The Independence of the Belgian Constitutional Court

Maes, Evelyne

doi:10.1007/978-94-6265-359-7_2

Evelyne Maes⁸

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of Constitutional Law ((EYCL,volume 1))

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Abstract

The independence of a constitutional court depends on the independence of the institution itself and of its members. This chapter argues that the Belgian Constitutional Court is a strong, independent institution. Its existence, competences and composition are entrenched in strong legislation: the Belgian Constitution and the Special Act on the Constitutional Court. The Belgian Constitutional Court also enjoys normative and operational autonomy. The financial autonomy of the Constitutional Court is however not fully guaranteed in practice, for two reasons. Firstly, the government forces the Constitutional Court to cut down on its expenditures, regardless of the consequences on its functioning. Secondly, the House of Representatives wants to have more control on the budget and the expenditures of the Constitutional Court than the Special Act on the Constitutional Court allows for at the moment. It is argued that more control by the House of Representatives would endanger the independence of the Constitutional Court and the principle of the separation of powers. It is furthermore argued that the independence of the constitutional judges is also quite well safeguarded. Nevertheless, the appointment procedure could be ameliorated by the obligation for Parliament to organize a public hearing before confirming the nomination of a candidate-judge. This would contribute to the legitimacy and thus independence of the Constitutional Court. Finally, it is argued that the accountability of the Constitutional Court could be reinforced if the Constitutional Court would use a more deliberative argumentation style and would allow separate opinions.

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Notes

1.
The US Supreme Court is not a constitutional court in the European sense of a constitutional court. It is a Supreme Court, which reviews the judgements of lower cases. In practice, the US Supreme Court considers its jurisdiction over constitutional issues as its main mission and scrutinises mainly legal norms and their implementation to the US Constitution. Bishop et al. 2006, p 26 and Shapiro 2013, p 64.
2.
The Congress has this competence on the ground of Article III, Section 2, para 2, fine US Constitution: ‘In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.’
3.
SC 12 April 1869, Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1869). The Supreme Court had the possibility to decide the case before the entering into force of the new Act. The majority of the Supreme Court Justices did not want to do that. Choper 1974, p 852 and Hall 1999, p 180.
4.
The Hungarian Constitutional Court is now only competent to scrutinise legislation for violations of the right to life and human dignity, the protection of privacy, the freedom of thought, of conscience and religion and the rights regarding Hungarian citizenship.
5.
Kovács 2013, pp 3–4.
6.
Venice Commission Opinion 720/2013, p 20.
7.
European Commission, ‘Hungary and the Rule of Law - Statement of the European Commission in the Plenary Debate of the European Parliament’, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-324_en.htm Accessed 8 March 2019.
8.
https://verfassungsblog.de/evade-constitution-case-hungarian-constitutional-courts-decision-judicial-retirement-age-part-ii/ Accessed 8 March 2019.
9.
European Commission 20 December 2017, COM(2017) 835 final, 2017/0360 (APP).
10.
Jacquelot 2009, p 5 and Zähle 2011, pp 174–175.
11.
Cf. Coke, 12 Co. Rep. 64–65 or 77 Eng. Rep. 1342–1343 (Prohibitions del Roy). See also Cartier 2011, p 34.
12.
ECtHR, DMD Group v. Slovakia, 5 October 2010, application no. 19334/03, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2010:1005JUD001933403, para 58; ECtHR, Jorgic v. Germany, 12 July 2007, application no. 74613/01, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2007:0712JUD007461301, para 64; ECtHR, Lavents v. Latvia, 28 November 2002, application no. 58442/00, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2002:1128JUD005844200, para 81.
13.
See for example ECtHR, Süzer and Eksen Holding v. Turkey, 23 January 2013, application no. 6334/05, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2012:1023JUD000633405, para 75 and ECtHR, Brumarescu v. Romania, 28 October 1999, application no. 28342/95, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1999:1028JUD002834295, para 61.
14.
ECJ, Wilson, 19 September 2006, case C-506/04, EU:C:2006:587, para 51, and, ECJ, Margarit Panicello, 16 February 2017, case C-503/15, EU:C:2017:126, para 37.
15.
ECJ, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas, 27 February 2018, case C-64/16, EU:C:2018:117, para 43.
16.
Ibid., paras 44–45.
17.
Alen and Muylle 2011, p 486.
18.
Delpérée and Rasson-Roland 1990, pp 21–23; Delva 1991, p 78 and Velaers 1990, p 97.
19.
The competence of the Constitutional Court can be enlarged by a Special Act.
20.
In footnote this Act will be abbreviated by Special Act CC.
21.
Article 195 of the Constitution.
22.
Article 43 of the Constitution.
23.
Article 4, 3rd paragraph of the Constitution.
24.
Artikel 123, para 2 Special Act CC.
25.
See supra, the examples of the US Supreme Court (court packing plan and changing the competence of the US Supreme Court).
26.
At this moment, the age for retirement is 70 years. Article 4 of the Act 6th January 1989 ‘betreffende de wedden en pensioenen van de rechters, de referendarissen en de griffiers van het Grondwettelijk Hof’.
27.
See also Thomas 2010, p 88.
28.
Thomas 2010, p 97.
29.
Thomas 2010, p 97.
30.
See for example Parl. doc Senate 2002–03, n° 2–897/6, 169ff. See also Debry 2010, p 65 (footnote 100).
31.
CC 28 March 2002, n° 62/2002; 19 January 2000, n° 1/2000 and 26 May 1999, n° 55/99 (three preliminary rulings on the constitutionality of Article 26 Special Act CC).
32.
Article 122 Special Act CC.
33.
Favoreu et al. 2012, p 258; Thomas 2010, p 94 and Zurn 2007, p 278.
34.
Article 42 Special Act CC. Bossuyt et al. 2011, p 6.
35.
Arcticles 42 and 43 Special Act CC.
36.
See Parl.doc Senate 2002–03, n° 2–897/6, 175.
37.
Alen and Muylle 2011, p 487; Henneuse and Rosoux 2006, p 10 and Zurn 2007, p 277.
38.
Di Manno 1994, pp 53 and 60; Thomas 2010, p 89 and ‘Rapport national français - Séparation des pouvoirs et indépendance des cours constitutionnelles et instances équivalentes’, available at https://www.venice.coe.int/WCCJ/Rio/Papers/FRA_Conseil_constitutionnel_f.pdf Accessed 8 March 2019, at 4.
39.
Alen and Muylle 2011, p 487.
40.
See also Debry 2010, p 66.
41.
On 24 March 2000 the parliamentary Commission for accountability decided that the Court of Audit will control the execution of the budget and the accounts and will report to the Commission. Parl.doc Chamber 1999–2000, n° 50–693/1, 5. The Belgian Constitutional Court agreed to this in a Protocol of 20 June 2002, signed by the Constitutional Court and the Chamber of Representatives. See Debry 2010, p 57.
42.
Parl.doc Chamber 1999–2000, ‘Arbitragehof – begroting van het begrotingsjaar 2000 – aanpassing van de dotatie van het begrotingsjaar 2000’, n° 50–693/1, 4–5.
43.
Parl.doc Chamber 2003–04, n° 51–552/1, 15.
44.
Parl.doc Chamber 2000–2001, n° 50–987/1, and Parl.doc Chamber 2008–2009, n° 52–1937/1.
45.
Parl.doc Chamber 2008–2009, n° 50–1936/2, 3.
46.
Parl.doc Chamber 2008–2009, n° 52–1937/1.
47.
Parl.doc Chamber 2008–2009, n° 52–1937/4 and n° 52–1937/5.
48.
Parl. doc Chamber 1999–2000, n° 50–693/1, 10.
49.
In 2003, the Constitutional Court received an extra fund because of the enlargement of its competences. In 2000, it received an extra of 7,800,000 frank (cc. 194,352 euro) to finance the XII^th Conference of European constitutional courts in Brussels in May 2002. Parl.doc Chamber 1999–2000, n° 50–693/1, 3.
50.
Parl.doc Chamber 2012–2013, n° 53–2521/8, 5 and Parl.doc Chamber 2012–2013, n° 53–2578/1, 14. To safeguard its autonomy the Constitutional Court prefers to have a reserve that allows the proper functioning for six months. This reserve should be five million euro. Parl.doc Chamber 2012–2013, n° 53–2578/1, 13. Henneuse and Rosoux 2006, p 11.
51.
Parl.doc Chamber 2014–2015, n° 54–68/1, 10.
52.
Parl.doc Chamber 2008–2009, n° 52–1636/1, 18–19.
53.
Parl.doc Chamber 2014–2015, n° 54–68/1, 11–12.
54.
Parl.doc Chamber 2015–2016, n° 54–1497/1, 8–11.
55.
The dignity of the appointment procedure of the US Supreme Court Justices is threatened by the high media attention and the private questions during the auditions. Davis 2005, p 23.
56.
Venice Commission, Report on the composition of constitutional courts, CDL-JU (97) 34 rev2, 6.
57.
Szymczak 2006, p 426.
58.
Venice Commission, Report on the composition of constitutional courts, CDL-JU (97) 34 rev2, 4–6. See also Rousseau 1998, p 49.
59.
Until 1993, only the Senate nominated candidate judges. The language groups in the Senate reflected the communities in Belgium. That way the balance between the communities was safeguarded. See old Article 32 Special Act CC and Parl. Doc Senate 1981–82, n° 246/2, 140. This was changed by the Special Act of 16 July 1993, without having regard to the involvement of the communities. See Parl.doc Senate 1992–93, n° 558/1, 62–63. See Courtoy 2000, p 539; Delpérée and Rasson-Roland 1990, 29 and Delpérée 1988, p 104.
60.
Article 32 Special Act CC. See also Rasson-Roland 2004, p 26.
61.
Verdussen 2013, 69 and Rasson-Roland 2004, p 26.
62.
Courtoy 2000, p 25. The so-called anti-democratic party Vlaams Blok was not entitled to nominate a judge.
63.
Rasson-Roland 2004, p 25 and Courtoy 2000, p 540.
64.
Verdussen 2012, p 150.
65.
There is one example where the Parliament did not merely vote for the two candidate-judges that were nominated by the entitled party. In 2007, a candidate-judge, Mia De Schamphelaere, did not receive the two-third majority. This was remarkable, as the other candidate-judge, Trees Merckx-Van Goey, received firstly the two-third majority. Therefore, the King would appoint Merckx-Van Goey as constitutional judge. According to the media, the other political parties wanted to give a sign that a candidate-judge renowned for having conservative ideas on the legislation regarding abortion and euthanasia, would never be appointed as a constitutional judge. See Hand. Senate 2007–08, 9 October 2007, 18 and ‘“Majeur politiek incident” in Senaat’, De Standaard, 11 October 2007 and ‘Cinema II’, De Morgen, 11 October 2007.
66.
Rasson-Roland 2004, 25.
67.
ECtHR, Crociani v. Italy, 18 December 1980, application no. 8603/79 etc., ECLI:CE:ECHR:1980:1218DEC000860379.
68.
ECtHR, Ruiz-Mateos v. Spain, 6 November 1990, application no. 12952/87, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1993:0623JUD001295287.
69.
ECtHR, Salaman v. United Kingdom, 15 June 2000, application no. 43505/98, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2000:0615DEC004350598.
70.
For election by parliament of extra judges in the Italian Constitutional Court, see ECtHR, Crociani v. Italy, 18 December 1980, application no. 8603/79 etc., ECLI:CE:ECHR:1980:1218DEC000860379. For other judges, see ECtHR, Ninn-Hansen v. Denmark, 18 May 1999, application no. 28972/95, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1999:0518DEC002897295; ECtHR, Filippini v. San-Marino, 26 August 2003, application no. 10526/02, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2003:0826DEC001052602 (appointment by the legislator) and ECtHR, Zolotas v. Greece, 2 June 2005, application no. 38240/02, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2005:0602JUD003824002, para 24 and 26 and ECtHR, Campbell and Fell v. United Kingdom, 28 June 1984, application no. 7819/77, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1984:0628JUD000781977, para 79 (appointment by the government). See also Szymczak 2006, p 428.
71.
Szymczak 2006, p 427.
72.
ECtHR, Zolotas v. Greece, 2 June 2005, application no. 38240/02, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2005:0602JUD003824002, para 24 and 26 and ECtHR, Campbell and Fell v. United Kingdom, 28 June 1984, application no. 7819/77, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1984:0628JUD000781977, para 79.
73.
See also Parl.doc. Senate 1981–82, n° 246/2, 155. Pro, Verdussen 2004, p 53. Contra, Robert and Rousseau 1998, 1.
74.
Kelsen 1942, p 188.
75.
Benda et al. 2012, 70 (para 5, n° 139).
76.
Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities, Article 1.
77.
Ibid., Article 47.
78.
Ibid., Article 47.
79.
As happens in South-Africa. The President of South-Africa appoints the judges on advice of the Judicial Service Commission: the JSC nominates one candidate-judge for the judiciary, so the President does not enjoy a discretionary power. For the appointment of constitutional judges, the JSC nominates several candidates, so the President can choose one candidate. Murray 1999, p 865.
80.
A March held to contest the political and juridical situation in Belgium after the Dutroux affair. One of the criticisms was that the appointment of judges of the judiciary was too political and therefore did not guarantee quality and independence. The government promised to reform the judiciary to make it more independent and politically neutral.
81.
Hand. Senate 1996–97, 20 December 1996, 2186.
82.
Parl. doc Senate 1996–97, n° 1–491/1, 20.
83.
The ‘Reglement’ of the Senate does not regulate these hearings. See Parl.doc Senate 1996–97, n° 1–491/1, 9.
84.
The Constitutional Courts is composed of twelve judges: six of them are so-called ‘judges-lawyers’: professors, judges or law clerks at the highest Courts (Cour de Cassation, Conseil d’Etat or Constitutional Court). Six of them are the so-called ‘judges-politicians’: they are appointed thanks to their political expertise (a parliamentary mandate of minimum five years).
85.
Hand. Senate 2017–2018, 13 July 2018, Hand. Senate 2013–14, 19 December 2013, 29; Hand. Senate 2000–01, 7 December 2000, 23 and Hand. Senate 1996–97, 20 December 1996, 2186. In this hearing, candidate-judges would be tested on their knowledge of the other official languages and their neutrality regarding the Belgian language questions. Courtoy 2000, p 540.
86.
See Hand. Senate 2007–08, 9 October 2007, 18; Hand. Chamber, 2009–2010, 11 March 2010, 34ff; Hand. Chamber 2003–04, 4 March 2004; Hand. Chamber 2000–2001, 15 February 2001, 34 and 40 and Hand. Chamber 1999–2000, 10 November 1999, 14.
87.
Verdussen 2012, p 150 and Rasson-Roland 2004, pp 26–27.
88.
François Daout (and Pierre Vandernoot). Hand. Senate 2010–2011, 9 December 2010, 20.
89.
Kischel 2013, pp 972–973.
90.
Benda et al. 2012, p 68 (para 5, n° 134) and Kischel 2013, pp 974–975.
91.
Benda et al. 2012, 68 (para 5, n° 134).
92.
Carcassonne 2008, p 5. See for the United Kingdom, Clark 2010, pp 466 and 477.
93.
For guidelines to candidate-justices how to answer questions, see Alleman and Mazzone 2010, pp 1378–1381. For the kind of questions that should or should not be asked, see Kischel 2013, p 973.
94.
Verdussen 2012, p 150.
95.
Kischel 2013, pp 977–978.
96.
Clark 2010, p 467.
97.
Venice Commission, Report on the composition of constitutional courts, CDL-JU (97) 34 rev2, p 14.
98.
Ibid., pp 14–15. See also Benda et al. 2012, p 62 (para 5, n° 119); Robert and Rousseau 1998, p 1753; Rousseau 1998, p 58 and Umbach et al. 2005, p 198 (para 4, n° 8).
99.
Article 4, para 1 BVerfGG. See BVerfG 3 December 1975, BVerfGE 40, 356. See Benda et al. 2012, pp 62–63 (para 5, n° 120).
100.
Article 56 French Constitution and Article 12 Organic act Conseil constitutionnel. This is criticized by Fromont 2007; p 52. Nine years is not too short, according to former judge Robert in Robert and Rousseau 1998, p 1753 and is ideal according to Drago 2003, p 76.
101.
Article 4 of the Act of 6 January 1989 ‘betreffende de wedden en pensioenen van de rechters, de referendarissen en de griffiers van het Grondwettelijk Hof’, BS 7 January 1989, err. BS 1 February 1989.
102.
The proposal to limit the mandate to fifteen years and non-renewable was rejected by a large majority of votes. See Parl.doc Senate 1981–82, n° 246/2, 156–157, such as a proposal to have a renewable mandate of six years, see Parl. doc Senate 1981–82, n° 246/2. See also Courtoy 2000, p 539.
103.
See also Benda et al. 2012, p 63 (para 5, n° 121) and de Visser 2014, p 219.
104.
See for example ECtHR, Campbell and Fell v. United Kingdom, 28 June 1984, application no. 7819/77, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1984:0628JUD000781977, para 80.
105.
Fuld 1962, p 927; Moorhead 1952, p 822 and Voss 1992, p 653.
106.
Feyen 2012, p 274.
107.
Sohier 1986, p 767 and Zweigert 1968, D. 28.
108.
Prignon 2011, p 115; Douglas 1948, pp 105–106; Mastor 2001, p 230; Zweigert 1968, D. 30 and D. 37.
109.
Cass. 13 March 2012, P.11.1750.N/8. See Martens 2013, pp 806–807.
110.
Parl.doc Chamber 2008–09, n° 52–1912/1; Parl.St. Senate 1981–82, n° 246/2, 195 and 202; Parl St. Chamber 1980–81, 704/1, 53; Parl.doc Chamber 1982–83, n° 647/5, 15. See also Velaers 1990, pp 521–522.
111.
Hand. Senate 1982–83, 5 May 1983, n° 57, 1917.
112.
Parl.St. Senate 1981–82, n° 246/2, 196 and 202; Hand. Chamber 1982–83, 2 June 1983, n° 81–82, 2416; Hand. Senate 1982–83, 27 April 1983, n° 52, 1802.
113.
Hand. Chamber 1982–83, 2 June 1983, n° 81–82, 2416.
114.
Hand. Senate 1982–83, 27 April 1983, n° 52, 1802.
115.
Hand. Chamber 1982–83, 2 June 1983, n° 81–82, 2416; Hand. Senate 1982–83, 27 April 1983, n° 52, 1802.
116.
Hand. Senate 1982–83, 27 April 1983, n° 52, 1802.
117.
Parl.St. Senate 1981–82, n° 246/2, 195 and 202.
118.
Parl.St. Senate 1981–82, n° 246/2, 202.
119.
Parl.St. Senate 1981–82, n° 246/2, 197.
120.
Parl.St. Senate 1981–82, n° 246/2, 196ff, 202ff and 223; Hand. Senate 1982–83, 5 May 1983, n° 57, 1917 and 26 April 1983, 1782.
121.
Edward 1995, p 539–558; Weiler 2001, pp 8–9; Wouters 2001, p 346 and Korah 1997, pp 98–103.
122.
Passaglia 2007, p 881.
123.
Verdussen 2004, p 67.
124.
Verdussen 2004, pp 66–67.

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Acknowledgement

I would specifically like to thank Mia Lozie for the great help regarding the translation of my contribution.

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Authors and Affiliations

Saint-Louis University, Brussels, Belgium
Evelyne Maes

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Evelyne Maes
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Correspondence to Evelyne Maes .

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Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Ernst Hirsch Ballin
Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Gerhard van der Schyff
Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Maarten Stremler

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Maes, E. (2020). The Independence of the Belgian Constitutional Court. In: Hirsch Ballin, E., van der Schyff, G., Stremler, M. (eds) European Yearbook of Constitutional Law 2019. European Yearbook of Constitutional Law, vol 1. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-359-7_2

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-359-7_2
Published: 03 December 2019
Publisher Name: T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague
Print ISBN: 978-94-6265-358-0
Online ISBN: 978-94-6265-359-7
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