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‘… destroy all sense of dependence’: On the Selection and Independence of the Judiciary in Norway

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European Yearbook of Constitutional Law 2019

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of Constitutional Law ((EYCL,volume 1))

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Abstract

Notwithstanding its bicentennial system of judicial review, the constitutional system of Norway does not seem to justify a shift from a triangular to a bipolar perspective. In the single-tiered judicial system, the courts have competence in any legal matter, including administrative and constitutional law. Some lacunae in the constitutional protection have not given rise to serious concerns about its independence. However, judicial appointments by the executive give rise to some particular questions. The author argues that appointment completely isolated from the political branches of government, as sometimes advocated, undermines the legitimacy of judges with a permanent status to undertake constitutional and other norm-setting functions.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Editor’s guidelines. As current literature tends to use the word ‘constitutionalism’ in different ways that are not always made apparent, it will not be further called upon in this chapter.

  2. 2.

    For a prominent example, see Koopmans 2003, pp 248–251.

  3. 3.

    See for instance Trondal 2012.

  4. 4.

    Van der Schyff 2010, p 5.

  5. 5.

    See for instance Ortiz-Spinosa and Roser 2017 and OECD 2017, Fig. 3.14.

  6. 6.

    The expression, forged by the playwright Henrik Ibsen during the nation-building years of the late 1800s, has been contested by historians.

  7. 7.

    Cf. Langeland 2005.

  8. 8.

    Cf. Christensen et al. 2015.

  9. 9.

    Among several hundred constitutions adopted during the last years of the 18th and the first years of the 19th centuries, only few actually succeeded in constituting a new state and/or a new political regime.

  10. 10.

    On the symbolic functions of constitutions, see Smith 2012c, pp 767–795.

  11. 11.

    For a comparative look at the doctrine of precedent in Norway, see Eng 2000.

  12. 12.

    Supreme Court of Norway 2017.

  13. 13.

    In addition to the provisions on the National Court, Articles 55 and 64 of the Constitution, which confer the resolution of disputes over parliamentary elections to Parliament, provide examples.

  14. 14.

    Cf. Langeland 2005 and Sandmo 2005.

  15. 15.

    Articles 21 and 22(2) of the Constitution.

  16. 16.

    The Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway 2018, https://lovdata.no/dokument/NLE/lov/1814-05-17/ (unofficial translation). Accessed 1 March 2019.

  17. 17.

    Of course, the statement about the absence of ‘serious threats’ does not exclude that a number of other concerns merit discussion. See further in the anthology published in Norwegian at the occasion of the centennial of the Norwegian Association of Judges (Engstad et al. 2012), including Smith 2012a (on the use of short-term appointments for filling vacancies, including the use of retired judges in short-term positions within the collegial formations of the courts of appeal).

  18. 18.

    Engstad et al. 2014.

  19. 19.

    The Supervisory Committee for Judges 2016.

  20. 20.

    Since the very beginning, the generally framed non-retroactivity clause in Article 97 has constantly been the constitutional provision attracting the highest number of court cases.

  21. 21.

    On the emergence of the Constitution of Norway as positive law, see Smith 1999.

  22. 22.

    On the emergence of judicial review of legislation in Norway, see namely Holmøyvik 2007; Kierulf 2018; Langeland 2005 and Smith 1993.

  23. 23.

    Slagstad 1995 and Langeland 2005.

  24. 24.

    Cf. Langeland 2005, pp 369 ff.

  25. 25.

    UfL 1866, p 165 (Wedel Jarlsberg) on a question of non-retroactivity.

  26. 26.

    It is no surprise that Lasson’s core reasoning leans heavily on a kind of hierarchical argument close to those called upon by US Chief justice Marshall in the famous Marbury v Madison case (1802).

  27. 27.

    Supreme Court of Norway, ‘den store konsesjonssak’, 19 October 1917, Rt. 1918, p 1.

  28. 28.

    Supreme Court of Norway, ‘Kløfta’, 27 January 1976, Rt. 1976, p 1.

  29. 29.

    Supreme Court of Norway, ‘tomtefeste III’, 21 September 2007, Rt. 2007, p 1308. On the recent history of the Supreme Court of Norway, see Sunde 2005.

  30. 30.

    Supreme Court of Norway, ‘rederiskatt’, 12 February 2010, Rt. 2010, p 143.

  31. 31.

    Supreme Court of Norway, ‘Opplysningsvesenets fond’, 12 May 2010, Rt. 2010, p 535.

  32. 32.

    Supreme Court of Norway, ‘krigsforbrytelse’, 3 December 2010, Rt. 2010, p 1445. On the 2010 cases, see Smith 2011, pp 180–190 and Smith 2012b, pp 577–578.

  33. 33.

    For a telling example, see Supreme Court of Norway, ‘Maria’, 29 January 2015, Rt. 2015, p 93 on the legality of expulsing a Nigerian woman whose small daughter had obtained Norwegian citizenship.

  34. 34.

    Supreme Court of Norway 2018.

  35. 35.

    Bårdsen 2017.

  36. 36.

    See further Smith 2017.

  37. 37.

    Supreme Court of Norway, 24 November 2014, Rt. 2014, p 1105.

  38. 38.

    See further Kinander 2016.

  39. 39.

    A governmental commission appointed in 2017 is currently discussing whether the administration of the judiciary should turn to an even stronger version of encapsulation from the political branches of government; see also www.domstolkommisjonen.no. Accessed 1 March 2019.

  40. 40.

    Madison 1961.

  41. 41.

    The Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway 2018, https://lovdata.no/dokument/NLE/lov/1814-05-17/ (unofficial translation). Accessed 1 March 2019.

  42. 42.

    For a political science perspective, see Grendstad et al. 2015.

  43. 43.

    See for instance Bårdsen 2015, commented upon by Smith 2017.

  44. 44.

    See for instance Stone Sweet 2012.

  45. 45.

    Council of Europe 2010.

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Smith, E. (2020). ‘… destroy all sense of dependence’: On the Selection and Independence of the Judiciary in Norway. In: Hirsch Ballin, E., van der Schyff, G., Stremler, M. (eds) European Yearbook of Constitutional Law 2019. European Yearbook of Constitutional Law, vol 1. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-359-7_6

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