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Francisco Lucas Pires’ Views on the Economic and Monetary Union and the Single Currency: An Assessment Twenty Years Later

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What Market, What Society, What Union?

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Abstract

In his volume on the Treaty of Amsterdam, Francisco Lucas Pires provided a thorough and critical analysis of the then recently approved Treaty. In particular, he examined whether the Treaty of Amsterdam marked the shift from a European integration process focused on the market to a European society, and he showed extraordinary capacities to foresee how the European Union (EU) would develop from then onwards. This chapter first examines Francisco Lucas Pires’ views on the Treaty of Amsterdam and the single currency in general and assesses the evolution the EU has witnessed since. The following part of this analysis is devoted specifically to the study of the features of the EU’s economic institutional governance contained in the postscript). The final section concludes.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This decision was taken at the European Council meeting held in Hannover on 27–28 June 1988 during which the Heads of State and Government agreed to appoint a committee to study ways to achieve a European economic and monetary union. This Committee, chaired by then Commission President Delors, produced a report on economic and monetary union in the European Community in April 1989. Committee for the study of the Economic and Monetary Union 1989.

  2. 2.

    Lucas Pires 2020, Chap. 1 in the present book.

  3. 3.

    Indeed, the Maastricht Treaty included a reference to EMU in its text for the first time; it also foresaw the creation of the European Central Bank.

  4. 4.

    Lucas Pires 2020, Chap. 1 in the present book.

  5. 5.

    For instance: Spiegel online, “Germany Open to Possible Greek Euro Zone Exit”, 5.1.2015.

  6. 6.

    Eurobarometer 2017.

  7. 7.

    Eurobarometer 2018.

  8. 8.

    Lucas Pires 2020, Chap. 1 in the present book.

  9. 9.

    Lucas Pires 2020, Chap. 1 in the present book.

  10. 10.

    Lucas Pires 2020, Chap. 1 in the present book.

  11. 11.

    Further on the right to petition: Tiburcio 2015.

  12. 12.

    For an assessment, see: Ingravallo 2017 and Karatzia 2017.

  13. 13.

    Among many other publications: Fromage 2015, Jancic 2017 and Hefftler et al. 2015.

  14. 14.

    Lucas Pires 2020, Chap. 1 in the present book.

  15. 15.

    Lucas Pires 2020, Chap. 2 in the present book.

  16. 16.

    Lucas Pires 2020, Chap. 5 in the present book.

  17. 17.

    This was clearly reaffirmed by Commission President Juncker in his 2017 State of the Union speech for instance. Juncker 2017.

  18. 18.

    Lucas Pires 2020, Chap. 2 in the present book.

  19. 19.

    Lucas Pires 2020, Chap. 5 in the present book.

  20. 20.

    Lucas Pires 2020, Chap. 5 in the present book.

  21. 21.

    Suffice it to refer to the Treaty on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance or the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism.

  22. 22.

    Only 42.61% of European citizens voted in the 2014 elections; the turnout has been steadily decreasing since the first direct elections in 1979. European Parliament, Results of the 2014 European elections—turnout, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/turnout.html (11.11.2018).

  23. 23.

    I refer here for instance to the issues linked to the informality of the Eurogroup, or the inadequacy of the European Parliament as the organ in charge of guaranteeing accountability of Eurozone- or Banking Union-specific issues.

  24. 24.

    Recent initiatives have included for instance the proposal of an Erasmus programme for civil servants, the delivery of a free Interrail pass to EU citizens when they turn 18 or the Spitzenkandidaten procedure in the run-up to the European Parliament elections.

  25. 25.

    Article 11-2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks attached to the Treaty of Maastricht.

  26. 26.

    Article 11-2 of Protocol nº4 on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank.

  27. 27.

    Article 26-3 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions.

  28. 28.

    Fromage and Ibrido 2018.

  29. 29.

    Lucas Pires 2020, Chap. 5 in the present book.

  30. 30.

    On the extension of these practices during the crisis especially: Fraccaroli et al. 2018.

  31. 31.

    Amtenbrink and van Duin 2009, 468.

  32. 32.

    Claeys et al. 2014, 7.

  33. 33.

    Heidebrecht 2015, 511.

  34. 34.

    Lucas Pires 2020, Chap. 5 in the present book.

  35. 35.

    Amtenbrink and van Duin 2009, 578f.

  36. 36.

    Belke 2017, p. 8.

  37. 37.

    Fromage et al. 2019.

  38. 38.

    Lucas Pires 2020, Chap. 5 in the present book.

  39. 39.

    Lucas Pires 2020, Chap. 5 in the present book.

  40. 40.

    Fromage and Ibrido 2018.

  41. 41.

    Lucas Pires 2020, Chap. 5 in the present book.

  42. 42.

    This intention was voiced by then-ECB President Mario Draghi in 2012. Draghi 2012.

  43. 43.

    Further on this concept: Lastra 1992 and Petit 2019.

  44. 44.

    Lucas Pires 2020, Chap. 5 in the present book.

  45. 45.

    Kreilinger 2013, 3. Further on the absence of accountability vis-à-vis the two Councils: Monjal 2016 and Roland 2016.

  46. 46.

    Lucas Pires 2020, Chap. 2 in the present book.

  47. 47.

    Fromage 2018.

  48. 48.

    See on these proposals, inter alia Curtin and Fasone 2017.

  49. 49.

    European Commission, Policy package on ‘Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union’, https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/economy-finance/completing-europes-economic-and-monetary-union-policy-package_en.

  50. 50.

    Lucas Pires 2020, Chap. 5 in the present book.

  51. 51.

    This intervened by means of the introduction of the European Semester for instance.

  52. 52.

    Inter alia Griglio and Lupo 2018.

  53. 53.

    Lucas Pires 2020, Chap. 2 in the present book.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Law, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands

    Diane Fromage

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  1. Diane Fromage
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Correspondence to Diane Fromage .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Law, Católica Law School, Lisbon, Portugal

    Martinho Lucas Pires

  2. Nova Law School, Faculty of Law, Nova University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal

    Francisco Pereira Coutinho

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Fromage, D. (2020). Francisco Lucas Pires’ Views on the Economic and Monetary Union and the Single Currency: An Assessment Twenty Years Later. In: Lucas Pires, M., Pereira Coutinho, F. (eds) What Market, What Society, What Union?. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-371-9_9

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