd., ECLI:EU:T:2010:69, Judgment of the General Court of 4 March 2010, paras 103–4.

  168. 168.

    Anheuser, above n. 164, paras 67 and 91.

  169. 169.

    Gattinara 2012, p. 275.

  170. 170.

    Case C-310/06 FTS International, ECLI:EU:C:2007:456, Judgment of the Court of 18 July 2007, para 15.

  171. 171.

    Gattinara 2012, p. 276.

  172. 172.

    Bronckers 2008, p. 889.

  173. 173.

    Cases C-260/08 HEKO Industrieerzeugnisse, ECLI:EU:C:2009:768, Judgment of the Court of 10 December 2009, para 22; C-373/08 Hoesch Metals and Alloys, ECLI:EU:C:2010:68, Judgment of the Court of 11 February 2010, para 41.

  174. 174.

    Kuijper and Bronckers do however argue that the principle of consistent interpretation produces outcomes comparable to direct effect. See Kuijper and Bronckers 2005, p. 1140.

  175. 175.

    It should be noted that any CJEU interpretation would not be binding on a DSM (at least not an ISDS tribunal). See Opinion 1/17, above n. 88, para 117.

  176. 176.

    Eeckhout 2011, p. 357.

  177. 177.

    These principles were first established in relation to the GATT. See: Cases C-69/89 Nakajima, ECLI:EU:C:1991:186, Judgment of the Court of 7 May 1991, paras 30–32; C-70/87 Fediol, ECLI:EU:C:1989:254, Judgment of the Court of 22 June 1989, paras 19–20. Subsequently, this has been confirmed in relation to the WTO. See: Portugal ν. Council, above n. 124, para 49; Biret, above n. 142, para 53.

  178. 178.

    Council Regulation 3286/94 laying down Community procedures in the field of the common commercial policy in order to ensure the exercise of the Community’s rights under international trade rules, in particular those established under the auspices of the World Trade Organization, [1994] OJ L349/71.

  179. 179.

    Council Regulation 2423/88 on protection against dumped or subsidized imports from countries not members of the EEC [1988], OJ L209/1.

  180. 180.

    Koutrakos 2015, p. 304.

  181. 181.

    Cases C-188/88 NMB v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1992:114, Judgment of the Court of 10 March 1992, para 23; C–162/94 Commission v. Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:1995:450, Judgment of the Court of 14 December 1995, para 99; T-256/97 BEUC v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:1999:15, Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 27 January 2000, para 65; C–76/00P Petrotub and Republica, ECLI:EU:C:2003:4, Judgment of the Court of 9 January 2003, paras 53–58; Reliance Industries, above n. 167, paras 87–91.

  182. 182.

    Case C-352/96 Italy v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:1998:531, Judgment of the Court of 12 November 1998, para 20.

  183. 183.

    Case C-317/99 Kloosterboer Rotterdam, ECLI:EU:C:2001:681, Judgment of the Court of 13 December 2001.

  184. 184.

    Case C-317/99 Kloosterboer Rotterdam, ECLI:EU:C:2001:229, Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer delivered on 2 May 2001, paras 35–8.

  185. 185.

    Chiquita, above n. 143, para 161.

  186. 186.

    Van Parys, above n. 144, at para 41.

  187. 187.

    Ikea Wholesale, above n. 146, paras 30–35.

  188. 188.

    Some take the view that both the Nakajima and Fediol principles serve as examples of indirect effect. See: Eeckhout 1997, pp. 45–46; Bourgeois 2003, p. 117. In contrast, others take the view that it should be appropriately categorised as an exception. See Hix 2013, pp. 49–50.

  189. 189.

    Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishes a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union, [2019] OJ L/791.

  190. 190.

    This is permitted by the relevant EU regulation. See ibid., Article 4.

  191. 191.

    EU policy responses to negative WTO dispute settlement decisions have been considered in both legal and political science literature. Legal examples include de Búrca and Scott 2002 (discussing how WTO law can influence decision-making in the EU); Princen 2004 (arguing that EU trade officials are critical to the enforcement of such decisions); Bourgeois and Lynskey 2008 (discussing how the EU legislature takes WTO obligations into account). In the political science, important contributions are made in Young 2012 (arguing the impact of the WTO decisions on the EU is not as pervasive as one might assume); Yildirim 2016 (suggesting the degree of integration to global value chains of a relevant sector affects the EU’s response to WTO decisions); Young 2004 (highlighting the difficulties the EU has in complying with WTO decision).

  192. 192.

    Young finds that by 2008 the EU had had 15 adverse rulings against it and in each case it had changed its policy in some manner. See Young 2010, pp. 120–121.

  193. 193.

    Council Directive 85/649 prohibiting the use in livestock farming of certain substances having a hormonal action, [1985] OJ L32/228.

  194. 194.

    The Canadian complaint (WTO Panel, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS48/R/CAN, Report of 18 August 1997) and the US complaint (WTO Panel, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/R/USA, Report of 18 August 1997) were treated formally as two separate complaints, however, the panels’ composition was identical and their conclusions the same.

  195. 195.

    WTO Appellate Body, European Communities—EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R, Report of 16 January 1998, para 178.

  196. 196.

    Young 2012, p. 32.

  197. 197.

    A full dissection of the long-running dispute is found in de Melo 2015, pp. 2–9.

  198. 198.

    Council Regulation No 3290/94 of 22 December 1994 on the adjustments and transitional arrangements required in the agriculture sector in order to implement the agreements concluded during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, [1994] OJ L349/105; Commission Regulation (EC) No 478/95 of 1 March 1995 on additional rules for the application of Council Regulation No 404/93 as regards the tariff quota arrangements for imports of bananas into the Community and amending Regulation No 1442/93, [1995] OJ L49/13.

  199. 199.

    Council Regulation No 1637/98 of 20 July 1998 amending Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 on the common organisation of the market in bananas, [1998] OJ L210/28.

  200. 200.

    Council Regulation No 2587/2001 of 19 December 2001 amending Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 on the common organisation of the market in bananas, [2001] OJ L345/13.

  201. 201.

    Regulation No 1260/2001 of 19 June 2001 on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector, [2001] OJ L178/1.

  202. 202.

    WTO Appellate Body, European Communities—Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265 (Australia), WT/DS266 (Brazil) and WT/DS283 (Thailand), Reports of 15 October 2004 and 28 April 2005.

  203. 203.

    Council Regulation No 318/2006 of 20 February 2006 on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector, [2006] OJ L58/1.

  204. 204.

    A full breakdown of the issues is provided in de Chazournes and Mbengue 2004, pp. 289–291.

  205. 205.

    WTO Panel, European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R and WT/DS293/R, Reports of 29 September 2006.

  206. 206.

    Bourgeois and Lynskey 2008, pp. 210–212.

  207. 207.

    European Parliament (2001) Report issued by European Parliament on the proposal for a European Parliament and Council regulation concerning traceability and labelling of genetically modified organisms and traceability of food and feed products produced from genetically modified organisms and amending Directive 2001/18/EC, COM(2001) 182, 26.

  208. 208.

    Regulation No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 concerning the traceability and labelling of genetically modified organisms and the traceability of food and feed products produced from genetically modified organisms and amending Directive 2001/18/EC, [2003] OJ L268/24.

  209. 209.

    Council Regulation 3254/91 of 4 November 1991 prohibiting the use of leghold traps in the Community and the introduction into the Community of pelts and manufactured goods of certain wild animal species originating in countries which catch them by means of leghold traps or trapping methods which do not meet international humane trapping standards, [1991] OJ L308/1.

  210. 210.

    Princen 2004, p. 565.

  211. 211.

    Council Directive 93/35/EEC of 14 June 1993 amending for the sixth time Directive 76/768/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to cosmetic products, [1993] OJ L151/32.

  212. 212.

    EU Monitor (2000) Explanatory Memorandum to COM(2000)189 - Amendment of Council Directive 76/768/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to cosmetic products. https://www.eumonitor.eu/9353000/1/j4nvhdfdk3hydzq_j9vvik7m1c3gyxp/vi8rm2yx5cy4. Accessed 20 December 2019.

  213. 213.

    de Búrca and Scott 2002, p. 11.

  214. 214.

    Regulation No 912/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 establishing a framework for managing financial responsibility linked to investor-to-state dispute settlement tribunals established by international agreements to which the European Union is party, [2014] OJ L257/121, Article 3(1)(a)–(c). For a detailed discussion, see Titi 2017, p. 83.

  215. 215.

    Examples include Van Harten and Scott 2016 (relying on empirical evidence to demonstrate that ISDS leads to the internal vetting of governmental proposals); Brown 2013 (arguing that ISDS restriction the regulatory choice of governments, particularly in relation to environmental regulation); Janeba 2016 (suggesting ISDS can affect a government’s decision on whether to pursue a particular policy proposal).

  216. 216.

    It is possible to divide the term into three separate categories: internalisation chill, threat chill, and cross-border chill. See Tienhaara 2018, pp. 233–239

  217. 217.

    Tienhaara 2011, pp. 607–608.

  218. 218.

    UNCTAD 2018, p. 5.

  219. 219.

    Cory et al. 2009, 2.

  220. 220.

    Cornfeld and Sauer 2010, p.1.

  221. 221.

    SCC, Charanne B.V. and Construction Investment v. Spain, Arb. No.062/2012, Award of 21 January 2016; ICSID, Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energia Solar Luxembourg v. Kingdom of Spain, Case No. ARB/13/36, Award of 4 May 2017; SCC, Isolux Netherlands, BV v. Kingdom of Spain, Case V2013/153, Award of 17 July 2016; SCC, Novenergia v. Spain, Case No. 063/2015, Award of 15 February 2018.

  222. 222.

    del Río and Mir-Artigues 2014, p. 24.

  223. 223.

    UNCITRAL, Achmea B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 2008–13 (formerly Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic), Award of 7 December 2012.

  224. 224.

    Case C-284/16 Slowakische Republik v. Achmea BV, ECLI:EU:C:2018:158, Judgment of the Court of 6 March 2018. Although outside our focus, it is noted that the issue of intra-EU investment disputes is an issue that has received widespread academic attention. See generally: Wehland 2009 (discussing the relevant of EU law to an intra-EU investment arbitration); Söderlund 2007 (predicting that intra-EU BITs will be of little future relevance); Kleinheisterkamp 2012 (examining difficulties that can stem from intra-EU investment disputes arising under the ECT).

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Pedreschi, L.F. (2020). Enforcement of EU Trade and Investment Agreements. In: Public Services in EU Trade and Investment Agreements. Legal Issues of Services of General Interest. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-383-2_7

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