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The National Reconciliation Commission in Practice

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Transitional Justice in Ghana

Part of the book series: International Criminal Justice Series ((ICJS,volume 25))

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Abstract

In transitional societies where the rule of law is in limbo and state institutions are usually fragile, implementation of mechanisms to address gross human rights violations can prove to be an arduous journey, and the establishment of truth commissions in such contexts is filled with several uncertainties. In as much as the work of a truth commission depends on its enabling laws, the extent to which the commission’s procedures comply with international human rights law is a defining element in meeting the outsized anticipations that usually accompany such mechanisms. In order to assess how the legal framework of Ghana’s National Reconciliation Commission was implemented, this chapter employs normative and comparative approaches to analyse how the commission carried out and fulfilled its mandate. It also reflects on the commission’s procedure, identifies the core challenges that hindered its work and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the commission’s report. The accentuation of the commission’s structure, hearings and report provide insight into how the features and mandate of the National Reconciliation Commission defined and shaped its outcome.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Bowden et al. 2009, p. 3.

  2. 2.

    See National Reconciliation Commission 2004, vol 1, para 2.1.1.

  3. 3.

    Ibid., vol 2, para 1.4.1.

  4. 4.

    Ibid., vol 2, para 2.0.1.

  5. 5.

    Ibid., vol 1, para 2.1.1; and vol 2, para 2.1.1.

  6. 6.

    Ibid., vol 1, para 2.2.1; and vol 2, para 2.2.1.1.

  7. 7.

    Ibid., vol 1, para 2.3.3.2.1 and s 4(a) of the NRC Act.

  8. 8.

    Ibid., vol 2, para 2.3.3.2.1.

  9. 9.

    Ibid., vol 1, para 2.3.3.4.1 at note 1.

  10. 10.

    Ibid., vol 1, para 2.3.3.4.1 at note 1.

  11. 11.

    About this aspect of the NRC’s mandate, see Sect. 3.3.5 in Chap. 3 of this book.

  12. 12.

    See National Reconciliation Commission 2004, vol 1, para 2.3.3.1.2.

  13. 13.

    See Pensamento Do Clube Militar. http://clubemilitar.com.br/pensamento-do-clube-militar-14/. Accessed 15 October 2019.

  14. 14.

    Although the NRC initially operated from a short-term location at Ghana’s Independence Square Building in Accra, it was eventually based permanently at the Old Parliament House in Accra. See National Reconciliation Commission 2004, vol 1, para 1.11; vol 2, para 1.14.1.

  15. 15.

    According to the NRC, zonal offices were established rather than regional offices as a result of the lack of funds and logistics to set up offices in all ten regions of Ghana. See National Reconciliation Commission 2004, vol 2, para 1.10.1.

  16. 16.

    See National Reconciliation Commission 2004, vol 2, para 1.10.1.

  17. 17.

    Ibid., vol 2, para 1.12.1; and vol 1, para 1.10.3.

  18. 18.

    Ibid., vol 1 para 1.10.1; and vol 2, para 1.5.1.

  19. 19.

    Ibid., vol 1, para 1.10.1; and vol 2, para 1.10.1.

  20. 20.

    Ibid., vol 2, paras 1.11.1, 1.13.0.

  21. 21.

    Ibid., para 1.13.1(1).

  22. 22.

    Ibid., para 1.13.1(2).

  23. 23.

    Ibid., para 1.13.1(3).

  24. 24.

    Ibid., para 1.13.1(4).

  25. 25.

    Ibid., para 1.13.1(4).

  26. 26.

    Ibid., para 1.13.1(5).

  27. 27.

    Ibid., para 2.7.1.

  28. 28.

    Ibid., para 2.7.2.

  29. 29.

    Ibid., para 2.7.3.

  30. 30.

    The said three committees were in the areas of research and systemization of information, liaison with civil society groups and institutions, and external communications. The 13 focus areas as outlined by the commission related to dictatorship and gender; the Araguaia armed group; contextualization, grounds and reasons for the 1964 civil-military coup; dictatorship and the justice system; dictatorship and repression of workers and trade union movement; the repression structure; the dead and disappeared; serious human rights violations against indigenous people; Operation Condor; the role of churches during the dictatorship; military persecution; human rights violations of Brazilians abroad and foreigners in Brazil; and the dictatorial military rule. See Comissão Nacional da Verdade 2015. http://www.cnv.gov.br/institucional-acesso-informacao/grupos-de-trabalho.html. Accessed 19 October 2019. Despite the existence of these divisions, the unfixed nature of the Comissão Nacional da Verdade’s leadership position gave rise to some complaints from the commission’s staff, regarding inconsistency caused by regular changes in the commission’s leadership. It was alleged that each new leader of the commission came with new demands. See Magalhães and Leitão 2013, http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/04/1262356-apos-quase-um-ano-comissao-da-verdade-e-alvo-de-criticas.shtml. Accessed 15 October 2019.

  31. 31.

    See South Africa, Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 34 of 1995, assented to 19 July 1995 (entered into force 1 December 1995) (South African TRC Act), s 3(3).

  32. 32.

    The slow progress of its work was also compounded by misunderstandings between some international workers of the commission and its members. This reduced its credibility both locally and internationally. See James-Allen et al. 2010, pp. 7–8, who write that one member of the commission’s International Technical Advisory Committee vacated his position as a result of tensions between him and the commissioners. In reality, the International Technical Advisory Committee had no other members during a greater period of the commission’s work because one appointed member never assumed his position, whilst the third member assumed her position for a brief period.

  33. 33.

    See BBC News 2002. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2235853.stm. Accessed 9 October 2019; and National Reconciliation Commission 2004, vol 1, para 2.5.

  34. 34.

    See National Reconciliation Commission 2004, vol 1, paras 2.3.2.4, 2.5.2.1.

  35. 35.

    Ibid., vol 1, para 2.3.2.

  36. 36.

    Ibid., vol 1, para 2.3.2; and vol 2, para 2.3.2.1.

  37. 37.

    Ibid., vol 1, para 2.3.2; and vol 2, para 2.3.2.1.

  38. 38.

    Ibid., vol 1, para 2.3.2.3; and vol 2 para 2.3.2.3.

  39. 39.

    Ibid., vol 1, para 2.5.4.1.

  40. 40.

    Ibid., para 2.5.4.1.

  41. 41.

    Ibid., para 2.5.4.1.

  42. 42.

    Ibid., para 2.5.4.1.

  43. 43.

    Ibid., para 2.5.5.1, and para 2.5.5.1 at note 4, where the commission notes that although it did not underestimate any of the human rights violations reported, it ranked killing as more severe than other violations such as denial of a person’s financial entitlements, because of its irreversibility. In the same vein, torture was ranked higher in severity than wrongful dismissal.

  44. 44.

    National Reconciliation Commission 2004, vol 1, para 2.3.3.6.1.

  45. 45.

    Ibid., para 2.3.3.6.2.

  46. 46.

    See Sect. 4.2.2.

  47. 47.

    Ibid., para 2.3.3.6.4.

  48. 48.

    See Republic of Ghana, National Reconciliation Commission Act, 2002, Act 611 (NRC Act), s 4(f); and National Reconciliation Commission 2004, vol 1, paras 2.3.3.7.1, 2.3.3.7.2.

  49. 49.

    See National Reconciliation Commission 2004, vol 1, para 2.6.3.1.

  50. 50.

    Ibid., paras 2.6.2.1, 2.3.4.1.

  51. 51.

    Ibid., vol 2, para 2.3.4.1.

  52. 52.

    Ibid., vol 1, para 2.3.4.1.

  53. 53.

    See Valji 2006, p. 8 at note 31.

  54. 54.

    It must be noted however that it was not mandatory for perpetrators to provide such testimony. See National Reconciliation Commission 2004, vol 1, paras 2.6.2.2, 2.6.2.1.

  55. 55.

    See National Reconciliation Commission 2004, vol 1, para 2.6.2.2.

  56. 56.

    See Wain 2003, p. 8.

  57. 57.

    See National Reconciliation Commission 2004, vol 1, para 2.6.4.2.

  58. 58.

    Ibid., para 5.0.2.

  59. 59.

    Ibid., para 5.0.1.

  60. 60.

    The commission considered these petitions to exceed its mandate because they did not fall within the mandated period for the commission’s investigations (i.e., the said cases occurred either prior to 6 March 1957 or after 6 January 1993) or were not about a public official or public institution as was required in the NRC’s mandate. See National Reconciliation Commission 2004, vol 1, para 5.0.1.

  61. 61.

    See Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission 2002, vol 4, para 1.12.

  62. 62.

    See Gready 2011, p. 160.

  63. 63.

    See National Reconciliation Commission 2004, vol 1, para 2.3.3.4.3.

  64. 64.

    Ibid., para 2.3.3.5.2.

  65. 65.

    Ibid., para 2.3.3.5.2.

  66. 66.

    Ibid., para 2.3.3.5.2.

  67. 67.

    Ibid., para 2.5.3.1.

  68. 68.

    Ibid., para 2.3.3.5.2.

  69. 69.

    See Valji 2006, p. 4.

  70. 70.

    Ibid., p. 19.

  71. 71.

    See Ameh 2006, p. 359.

  72. 72.

    See Hayner 2011, p. 57.

  73. 73.

    Aside this grant, other bodies like the Open Society Initiative for West Africa provided some funding and logistics, whilst the International Centre for Transitional Justice provided the commission with technical assistance. See National Reconciliation Commission 2004, vol 1, p. ii.

  74. 74.

    See Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2013, p. 283, who writes that some expected international donations for the commission’s work were delayed, thereby compounding the commission’s financial difficulties.

  75. 75.

    About the lack of agreement on the commission’s budget, see Samuel and Green 2017, p. 111 at note 134. See also Yusuf 2013, p. 337.

  76. 76.

    Ameh 2006, p. 359.

  77. 77.

    Ibid., p. 360.

  78. 78.

    It is also believed that the predominantly male staff base of the NRC intimidated witnesses sometimes, owing to traditional and social beliefs in Ghana, which make it difficult for female victims to freely open up to the male statement takers. See Valji 2006, p. 20.

  79. 79.

    See Valji 2006, p. 20, who iterates a respondent’s opinion that although it was common knowledge within Ghanaian society that several rapes and sexual assaults occurred during the era of the Provisional National Defence Council, a minute number of such cases were actually reported to the commission. On this subject, see also Hayner 2011, p. 57.

  80. 80.

    See Oduro 2013, p. 321.

  81. 81.

    See Valji 2006, p. 19, where she refers to this assertion made by a respondent she interviewed.

  82. 82.

    Ansah-Koi K, Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Personal Interview (18 August 2016).

  83. 83.

    See Valji 2006, p. 20, where she cites this assertion made by a respondent she interviewed.

  84. 84.

    For this and further examples of such possibly untrue testimonies, see Ghana Web 2003a. http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/economy/artikel.php?ID=33294. Accessed 27 October 2019; and Gyimah-Boadi 2003, p. 3, where he discusses this issue.

  85. 85.

    In his description of the NRC proceedings, Gyimah-Boadi 2003, p. 1, writes that members of the commission sat on an elevated platform that overlooked the witness and an interpreter, with perpetrators and their lawyers seated at one remote side of the witness and the NRC’s workers on another side. The witness was led in evidence by the NRC’s lawyer and then discharged. See also Valji 2006, p. 12; and Wain 2003, p. 8.

  86. 86.

    See Valji 2006, p. 11.

  87. 87.

    Ibid., p. 12.

  88. 88.

    See Gyimah-Boadi 2003, p. 2.

  89. 89.

    See Valji 2006, p. 11.

  90. 90.

    Ibid., pp. 8–9.

  91. 91.

    See for instance Asamoah 2014, p. 502, who writes that the chairman was one avenue through which members of the opposition were treated in an unfair manner; and Ghana Web 2003b. http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Remove-NRC-Chairman-NDC-34445 Accessed 13 October 2019.

  92. 92.

    Regarding the biased attitude of the Chairman, see Asamoah 2014, pp. 502–504, where he describes his own appearance before the commission. See Oduro 2013, p. 321; and Valji 2006, pp. 8–9.

  93. 93.

    See Asamoah 2014, p. 502; and Oduro 2013, p. 321.

  94. 94.

    See Ghana Web 2003b. http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Remove-NRC-Chairman-NDC-34445. Accessed 13 October 2019; and Gyimah-Boadi 2003, p. 5.

  95. 95.

    For instance, the petition cited a past incident where the property of the Chairman’s father was confiscated by their party during their political regime. Also, the petition stated that the Chairman’s father was a victim of the kangaroo courts that were established by the government of the Provisional National Defence Council. See Ghana Web 2003b. http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Remove-NRC-Chairman-NDC-34445. Accessed 13 October 2019.

  96. 96.

    See Ghana Web 2003b. http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Remove-NRC-Chairman-NDC-34445. Accessed 13 October 2019.

  97. 97.

    Ibid.

  98. 98.

    See the Daily Graphic 2003. http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/NRC-Is-Biased-CPP-38400. Accessed 13 February 2018.

  99. 99.

    Ghana News Agency 2004a. http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Court-dismisses-Tsikata-s-application-against-NRC-Chairman-614. Accessed 13 October 2019.

  100. 100.

    Ibid.

  101. 101.

    See Root 2013, pp. 426–427.

  102. 102.

    Ibid., p. 427. See also Amnesty International 2004, p. 27. https://www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/themes/international_courts_tribunals/amnestyaugust2004.pdf. Accessed 18 October 2019; and International Centre for Transitional Justice. https://www.ictj.org/news/ten-years-after-peru-truth-commission. Accessed 18 October 2019.

  103. 103.

    See Deutsche Welle. http://www.dw.com/pt/brasil-encara-responsabilidade-na-ditadura-diz-historiadora/a-18112450. Accessed 20 October 2019.

  104. 104.

    See Magalhães and Leitão 2013, http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/04/1262356-apos-quase-um-ano-comissao-da-verdade-e-alvo-de-criticas.shtml. Accessed 15 October 2019.

  105. 105.

    See James-Allen et al. 2010, p. 9.

  106. 106.

    In South Africa, one of the country’s ex-Presidents was sued, following his failure to honour a subpoena invitation by the commission. In another lawsuit, an order was obtained against the South African TRC to provide individuals who were to be named as perpetrators in its hearings with due notice. In a third suit, the commission’s authority to award amnesties was the subject of one lawsuit, in which it was claimed that this power was unconstitutional. The suit was however unsuccessful. See Hayner 2011, pp. 30–31.

  107. 107.

    See Gyimah-Boadi 2002, p. 3; and Valji 2006, p. 5.

  108. 108.

    Regarding the debates that surrounded the establishment of the NRC, see Boafo-Arthur 2006, pp. 138–145; and Boafo-Arthur 2005, pp. 118–124.

  109. 109.

    Ghana Web 2003c. http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/NDC-Other-Parties-Boycott-NRC-Hearings-31573. Accessed 13 February 2019.

  110. 110.

    See Ghana Web 2003a. http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/economy/artikel.php?ID=33294. Accessed 27 October 2019; and Gyimah-Boadi 2003, p. 3. See also Alidu 2010, pp. 163–164.

  111. 111.

    See Ghana Web 2003a. http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/economy/artikel.php?ID=33294; and Gyimah-Boadi 2003, p. 3.

  112. 112.

    See Alidu 2010, pp. 163–164.

  113. 113.

    For instance, a former National Security Chief from the regime of the Provisional National Defence Council, alleged in a media briefing that the NRC was making attempts to ambush him with untruthful witnesses. See the Ghanaian Chronicle 2004. http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Kojo-T-Raises-Alarm-NRC-Planning-To-Ambush-me-60506. Accessed 13 October 2019. See also Alidu 2010, pp. 156–157.

  114. 114.

    For instances of such negative propaganda, see Gyimah-Boadi 2002, p. 3.

  115. 115.

    In one instance, the former President alleged on radio that lies had been concocted by affiliates of the ruling party at the hearings of the NRC. In his view, such lies were part of a grand scheme by the ruling party to divert the minds of Ghanaians from the failures of their government. See the Ghanaian Lens 2004. http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Rawlings-Grants-Interview-On-The-Lies-At-The-NRC-61820. Accessed 13 October 2019; and Valji 2006, p. 5.

  116. 116.

    See Quinalha 2014. http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/50-years-later-still-in-search-of-truth-challenges-facing-truth-commissions-in-brazil/. Accessed 15 October 2019.

  117. 117.

    Duffy 2010. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8451109.stm. Accessed 15 October 2019.

  118. 118.

    The Comissão Nacional da Verdade was unable to effectively trace disappeared and dead individuals owing to the minimal support they obtained from the country’s military. In one instance, the commission’s attempt to obtain certain evidential records from an ex-military official was put on hold for about six months, due to an injunction that was obtained by the military official’s wife. Eventually, the injunction was overturned, thereby enabling the Comissão Nacional da Verdade to have access to the said records. See Arruda 2014. http://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/roldao-arruda/comissao-tera-acesso-a-informacoes-sobre-militar-apontado-como-chefe-da-casa-da-morte/. Accessed 15 October 2019; Folha de Săo Paulo 2014. http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2014/12/1558801-grupo-fracassa-na-tentativa-de-encontrar-mortos-e-desaparecidos.shtml. Accessed 15 October 2019; and see Quinalha 2014. http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/50-years-later-still-in-search-of-truth-challenges-facing-truth-commissions-in-brazil/. Accessed 15 October 2019.

  119. 119.

    See Hayner 2011, p. 69.

  120. 120.

    On this subject, see Valji 2006, p. 13.

  121. 121.

    Ibid.

  122. 122.

    Ibid. According to her, only two cases are popularly cited by the public in which the perpetrators openly admitted their wrong and asked for forgiveness from the victims.

  123. 123.

    See Ghana Web 2004. http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/NRC-ends-on-a-low-note-61664. Accessed 13 October 2019.

  124. 124.

    Ibid.

  125. 125.

    See Sakyi-Addo 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2860489.stm. Accessed 9 October 2019.

  126. 126.

    See Valji 2006, p. 15.

  127. 127.

    Ghana News Agency 2004b. http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Rawlings-At-NRC-No-Drama-51645. Accessed 13 October 2019; and Valji 2006, pp. 15–16.

  128. 128.

    For instance, more than a year after the appearance of Rawlings before the NRC, a son of one of the murder victims (i.e., the murder of three High Court judges in 1982, which was the subject matter of Rawlings’ appearance before the commission) expressed on radio his desire for the commission to recall the former President for further questioning. This indicates a general dissatisfaction with the commission’s earlier questioning of Rawlings. See Peace FM 2004. http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Prez-Spokesman-Dares-Rawlings-60179. Accessed 23 October 2019. See also Valji 2006, pp. 15–16, who opines that the manner in which the NRC handled Rawling’ appearance gives a vivid picture of the difficulties that truth commissions have in dealing with prominent political figures. She asserts that if such moments are not handled with care, the appearance of such political figures could rather create a platform to display more scorn rather than to foster the reconciliatory agenda of the truth commission.

  129. 129.

    See Gready 2011, p. 31, where he makes reference to this criticism.

  130. 130.

    Even in instances where a commission is well-funded to conduct all its investigations, such problems could still arise. In Germany, several ex-government officials refused to give testimony at the hearings of the Commission of Inquiry for the Assessment of History and Consequences of the SED Dictatorship, owing to their fear of being tried in future on account of their testimonies. See Hayner 2011, p. 52.

  131. 131.

    See Weah 2012, p. 7.

  132. 132.

    See Yusuf 2007, p. 8.

  133. 133.

    See Supreme Court of Nigeria, Chief Gani Fawehinmi et al. v General Ibrahim Babangida (Retired) et al. (Case Chief Gani Fawehinmi), 31 January 2003, SC.360/2001, where, the Supreme Court of Nigeria held amongst other things that summons by the Oputa Panel constituted a violation of the rights of the individuals involved. The court also held that the Tribunals of Inquiry Act, under which the Oputa Panel derived authority to issue warrants and compel the appearance of witnesses, was a law that was applicable only to the federal capital of Abuja and not the whole of Nigeria. Moreover, the aspects of the respective provisions of the Tribunals of Inquiry Act that empowered the commission to impose fines and imprisonments was a contravention of the Nigerian Constitution and was thus unconstitutional. For further discussion of this decision, see also Yusuf 2007, pp. 277–279. See also Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission 2002, vol 4, para 1.15.

  134. 134.

    See Yusuf 2007, p. 16, 2013, p. 337.

  135. 135.

    See the Daily Graphic 2004. http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/NRC-Winds-Up-Business-68901. Accessed 13 October 2019; and Ghana Web 2004. http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/NRC-ends-on-a-low-note-61664. Accessed 13 October 2019.

  136. 136.

    See Amnesty International 2005–2007, p. 2. http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session2/GH/AI_GHA_UPR_S2_2008anx_annualreportentries.pdf. Accessed 9 October 2019.

  137. 137.

    See National Reconciliation Commission 2004, vol 3, para 8.

  138. 138.

    Ibid.

  139. 139.

    Ibid., vol 1, para 6.1.1(1).

  140. 140.

    Ibid., vol 1, para 6.1.1(2), (6).

  141. 141.

    Ibid., vol 1, para 6.1.1(3), (4).

  142. 142.

    Ibid., vol 1, para 6.1.1(4).

  143. 143.

    Ibid., vol 1, para 6.1.1(5).

  144. 144.

    Ibid., vol 1, para 6.1.1(7).

  145. 145.

    Ibid., vol 1, para 6.1.1(8).

  146. 146.

    Ibid., vol 1, para 6.1.1(9).

  147. 147.

    Ibid., vol 3, para 3.2.9.2.

  148. 148.

    See Ramalho 2014. http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2014/12/ministros-defendem-decisao-do-stf-e-questionam-revisao-da-lei-da-anistia.html. Accessed 15 October 2019.

  149. 149.

    National Reconciliation Commission 2004, vol 3, paras 3.12.1–3.12.3, 3.12.6, 3.12.11.

  150. 150.

    Ibid., para 7.7.4.

  151. 151.

    Ibid., paras 3.8.1–3.8.15.

  152. 152.

    Ibid., para 3.9.3.

  153. 153.

    Ibid., para 3.3.1.

  154. 154.

    Ibid., Chap. 1, paras 3.3.2–3.3.3.

  155. 155.

    Ibid., paras 3.3.5, 3.3.8, 3.3.17.1.

  156. 156.

    Ibid., para 3.3.6.

  157. 157.

    Ibid., para 3.3.7.

  158. 158.

    Ibid., para 3.3.9.

  159. 159.

    Ibid., para 3.3.11.

  160. 160.

    Ibid., paras 3.3.12.1, 3.3.12.2, 3.3.12.5.1.

  161. 161.

    Ibid., para 3.3.12.3.

  162. 162.

    Ibid., paras 3.3.12.4 and 3.3.12.6 and 3.3.12.7.

  163. 163.

    Ibid., para 3.3.13.

  164. 164.

    Ibid., para 3.3.15.

  165. 165.

    Ibid., paras 3.3.19–3.3.27, 3.3.28–3.3.35.

  166. 166.

    Ibid., paras 3.4.7, 3.4.9.

  167. 167.

    Ibid., paras 3.4.11–3.4.14. This recommendation of the NRC can be explained against the backdrop that under the 1992 Constitution it is provided that justices of the Supreme Court should be appointed by the President with advice from the Judicial Council, in consultation with the Council of State. The Chief Justice is also appointed by the President in consultation with the Council of State and with approval from Parliament. However, Court of Appeal and High Court judges must be appointed by the President in consultation with the Judicial Council. The Constitution does not however provide the detailed steps for appointment, to ensure objectivity. Besides, a majority of the members of the Council of State, who advise the President are also appointed by the President. In the circumstances, the President of Ghana wields a large amount of power regarding the caliber of persons who join the bench. This problem is further exacerbated by the fact that there is no constitutional limit on the number of Supreme Court judges in Ghana. In light of these circumstances, credibility of the appointment process of judges is rather doubtful.

  168. 168.

    National Reconciliation Commission 2004, vol 3, paras 3.4.18–3.4.19.

  169. 169.

    Ibid., paras 3.4.21, 3.4.22–3.4.25.

  170. 170.

    Ibid., para 3.4.26.

  171. 171.

    Ibid., paras 3.5.1–3.5.9.

  172. 172.

    Ibid., paras 3.6.2, 3.6.3.

  173. 173.

    Ibid., para 3.6.3.

  174. 174.

    Ibid., para 3.6.9.

  175. 175.

    Ibid., paras 3.6.10, 3.6.11.

  176. 176.

    Ibid., para 3.7.1.

  177. 177.

    Ibid., para 3.7.7.

  178. 178.

    Ibid., para 3.7.6.

  179. 179.

    Ibid., paras 3.10.2–3.10.3, 3.10.8–3.10.9, 3.10.15, 3.10.17.

  180. 180.

    Ibid., paras 3.10.4, 3.10.5.

  181. 181.

    Ibid., paras 3.10.11–3.10.14, 3.10.16.

  182. 182.

    Ibid., paras 3.11.1–3.11.10.

  183. 183.

    Ibid., para 7.3.1.1.

  184. 184.

    Ibid., paras 7.3.1.2, 7.3.1.3, 7.3.1.4.

  185. 185.

    See NRC Act, above n 47, s 20(2)(h), which provides that one of the elements of the report is recommendations on the creation of a ‘reparations and rehabilitation fund’. See also National Reconciliation Commission 2004, vol 1, para 7.1.1.

  186. 186.

    See National Reconciliation Commission 2004, vol 1, paras 7.2.1(1)(2)(3) and (7).

  187. 187.

    Ibid., paras 7.4.3.2, 7.4.3.3 and 7.5.

  188. 188.

    Ibid., para 7.4.2.1.

  189. 189.

    Ibid., para 7.4.2.2.

  190. 190.

    Ibid., para 7.4.1.5.

  191. 191.

    Ibid., vol 1, para 7.4.1.3; vol 3, paras 3.2.1, 3.2.3.

  192. 192.

    Ibid., vol 1, para 7.4.1.3; vol 3, para 3.2.1.

  193. 193.

    These officers were specifically named in the report. See National Reconciliation Commission 2004, vol 3, para 3.2.7.3.

  194. 194.

    See National Reconciliation Commission 2004, vol 1, para 7.4.1.4.

  195. 195.

    Ibid., para 7.4.1.4.

  196. 196.

    Ibid., para 7.4.1.4.

  197. 197.

    Ibid., para 7.4.1.4.

  198. 198.

    Ibid., para 7.4.1.6.2.

  199. 199.

    Ibid., para 7.4.1.7.

  200. 200.

    For details of the findings and recommendations, see Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission 2002, vol 7.

  201. 201.

    See Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia 2009, vol II, paras 12.2–12.4.

  202. 202.

    See Root 2013, p. 426.

  203. 203.

    See Hayner 2011, p. 41.

  204. 204.

    See Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia 2009, vol II, p. 353 para 12.5, pp. 360–361 paras 14.2–14.3.

  205. 205.

    See Sierra Leone, Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000, 2 March 2000, s 17.

  206. 206.

    See National Reconciliation Commission 2004, vol 2, para 3.1.5.1. For details of the trust territory of the Trans Volta Togoland, see Sect. 2.2.3 in Chap. 2 of this book.

  207. 207.

    For instance, see Valji 2006, p. 21, where she cites the statement of a Ghanaian professor, who admits that in spite of his academic knowledge and experience, he acquired a large amount of new information from the NRC’s report.

  208. 208.

    See National Reconciliation Commission 2004, vol 2, paras 2.3.0, 2.4.0, 2.5.0, 2.60.

  209. 209.

    Ibid., para 2.5.4.1(2).

  210. 210.

    Regarding the weak investigative capacity of the commission, see Sect. 4.3.2 in the present chapter.

  211. 211.

    See National Reconciliation Commission 2004, vol 2, paras 8.4.1–8.4.26; and Sarpong 2004. http://www.worldpress.org/Africa/1827.cfm. Accessed 19 October 2019.

  212. 212.

    According to Ansah-Koi, above n 82, several other cases of disappearances that were reported to the commission were not investigated, and the truth is still unknown.

  213. 213.

    See Myjoyonline TV, Scars of the revolution (Video File) published by Myjoyonline TV on YouTube, 12 December 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p2BC4LNhnIE. Accessed 3 January 2020.

  214. 214.

    See James-Allen et al. 2010, pp. 14–15.

  215. 215.

    See Campbell 2000, pp. 51–52; and Hamber 2003, pp. 1078, 1084–1085.

  216. 216.

    Indeed, the commission states in its report that in exercising its mandate to identify perpetrators, it observed rules of natural justice in its hearings. See National Reconciliation Commission 2004, vol 1, para 2.3.3.4.1.

  217. 217.

    See MyJoyOnline Television, Who killed the judges-Joy News Special Assignment (2-10-18) (Video File), published by Myjoyonline Television on YouTube, 2 October 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JxTZiAXbX3I. Accessed 9 October 2019.

  218. 218.

    See for example Azumah 2018a. https://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2018/October-6th/who-killed-the-judges-baako-scandalised-by-silent-of-subsequent-govts-on-amedeka-.php. Accessed 9 October 2019; Azumah 2018b. https://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2018/October-6th/who-killed-the-judges-baako-reveals-missing-links-of-damning-history.php. Accessed 9 October 2019; and Mordy 2018. https://www.myjoyonline.com/politics/2018/October-5th/who-killed-the-judges-amedeka-was-brought-into-prison-as-mad-man.php. Accessed 9 October 2019.

  219. 219.

    See United Nations Commission on Human Rights 2005, paras 3, 5, 14 and 15.

  220. 220.

    Ibid., para 3. See also United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2015, pp. 3, 4; United Nations General Assembly 2014, para 10; United Nations Human Rights Council 2012, para 10; and United Nations General Assembly 2006, para 24.

  221. 221.

    Daly 2013, p. 264.

  222. 222.

    See Cuevas et al. 2002. https://www.apt.ch/content/files_res/Truth%20Comm_Executive%20Summary.pdf. Accessed 4 September 2019.

  223. 223.

    See Amnesty International 2005–2007, p. 2. http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session2/GH/AI_GHA_UPR_S2_2008anx_annualreportentries.pdf. Accessed 9 October 2019.

  224. 224.

    See Ghana Centre for Democratic Development 2005. https://books.google.de/books/about/Never_again.html?id=ZfwUAQAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y. Accessed 29 October 2019.

  225. 225.

    On this subject, see Odartey-Wellington and Alhassan 2016, p. 41.

  226. 226.

    Ibid., p. 40.

  227. 227.

    See the United States Institute of Peace. http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-nigeria. Accessed 16 October 2019; Yusuf Yusuf 2007, pp. 16–17, 2013, p. 337.

  228. 228.

    González and Varney 2013, p. 66. https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Book-Truth-Seeking-2013-English.pdf. Accessed 2 November 2019.

  229. 229.

    To compound matters further, some ex-warlords who had been named in the commission’s report, threatened to resume violence in the country. See Aning and Jaye 2011, pp. 13–15; James-Allen et al. 2010, pp. 10–11; and Weah 2012, pp. 5–6.

  230. 230.

    See West African Journal Magazine 2018. https://westafricanjournalmagazine.com/2018/03/23/un-pressures-liberia-to-implement-trc-report/. Accessed 16 October 2019.

  231. 231.

    See Ferrara 2015, pp. 50–52; Fuentes and Collins 2013, pp. 297–298; Fuentes 2012, pp. 123–124; and Kaye 1997, p. 697.

  232. 232.

    Ibid.

  233. 233.

    See Information Services Department of Ghana 2005. http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Govt-Issues-White-Paper-On-NRC-Report-79926. Accessed 13 October 2019.

  234. 234.

    See the Ghanaian Times 2005 http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/CDD-Boss-wants-NRC-report-implemented-83673. Accessed 24 October 2019.

  235. 235.

    See the Daily Graphic 2007. http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/8bn-Paid-To-Human-Rights-Victims-125571. Accessed 13 October 2019; and the Ghana News Agency 2006. http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/13-5bn-to-implement-NRC-recommendations-103210. Accessed 13 October 2019.

  236. 236.

    See Asare 2008, p. 35.

  237. 237.

    See Myjoyonline TV, Scars of the revolution (Video File) published by Myjoyonline TV on YouTube, 12 December 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p2BC4LNhnIE. Accessed 3 January 2020.

  238. 238.

    Ibid.

  239. 239.

    Ibid.

  240. 240.

    Ibid.

  241. 241.

    See the Daily Graphic 2007. http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/8bn-Paid-To-Human-Rights-Victims-125571. Accessed 13 October 2019.

  242. 242.

    See Arruda 2015. http://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/roldao-arruda/governo-ja-segue-recomendacoes-da-comissao-da-verdade-afirma-ministra/. Accessed 15 October 2019; and Charner 2015. http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/brazils-truth-commission-many-recommendations-little-action. Accessed 15 October 2019.

  243. 243.

    See Oduro 2013, p. 214, who notes that judging from the past attitude of Ghanaian governments in the implementation of reports, it is possible that the report of the NRC would at best remain a collection in Ghana’s archives.

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Yankson-Mensah, M. (2020). The National Reconciliation Commission in Practice. In: Transitional Justice in Ghana. International Criminal Justice Series, vol 25. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-379-5_4

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