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A Stress Test for Europe’s Judiciaries

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European Yearbook of Constitutional Law 2019

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of Constitutional Law ((EYCL,volume 1))

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Abstract

The rule of law, judicial independence and separation of powers are values guaranteed in constitutions of member states of the Council of Europe. Nevertheless, in recent years, a number of challenges to these accepted values have emerged in different countries all over Europe. The legal responses from European institutions against systemic rule of law threats has yet to prove effective. In this chapter we propose a national approach to protect European rule of law standards. To facilitate this process, we suggest stress-testing Europe’s judiciaries. This should be done by means of structured thought experiments in which the likely effects of adverse developments (such as the ones to be witnessed in some European countries today) should be predicted to identify and remedy weak points in the constitutional and legal framework.

This chapter builds on the ideas first discussed by the authors in Holmøyvik and Sanders 2017. The text was last revised on 7 July 2018. Subsequent developments in legislation, case law and doctrine have only been incorporated to a limited extent.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a comparative overview, see Summary Report on the responses by the CCJE member states to the questionnaire for the preparation of CCJE Opinion No. 18 (2015).

  2. 2.

    See for a list of recent Opinions of the Venice Commission on judicial reforms: https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?topic=27&year=all. Accessed 1 March 2019. See also the Joint report of the CCJE and CCPE Challenges for judicial independence and impartiality in the member states of the Council of Europe 2016; CCJE/CCPE, SG/Inf(2016)3rev; CCJE, Report on judicial independence and impartiality in the Council of Europe member states 2017 (CCJE(2017)5Prov5); see also the various Opinions of the CCJE on recent developments in Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, Turkey, and Ukraine

    https://www.coe.int/en/web/ccje/status-and-situation-of-judges-in-member-states. Accessed 1 March 2019.

  3. 3.

    See inter alia Pech and Scheppele 2017; Černič and Avbelj 2018; and Sanders and Von Danwitz 2018a.

  4. 4.

    See Follesdal 2017 for the stress test concept applied at the international level to the ECtHR.

  5. 5.

    Moretti et al. 2008, p 3.

  6. 6.

    Moretti et al. 2008, p 4.

  7. 7.

    Luhmann 1983, pp 100–106.

  8. 8.

    See inter alia European Court of Human Rights, Stafford v. the United Kingdom, 28 May 2002, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2002:0528JUD004629599, para 78; Court of Justice of the European Union, De Coster, 29 November 2001, ECLI:EU:C:2001:651, para 10; Court of Justice of the European Union, El Hassani, 13 December 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:960, para 40.

  9. 9.

    Stein 2009, p 302.

  10. 10.

    CCJE Opinion 18 (2015), para 11; see for example Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, Gerichtsbezirke, 10 June 1953, BVerfGE 2, 307 and Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, Soforthilfegesetz, 9 November 1955, BVerfGE 4, 331, paras 49–50; Hillgruber 2017, Article 97, para 1.

  11. 11.

    Gardbaum 2014, p 613.

  12. 12.

    On the contents of judicial independence, see Venice Commission, (CDL-AD(2010)004, Report on the Independence of the Judicial System Part I: The Independence of Judges; Venice Commission, (CDL-AD(2016)007, Rule of Law Checklist, p 20; CCJE, Magna Charta of Judges; CCJE Opinion No 1 (2001); Kiener 2001; Jackson 2012; Di Federico 2012; Engstad et al. 2014; Gee et al. 2015.

  13. 13.

    Venice Commission, CDL-AD(2016)007 Rule of Law Checklist.

  14. 14.

    CCJE Opinions and Magna Carta. See https://www.coe.int/en/web/ccje/ccje-opinions-and-magna-carta. Accessed 1 March 2019.

  15. 15.

    See on accountability only: CCJE Opinion No. 18 (2015), paras 20–33; ENCJ Report 2013–2014.

  16. 16.

    See especially the projects of the ENCJ on Independence and accountability 2016, 2017: https://www.encj.eu/articles/71. Accessed 1 March 2019.

  17. 17.

    For an in-depth overview of recurrent issues with examples of incidents across Europe, see the CCJE and CCPE 2016 Report SG/Inf(2016)3rev Challenges for judicial independence and impartiality in the member states of the Council of Europe, part D. See also the Bureau of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) CCJE-BU(2017)11 Report on judicial independence and impartiality in the Council of Europe member States in 2017.

  18. 18.

    On veto players, see Tsebelis 2002, p 2; and Tsebelis 1995, pp 289–325.

  19. 19.

    See CCJE/CCPE SG/Inf(2016)3rev, paras 176–178; Venice Commission CDL-AD(2016)001.

  20. 20.

    See the Declaration by the Venice Commission on undue interference in the work of Constitutional Courts in its member States, adopted by the plenary on 16 March 2016, http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/events/?id=2193. Accessed 1 March 2019.

  21. 21.

    Bureau of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) CCJE-BU(2017)11 Report on judicial independence and impartiality in the Council of Europe member States in 2017, paras 56–61.

  22. 22.

    In Slovakia, seats on the Constitutional Court were vacant for three years (2014–2017) due to the president refusing to appoint candidates elected by parliament. On the background and current political controversies concerning judicial appointments in Slovakia, see Ovádek 2018.

  23. 23.

    See Johnson and Radu 2013, p 35.

  24. 24.

    CCJE, Opinion n° 10 (2007); Venice Commission, CDL-AD(2010)004, paras 28–32; ENCJ, Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010–2011 (2011).

  25. 25.

    See Kosar 2018.

  26. 26.

    CCJE, Opinion n° 10 (2007), paras 15–20.

  27. 27.

    See the Venice Commission CDL-AD(2017)031 Poland - Opinion on the Draft Act amending the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary; on the Draft Act amending the Act on the Supreme Court, proposed by the President of Poland, and on the Act on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts, paras 19–27. There are a number of cases pending at the CJEU concerning this question: C-487/19; C 824/18; C-625/18; C-624/18; C-585/18.

  28. 28.

    See the Venice Commission CDL-AD(2017)005 Turkey - Opinion on the amendments to the Constitution adopted by the Grand National Assembly on 21 January 2017 and to be submitted to a National Referendum on 16 April 2017, paras 114–119; see also Sanders and Von Danwitz 2018a.

  29. 29.

    See the Venice Commission CDL-AD(2012)020 Opinion on the Cardinal Acts on the Judiciary that were amended following the adoption of Opinion CDL-AD(2012)001 on Hungary paras 38–45 and 88.

  30. 30.

    CCJE/CCPE SG/Inf(2016)3rev, para 166.

  31. 31.

    Venice Commission CDL-AD(2017)031-e, paras 44–52. The CJEU was addressed in relation to this issue: see European Court of Justice, Commission v. Poland, order of 17 December 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1021 by which the positions of the judges of the Supreme Court including the president’s were secured. See also the Opinion of AG Tanchev of 11 April 2019 and the judgement of 20 June 2019. See for the pending case C-192/18 the Opinion of AG Tanchev of 20 June 2019.

  32. 32.

    A recent example is the introduction of retirement schemes for judges in Armenia after the 2018 political revolution, see Venice Commission CDL-AD 2019(030), Armenia, Joint opinion on the amendment to the judicial code and some other laws.

  33. 33.

    CCJE/CCPE SG/Inf(2016)3rev, paras 182–183.

  34. 34.

    See with further references CCJE/CCPE SG/Inf(2016)3rev, paras 99–113.

  35. 35.

    See European Court of Human Rights, Kinský v. The Czech Republic, 9 February 2012, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2012:0209JUD004285606, paras 95–98.

  36. 36.

    See European Court of Human Rights, Baka v. Hungary, 23 June 2016, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:0623JUD002026112.

  37. 37.

    See the Venice Commission CDL-AD(2017)031 Poland - Opinion on the Draft Act amending the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary; on the Draft Act amending the Act on the Supreme Court, proposed by the President of Poland, and on the Act on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts, paras 100–108.

  38. 38.

    See Sanders and Von Danwitz 2017b and 2018b.

  39. 39.

    See Johnson and Radu 2013, p 38.

  40. 40.

    See Sanders and Von Danwitz 2017b and 2018a.

  41. 41.

    See the CCJE/CCPE SG/Inf(2016)3rev, paras 206–212.

  42. 42.

    See the Venice Commission CDL-AD(2016)026-e, para 75.

  43. 43.

    See the Venice Commission CDL-AD(2016)026 Poland - Opinion on the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal, para 123, and Commission Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374 of 21 July 2016 regarding the rule of law in Poland, para 41.

  44. 44.

    See the Venice Commission CDL-AD(2016)017 Georgia - Opinion on the Amendments to the Organic Law on the Constitutional Court and to the Law on Constitutional Legal Proceedings.

  45. 45.

    See CCJE/CCPE SG/Inf(2016)3rev, paras 118–152. See for this point also: Court of Justice of the European Union, judgements of 27 May 2019 (OG, - C 508/18 - and PI C-82/19, ECLI:EU:C:2019:456) and (PF - C 509/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:457).

  46. 46.

    See CCPE Opinion No. 9 (2014) ‘Rome Charter’.

  47. 47.

    Venice Commission CDL-AD(2017)028.

  48. 48.

    See the press release with a link to further information, especially the Reasoned proposal under Article 7(1) for a Council decision http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5367_en.htm. Accessed 1 March 2019.

  49. 49.

    See the press release: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20180906IPR12104/rule-of-law-in-hungary-parliament-calls-on-the-eu-to-act. Accessed 12 October 2019.

  50. 50.

    See Von Bogdandy et al. 2012, pp 496–507; Greer and Williams 2009, p 474.

  51. 51.

    Court of Justice of the European Union, Commission v. Poland, action brought on 21 December 2017 (case pending), case C-715/17

  52. 52.

    See for a detailed analysis: COM(2017) 835 final Reasoned Proposal in Accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on the European Union Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland.

  53. 53.

    See Scheppele 2016; see also Pech and Scheppele 2017, pp 38–44.

  54. 54.

    See Court of Justice of the European Union, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, 27 February 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117, paras 41–43; see also Closa et al. 2014/2015, p 9 ff, and Sanders and Von Danwitz 2018a.

  55. 55.

    See Court of Justice of the European Union, Commission v. Poland, preliminary order of 17 December 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1021, by which the positions of the judges of the Supreme Court including the president’s were secured. See the judgement in the same case of 20 June 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531. See for another important decision concerning the rule of law: Court of Justice of the European Union judgement, OG -C 508/18 and PF - C 509/18, 27 May 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:456.

  56. 56.

    Court of Justice of the European Union, LM, 25 July 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:586. See also: Wendel 2019.

  57. 57.

    See Kochenov 2016.

  58. 58.

    For a pessimistic view, see Kochenov 2015.

  59. 59.

    The Council of Europe has denied Russia voting rights, which, however, together with the payment cuts from Turkey, might lead to a financial crisis of the institution. See http://www.dw.com/en/russia-withholds-payments-to-the-council-of-europe/a-42792673. Accessed 1 March 2019.

  60. 60.

    See Elster 1995, p 394.

  61. 61.

    See Article 46(1) of the ECHR as interpreted in European Court of Human Rights, Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, 13 July 2000, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2000:0713JUD003922198. On the interrelation between national constitutions and European law, see Grimm 2016, pp 271–294.

  62. 62.

    For an overview of the Venice Commission’s opinions concerning the judiciary until 2015, see CDL-PI(2015)001 Compilation of Venice Commission Opinions and Reports Concerning Courts and Judges.

  63. 63.

    On the working methods of the Venice Commission, see Buquicchio and Granata-Menghini 2013, p 244.

  64. 64.

    The Venice Commission’s reference documents are available on the Commission’s website: http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/default.aspx?p=01_main_reference_documents&lang=EN. Accessed 1 March 2019.

  65. 65.

    See the Venice Commission, CDL-AD(2010)004 Report on the Independence of the Judicial System Part 1: The Independence of Judges. See also CDL-AD(2016)007 Rule of Law Checklist.

  66. 66.

    See in particular CCJE Opinion no. 1 (2001) on standards concerning the independence of the judiciary and the irremovability of judges, CCJE Opinion no. 17 (2014) on the evaluation of judges’ work, the quality of justice and respect for judicial independence and CCJE Opinion no. 18 (2015) on the position of the judiciary and its relation with the other powers of state in a modern democracy.

  67. 67.

    This point has been emphasized by the ECtHR in inter alia European Court of Human Rights, Kleyn and Others v. the Netherlands, 6 May 2003, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2003:0506JUD003934398 para 193. The Venice Commission too has repeatedly stressed the states’ margin of appreciation when deciding on which measures to take in order to comply with European standards, see Buqicchio and Granata-Menghini 2013, pp 244–246 and Craig 2017, pp 78–79.

  68. 68.

    See the Venice Commission CDL-AD(2010)004 Report on the Independence of the Judicial System Part 1: The Independence of Judges, para 82(2) and paras 28–32.

  69. 69.

    There is a discussion whether Judicial Councils are really effective in achieving their goals of securing judicial independence and impartiality, see Bobek and Kosar 2015.

  70. 70.

    This is not to say, however, that nothing could be improved on the German system. German Judges Associations have demanded the introduction of a Judicial Council for decades. See Sanders and Von Danwitz 2018a.

  71. 71.

    For a discussion on the ambiguity in the concept of judicial independence, see Macdonald and Kong 2012, pp 832–833.

  72. 72.

    This approach was also taken in the joint CCJE/CCPE Report SG/Inf(2016)3rev; see also Shetreet 2011, p 17.

  73. 73.

    See the reports of the Venice Commission CDL-AD(2016)001-e Opinion on amendments to the Act of 25 June 2015 on the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland, para 88, and CDL-AD(2016)026-e Poland - Opinion on the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal, para 123. See also the Venice Commission CDL-AD(2016)017 Georgia - Opinion on the Amendments to the Organic Law on the Constitutional Court and to the Law on Constitutional Legal Proceedings, para 64.

  74. 74.

    See Ginsburg and Melton 2014, pp 209.

  75. 75.

    On the distinction between the constitution as a machinery and a norm, see Troper 2001, pp 147–162.

  76. 76.

    See for example the suggestions made in the Council of Europe Plan of Action on Strengthening Judicial Independence and Impartiality, CM(2016)36 final.

  77. 77.

    For a discussion and overview of relevant contexts for judicial independence, see Macdonald and Kong 2012, pp 846–852.

  78. 78.

    See Ginsburg and Melton 2014, pp 206–209.

  79. 79.

    In the following we draw on the discussion and summary of scholarship in Trochev and Ellett 2014, pp 67–91.

  80. 80.

    See https://www.politico.eu/article/norway-accused-of-meddling-with-judicial-independence-per-christiansen-efta/. Accessed 1 March 2019.

  81. 81.

    See CDL-AD(2016)015 Republic of Moldova – Amicus Curiae Brief for the Constitutional Court on the Right of Recourse by the State against Judges, CDL-AD(2017)002 Republic of Moldova – Amicus Curiae Brief for the Constitutional Court on the Criminal liability of judges, and CDL-AD(2016)036 Albania – Amicus Curiae Brief for the Constitutional Court on the Law on the Transitional Re-evaluation of Judges and Prosecutors (the Vetting Law).

  82. 82.

    Sieder 2004, p 111.

  83. 83.

    Sieder 2004, p 105.

  84. 84.

    See also CCJE/CCPE Report SG/Inf(2016)3rev, paras 284–288, 291–302.

  85. 85.

    See with references to the discussion: Ginsburg and Melton 2014, p 188.

  86. 86.

    Ginsburg and Melton 2014, p 205.

  87. 87.

    Ginsburg and Melton 2014, p 208.

  88. 88.

    Ginsburg and Melton 2014, pp 194, 208. See for a similar argument in respect to the Swiss judiciary: Meyer 2019.

  89. 89.

    Gärditz 2018. Gärditz suggests including more safeguards in the constitution now, which could protect the constitutional court against an attack from a new government.

  90. 90.

    See for the ‘culture of judicial independence’: CCJE/CCPE, SG/Inf(2016)3rev, para 6; Sanders and Von Danwitz 2017a. See also Shetreet 2011, who, however, sees the culture of judicial independence as a general element of political culture. See for the importance of unwritten rules for the functioning of democracies: Levitsky and Ziblat 2018.

  91. 91.

    Venice Commission, Rule of Law Checklist CDL-AD(2016)007, para 42.

  92. 92.

    See for example an interview with Professor Gärditz of Bonn University, Germany: https://verfassungsblog.de/die-meisten-dinge-die-in-polen-und-ungarn-gelaufen-sind-koennten-ohne-weiteres-hier-auch-passieren/. Accessed 1 March 2019.

  93. 93.

    See https://www.politico.eu/article/norway-accused-of-meddling-with-judicial-independence-per-christiansen-efta. Accessed 1 March 2019.

  94. 94.

    Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, 24 March 2018, 1 BvQ 18/18.

  95. 95.

    Breyer 2010, pp 3–68.

  96. 96.

    Podolski 2018b.

  97. 97.

    Podolski 2018a, b.

  98. 98.

    See Geithner 2014, p 312.

  99. 99.

    See Elkins 2010.

  100. 100.

    See Bartole 2017.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway

    Eirik Holmøyvik

  2. University of Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany

    Anne Sanders

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  1. Eirik Holmøyvik
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  2. Anne Sanders
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Correspondence to Eirik Holmøyvik .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands

    Ernst Hirsch Ballin

  2. Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands

    Gerhard van der Schyff

  3. Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands

    Maarten Stremler

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Holmøyvik, E., Sanders, A. (2020). A Stress Test for Europe’s Judiciaries. In: Hirsch Ballin, E., van der Schyff, G., Stremler, M. (eds) European Yearbook of Constitutional Law 2019. European Yearbook of Constitutional Law, vol 1. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-359-7_12

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-359-7_12

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